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In recent decades, there has been a notable and growing practice of real earnings 
management practiced through accretive share buybacks. Corporate governance is 
recognised as a significance mechanism in confirming the credibility of financial 
reporting quality. Overall, this study examines accretive share buybacks as a 
mechanism for real earnings management. The objectives of this study are to investigate 
the influence of corporate governance mechanisms: board of directors (BOD) 
effectiveness (independence, size, meetings and financial expertise), audit committee 
(AC) effectiveness (independence, size, meetings and financial expertise), audit quality 
and ownership structure (family, managerial, foreign) on accretive share buybacks. 
Considering the stock options hypothesis, this study also investigates the impact of 
employee stock options (ESOS) on accretive share buybacks. The study utilised 235 
firm-year observations of non-financial firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia that were 
involved in accretive share buybacks over the years 2010 to 2015. By using panel data, 
the findings of the main analysis indicate that AC effectiveness and family ownership 
was negatively related to accretive share buybacks, but the effectiveness of the BOD 
and audit quality was positively associated with accretive share buybacks. The findings 
also show that ESOS were positively related to the accretive share buybacks, and no 
relationship was revealed between managerial ownership and foreign ownership with 
accretive share buybacks. The unexpected result of BOD effectiveness revealed the 
negative role of concentrated ownership in the monitoring functions of the BOD. This 
study contributes to a better understanding of corporate governance practices and 
accretive share buyback activities by Malaysian listed firms. The results indicate that 
firms should improve the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms (BOD, 
AC, audit quality and ownership structure) to enhance financial reporting quality. 
Hopefully, this study will provide a reference point for relevant parties to improve the 
applicable regulations and corporate governance schemes.  
 
Keywords: Accretive share buyback, corporate governance mechanisms, ownership 









Dalam beberapa dekad kebelakangan ini, terdapat satu amalan yang ketara dan 
berkembang dalam pengurusan pendapatan sebenar yang diamalkan menerusi 
pembelian semula saham secara akresi. Tadbir urus korporat diiktiraf sebagai 
mekanisme penting dalam mengesahkan kredibiliti kualiti pelaporan kewangan. Secara 
keseluruhannya, kajian ini menyelidik pembelian semula saham sebagai mekanisme 
pengurusan pendapatan sebenar. Objektif kajian ini adalah untuk mengkaji pengaruh 
mekanisme tadbir urus korporat: keberkesanan lembaga pengarah (BOD) (kebebasan, 
saiz, mesyuarat, dan kepakaran kewangan), keberkesanan jawatankuasa audit (AC) 
(kebebasan, saiz, mesyuarat dan kepakaran kewangan) kualiti audit dan struktur 
pemilikan (keluarga, pengurusan, asing) ke atas pembelian semula saham akresi. 
Dengan mengambl kira hipotesis opsyen saham, kajian ini juga menyiasat kesan opsyen 
saham pekerja (ESOS) ke atas pembelian semula saham akresi. Kajian menggunakan 
235 pemerhatian tahunan firma bagi firma bukan kewangan yang disenaraikan di Bursa 
Malaysia yang terlibat dalam pembelian semula saham akresi pada tahun 2010 hingga 
2015. Dengan menggunakan data panel, penemuan model utama menunjukkan bahawa 
keberkesanan AC dan pemilikan keluarga mempunyai kaitan negatif terhadap 
pembelian semula saham akresi tetapi keberkesanan BOD dan kualiti audit adalah 
berkaitan secara positif dengan pembelian semula saham akresi. Penemuan ini juga 
menunjukkan bahawa ESOS mempunyai kaitan positif dengan pembelian semula 
saham akresi, dan tiada hubungan didedahkan antara pemilikan pengurus dan pemilikan 
asing dengan pembelian semula saham akresi. Hasil yang tidak dijangka dari 
keberkesanan BOD menunjukkan peranan negatif pemilikan tertumpu dalam fungsi 
kawalan BOD. Kajian ini menyumbang kepada pemahaman yang lebih baik mengenai 
amalan tadbir urus korporat dan aktiviti pembelian semula saham oleh syarikat 
Malaysia yang disenaraikan. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahawa firma perlu meningkatkan 
keberkesanan mekanisme tadbir urus korporat (BOD, AC, kualiti audit dan struktur 
pemilikan) untuk meningkatkan kualiti pelaporan kewangan. Akhir sekali, kajian ini 
berharap hasilnya memberikan titik rujukan bagi pihak-pihak yang berkaitan untuk 
memperbaiki peraturan dan skim tadbir urus korporat yang berkenaan. 
 
Kata kunci: Pembelian semula saham akresi, mekanisme tadbir urus korporat, struktur 
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1 CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.0 Overview of the Chapter  
This chapter presents the introduction of the current study. It is divided into several 
sections. Section 1.1 displays the background of the study. Section 1.1.1 discusses 
corporate governance mechanisms and real earnings management by accretive share 
buybacks. Section 1.2 presents the problem statement. The research questions are stated 
in Section 1.3. Research objectives are presented in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 displays 
the motivations of this study. Section 1.6 explains the significance and contributions of 
this study. The chapter proceeds with the scope of the study in Section 1.7. Finally, 
Section 1.8 proceeds with the organisation of the thesis. 
   
1.1 Background of the Study 
Payout policy has gained a significant attention since the mid-twentieth century. Miller 
and Modigliani (1961) provide a theoretical analysis of the relationship between firms’ 
value and corporate payout policy. Their model indicates that payout policy would not 
affect firm's value in a perfect market. However, finding a perfect market is impractical 
due to several factors including information asymmetry, agency problems, tax 
differentials between dividend and capital gains, and transaction cost (Chen, 2006; 
Washer & Casey, 2011). Share buyback programs are one of payout policy methods in 
addition to regular and special dividends payments. The most popular method used by 
firms to buy back their share is open market buyback (Dittmar, 2000; Grullon & 




In Malaysia, share buybacks activities became legally permitted in September 1997 
after the Asian financial crisis 1997. Section 67A of Companies Act of 1965 was 
amended to implement open market share buyback programs. Section 112 (2) of the 
Companies Act 2016 also allows firms to be involved in share buyback programs. The 
primary aim of permitting share buyback was to stabilise the prices of shares in the 
stock market throughout the financial crisis (Isa, Ghani, & Lee, 2011). Figure 1.1 shows 
the number of firms listed on Bursa Malaysia that were engaged in actual share buyback 
programs over the period from years 2010 to 2015. The number of firms engaging in 
share buyback programs grew during this period from 120 to 160 firms. 
 
Figure 1.1 
Number of firms and the RM Value of Actual Shares Buyback between 2010 and 2015 
Source: Firms’ annual reports, Bursa Malaysia website 
 
 
Figure 1.1 also shows the Malaysian ringgit value of share buybacks through the period 
after the global financial crisis, which occurred in 2007 and 2008. This crisis caused a 
significant increase in the number of share buyback firms and the value of share 




































Actual Share Buyback Activities
Number of Firms Engaged in Buybacks RM Value of Actual Share Buybacks
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dramatically increased in the years between 2010 and 2014 and reached the highest 
point in 2014 at approximately RM 2.2 billion. This significant magnitude of value 
Ringgits and the numbers of share buyback firms listed on Bursa Malaysia create a 
questionable issue about the motivations of managers to become involved in share 
buyback activities, suggesting that share buyback activities have significant 
complications for the earnings of firms. 
 
Previous studies have identified several hypotheses that related to the motivations of 
firms to engage in share buyback programs worldwide, namely, the signalling 
undervaluation hypothesis (e.g. Abdul Latif & Taufil Mohd, 2013; Babenko, 
Tserlukevich, & Vedrashko, 2012; Dittmar, 2000; Gan, Bian, Wu, & Cohen, 2017; 
Vermaelen, 1981), the free cash flows hypothesis (e.g. Abdul Latif & Taufil-Mohd, 
2013; Dittmar, 2000; Evans, Evans, & Gentry, 2003; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Gan et al., 
2017; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Jensen, 1986),  the dividend substitution hypothesis 
(e.g. Dittmar, 2000; Fama & French, 2001; Jiang, Kim, Lie, & Yang, 2013; Miller & 
Prondzinski, 2017), the liquidity changes hypothesis (e.g., Barclay & Smith Jr, 1988; 
Brockman & Chung, 2001; Ginglinger & Hamon, 2007; Hillert, Maug, & Obernberger, 
2012; Moore, 2017), the tax savings hypothesis (e.g., Bagwell & Shoven, 1989; Jacob 
& Jacob, 2013; Korkeamaki, Liljeblom, & Pasternack, 2010; Moser, 2009; Oswald & 
Young, 2004; Rau & Vermaelen, 2002), the take over-deterrence hypothesis (e.g. 
Bagwell, 1991; Billett & Xue, 2007; Hai & Doan, 2012) and the optimal capital 
structure hypothesis (e.g., Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013; Dittmar, 2000; Dixon, 
Palmer, Stradling, & Woodhead, 2008; Gan et al., 2017; Hovakimian, 2004; Miller & 
Prondzinski, 2017). Finally, stock options hypothesis was among these (Dittmar, 2000; 
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Fenn & Liang, 2001; Hurtt, Kreuze, & Langsam, 2008; Kahle, 2002; Lamba & 
Miranda, 2010).  
 
The above-mentioned hypotheses related to share buyback are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive and all have significant empirical support when tested in developed market 
such as the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK), which operate in a 
corporate governance system with a comparatively high level of ownership dispersion, 
managerial autonomy and fraction of compensation that is performance-based 
(Brunswick & Columbia, 1998; Jansson & Larsson-Olaison, 2010). Generally, 
managers attempt to raise share price when they become under substantial pressure.  
 
Previous studies indicate that share buyback programs mostly serve as positive 
economic signals to boost shares price (Abdul Latif, Taufil-Mohd, Wan Hussin, & Ku 
Ismail, 2014; Albaity & Said, 2016; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 
2004; Oswald & Young, 2004; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009; Pradhan & Kasilingam, 
2016). However, managers may engage in share buyback activities to send a false signal 
to investors (Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, & Wang, 2010; Hamouda & Ben Arab, 2013; Wu, 
2012a). Wu (2011) found that the efficiency of signalling by share buyback programs 
is weakened for firms with more entrenchment problems, implying that share buyback 
are less informative for firms with higher level of managerial entrenchment. Fried 
(2005) indicated that insiders use share buyback activities to indirectly trade the shares 
of firms for themselves at a low price. 
 
Share buyback activities have also started to attract the attention of scholars as a device 
for real earnings management, which firm managers use to manipulate earnings per 
5 
 
share (EPS) (Bryan & Mason, 2016; Burnett, Cripe, Martin, & McAllister, 2012; 
Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Farrell, Yu, & Zhang, 2013; Horan, 2012; Hribar, 
Jenkins, & Johnson, 2006). Share buyback is considered as an accretive share buyback 
when EPS is increased by at least one cent in comparison to the EPS without the effect 
of share buyback (Burnett et al., 2012; Hribar et al., 2006). Accretive share buybacks 
adjust EPS through modified outstanding shares that represent denominators of EPS 
equation, which is different from other real earnings management proxies that modify 
the nominator of EPS equation. Managers engage in accretive share buyback activities 
to manipulate EPS to match the forecasts of analysts (Bens et al., 2003; Bryan & Mason, 
2016; Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2014; Hribar et al., 2006). Hribar et al. (2006) 
and Myers, Myers, and Skinner (2007) provide evidence that firms employ share 
buybacks to increase EPS to avoid missing the EPS forecasts of analysts to prevent an 
EPS decline or to meet specific EPS growth targets (Bens, Nagar, Skinner, & Wong, 
2003). 
 
In Malaysia, Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) reported that more than 50% of share 
buyback programs over the period from 2001 to 2008 were accretive shares buyback, 
leading to significant change in the EPS of firms, which bought back their shares. 
Chandren and Nadarajan (2013)  found a significant and positive association between 
accretive shares buyback and the EPS estimates of analysts. Recently, Abdul Latif, 
NishamTaufil, and Kamardin (2016) found that Malaysian firms frequently bought 
back their shares to manage reported EPS. Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren, Ahmad, 
and Ali (2015) examined the role of mechanisms of corporate governance, board of 
directors (BOD) features and managerial ownership in mitigating real earnings 
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management through accretive share buybacks. They reported a significant relationship 
between corporate governance and accretive share buybacks.  
 
However, this current study contributes to prior studies by exploring the impact of more 
mechanisms of corporate governance including audit committee (AC), audit quality, 
family ownership, and foreign ownership as well as employee stock options scheme 
(ESOS) besides BOD and managerial ownership on accretive share buyback activities 
as a tool for real earnings management.  
 
Previous studies have revealed that managers engage in earnings management to meet 
the forecasts of analysts (Gunny, 2010; Skinner & Sloan, 2002), maximise stock price 
prior to security issuance (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 
1998a; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998b) and maximise managerial compensation (Cheng 
& Warfield, 2005; Healy, 1985). Furthermore, managers are involved in earnings 
management practices to avoid losses (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997; Chandren, 2016; 
Roychowdhury, 2006). 
 
Principally, managers use earnings management practices to hide the economic and 
financial information of firms, which may alleviate the quality of financial reporting 
and hence mislead current and potential investors. Thus, corporate governance 
mechanisms are essential to protect investors by aligning of the interests of shareholders 
with the interests of managers, which lead to the increased integrity of the financial 
reporting process and enhancing financial information reliability (Farrel et al., 2013; 




1.1.1 Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Accretive Share Buybacks 
Effective mechanisms of corporate governance are more likely to enhance the quality 
of financial reporting then protect the rights of investors (Hussain, Hasnan, Sanusi, & 
Mahenthiran, 2016). These mechanisms decrease the information asymmetry between 
insider and outsider shareholders, and they improve the quality of financial reporting 
(Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004). According to agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, corporate governance mechanisms have significant roles in 
monitoring and controlling the actions of a firm's management (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 
2016; Dhaliwal, Naiker, & Navissi, 2010; Du, Jian, & Lai, 2017; Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003; Hillman, Withers, & Collins, 2009). Managers may engage in earnings 
management actions to mislead investors about firms’ performance. Thus, it is 
important for firms to have effective corporate governance devices to protect the rights 
of investors by providing precise and fair information on the firm activities (Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Persakis & Iatridis, 2016; Yatim, Iskandar, & Nga, 2016).  
 
Effective corporate governance mechanisms may decrease agency conflicts in firms 
and enhance the quality of financial information (Adiguzel, 2013; Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2016; Pergola & Joseph, 2011; Song & Windram, 2004). Previous studies 
have provided empirical evidence that effective corporate governance mechanisms 
have negative relationships with earnings management practices (e.g Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2016; Epps & Ismail, 2009; Habbash, 2012; Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 
2007; Shayan-Nia, Sinnadurai, Mohd-Sanusi, & Hermawan, 2017; Soliman & Ragab, 
2014; Song & Windram, 2004). Thus, effective mechanisms of corporate governance 
are more likely to have the ability to mitigate practices of earnings management and 
then protect current and potential investors from misleading financial information. 
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The primary attention has been given to the main players of corporate governance 
including the BOD, the AC, and external auditors (Norwani et al., 2011). The BOD 
communally has responsibility for the long-term success of firms. The BOD plays a 
critical role in providing good governance and ethical practices for firms (SC, 2017). 
The key role of the BOD is to perform the supervision and monitoring of management 
actions on behalf of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 1986). In Malaysia, 
Companies Act 1965 in section 67A and the new Companies Act 2016 in section 14(2) 
states that listed firms are allowed to engage in share buyback programs.  
 
Accordingly, the BOD has the responsibility for decisions involving share buyback 
activities. Thus, an effective BOD is more likely to restrain earnings management 
actions through accretive share buybacks than an ineffective one. Prior studies report a 
vital role for the BOD in mitigating accretive share buyback as a device for real earnings 
management. Farrell et al. (2013) documented that the presence of independent 
directors on the BOD mitigates accretive share buybacks. However, Chandren et al. 
(2015) in Malaysia found a positive impact of some features of the BOD including 
independence, CEO duality and BOD size on the accretive share buyback as a proxy 
for earnings management.  
 
The AC also plays a crucial role in a governance structure of firms (Li, Mangena, & 
Pike, 2012; Madi, Ishak, & Manaf, 2014). An effective AC can bring the independent 
judgment and transparency that are required to monitor the process of financial 
reporting (SC, 2017). An AC with a suitable level of knowledge, skills, experience and 
commitment is critical for achieving its monitoring functions effectively (Bin-Ghanem 
& Ariff, 2016). Despite the significant role of the AC in the quality of financial report 
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information, previous studies have not considered its relationship with accretive share 
buyback activities. According to MCCG 2012, the AC has the responsibility for the 
truthfulness of the financial reports. This current study explores the effectiveness of 
BOD via independence, size, meetings, and financial expertise and AC effectiveness 
via independence, size, meetings, and financial expertise in constraining accretive share 
buyback activities as a device for real earnings management.    
 
In addition to the BOD and AC, audit quality is considered to be another mechanism of 
corporate governance. Audit quality has a crucial role in limiting the ability of managers 
to use their discretion for earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; 
Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Chiang, Huang, & Hsiao, 2011; 
Elshafie & Nyadroh, 2014; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009; 
Houqe, Ahmed, & van Zijl, 2017; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Muttakin et al., 2017). More 
qualified auditors are more likely to help reduce violations of accounting standards and 
mitigate financial reports restatements (Elshafie & Nyadroh, 2014; Romanus, Maher, 
& Fleming, 2008).  Francis and Yu (2009) indicated that Big 4 audit firms can realise 
better audit quality and practice more effective monitoring than non-Big 4 audit firms. 
Big 4 audit firms have more experience and knowledge about the clients and their 
specialisations in relationship to non-Big 4 auditors (Francis & Yu, 2009; Krishnan, 
2003).  
 
Ownership structure is also seen as another corporate governance mechanism that may 
mitigate agency problems between the management and shareholders of a firm (García-
Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009; Farrell et al., 2013). However, high concentrated 
ownership creates agency conflicts (type II) between controlling shareholders and 
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outside investors (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). The 
investor protection level depends greatly on the quality of the corporate governance 
system and a firm’s ownership structure (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). 
Wong, Loo, Mohd and Mohamad (2009) found the ownership concentration negatively 
affected the ability of intuitional investors to monitor a firm’s management. Al-Rassas 
and Kamardin (2015a) also documented that ownership concentration has a positive 
effect on earnings management through discretionary accruals. Family-owned 
shareholdings dominate East Asian countries (Claessens et al., 2000; Filatotchev, Yung, 
& Piesse, 2005), and Malaysia is an emerging market with high concentrated 
shareholding (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003; Fan & Wong, 
2002; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011).  
 
The Malaysian capital market has the broad presence of family-controlled firms in 
which family members hold important positions in the top management and dominant 
sensitive positions on BOD (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010a; Chen, 2013; Haji, 2014; 
Hasnan, Rahman, & Mahenthiran, 2013). Previous studies have found a positive 
association between concentrated shareholdings by a family group with earnings 
management (Chi, Hung, Cheng, & Tien Lieu, 2014; Mohd-Saleh & Omar, 2014; Setia-
Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski, 2011; Tai, 2017). Despite the significant presence of 
family ownership in Malaysian market in which about 70% of the listed firms on the 
Bursa Malaysia are family controlled (Amran & Ahmad, 2010b; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2011), the existing literature does not examine the role of family-
owned firms in determining accretive buyback activities as a proxy for real earnings 




With respect managerial ownership, previous studies have revealed a positive 
association between managerial ownership and earnings management practices (Al-
Fayoumi, Abuyazed, & Alexander, 2010; Gopalan & Jayaraman, 2012; Halioui & Jerbi, 
2012; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003; Oluku, 2017). However, Farrell et al. (2013) in 
the US and Chandren et al. (2015) in Malaysia have found that managerial ownership 
has an effective role in limiting accretive buyback activities.  
 
Foreign ownership is also realised as an effective corporate governance mechanism, 
precisely in emerging markets with a low level of investors protections (Bayrakdaroglu, 
Ersoy, & Citak, 2012; Choi, Park, & Hong, 2012). Foreign investors can enhance 
corporate governance system through their participation in the BOD room (Yatim, 
Iskandar, & Nga, 2016). They have competitive features that would help transfer their 
specific knowledge to domestic firms (Choi et al., 2012). Prior studies have found a 
negative association between the proportion of foreign ownership and earnings 
management practices (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & Cosset, 2015; Guo, Huang, Zhang, & 
Zhou, 2015; Mohd Ali, Mohd Salleh, & Hassan, 2010). 
  
Beside corporate governance mechanisms, employee stock options (ESOS) have been 
found to encourage managers to be involved in accretive share buyback activities. The 
stock options hypothesis argues that managers engage in share buyback programs to 
avoid dilution in EPS caused by the exercise of employee stock options (Bens et al., 
2003; Kahle, 2002). Dittmar (2000), Bens et al. (2003), and Weisbenner (2000) have 
provided empirical evidence that firms use share buybacks to handle the dilution in EPS 
when firms distribute stock options. Managers holding large stock options are more 
likely to manipulate earnings to meet performance forecasts (Bergstresser & Philippon, 
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2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Houmes & Skantz, 2010). Thus, it is essential to 
investigate the linkage between stock options and accretive share buybacks.  
 
Overall, based on the previous discussions, this current study examines the effect of the 
BOD’ effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality, family ownership, managerial 
ownership, foreign ownership and ESOS on accretive shares buyback activities as a 
device for real earnings management.  
 
1.2 Problem Statement  
Managerial decisions on payout policy are a fundamental issue related to the agency 
conflict between managers and shareholders (Jensen, 1986). Share buyback policy is 
another method to distribute cash to shareholders of a firm (Brown, Beekes, & 
Verhoeven, 2011; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 
2002). Management decides on share buyback on behalf of a firm (Ginglinger & 
Hamon, 2009). The managers of firms are involved in share buyback to decrease the 
number of outstanding shares and then increase the value of EPS, which is known as 
an accretive share buyback and classified by scholars as as real earnings management 
tool (Burnett et al., 2012; Hribar et al., 2006). Previous studies have provided empirical 
evidence that managers use accretive share buyback as a tool for real earnings 
management (Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et al., 2006). Accretive 
share buybacks increase EPS value through decreasing the outstanding number of 
shares that represent the denominator of the EPS equation.  
 
Principally, managers engage in earnings management through real economic activities 
to match specific earnings targets rather than to increase a firm’s performance in the 
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long term (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Earnings management actions 
lead to hide economic and financial information of firms, which may negatively affect 
the quality of financial reporting and mislead current and potential investors. 
Accordingly, using accretive share buyback in managing earnings may negatively 
affect the performance and financial report quality of a firm. The existing literature 
provides empirical evidence that share buyback programs are used by managers to 
mislead investors (Chan et al., 2010). Almeida, Fos, and Kronlund (2016) found that 
managers are willing to trade off employment and investments for involvement in share 
buybacks to meet EPS estimations. Accretive share buybacks are likely to be costly to 
firms because the cash used in the buyback is unavailable for profitable activities 
(Burnett et al., 2012). 
 
In Malaysia, share buyback activities have become more prevalent during the last 
decade. Malaysian listed firms increasingly engaged in share buyback programs, where 
only 12 firms engaged in share buybacks in 1999 (Ramakrishnan, Ravindran, & 
Ganesan, 2007). Dramatically, the number increase by 2013 to reach more than 150 
firms and the value of actual share buybacks was more than RM 2.4 billion as shown 
in Section 1.1 Figure 1.1. Behind the increase in share buyback trends, accretive share 
buybacks were also increased. Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) reported that more than 
50% of share buyback activities of Malaysian listed firms from 2001 to 2008 were 
accretive share buybacks as presented in Figure 1.2. In other words, managers use share 
buyback policies to manage EPS to match the analysts EPS estimations.  
 
Consistently, Siew-Peng and Isa (2015) surveyed the motivations of share buyback in 
the Malaysian context and found that 23% of the firm managers used share buyback 
14 
 
activities to manage EPS. Similarly, Abdul Latif, Taufil Mohd and Kamardin (2016) 
found that Malaysian listed firms frequently were involved in share buyback activities 
to manage reported EPS. These debates support that notion that firms in Malaysia are 
involved in share buybacks to manage EPS. This share buyback is known accretive 
share buyback, which is indicative for the real earnings management. Earnings 
management practices typically lead to misleading both existing and potential investors 
through hiding the real economic performance of firms. This shows the importance of 
corporate governance mechanisms to protect the investor's rights.  
 
Figure 1.2, 
Accretive Share Buybacks in Malaysia over the Years from 2001 to 2008.  
Source: Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) 
 
As mentioned before, managers engage in earnings management practices to hide 
economic and financial information of firms, which may mitigate the quality of 
financial reporting and then mislead current and potential investors (Burnett et al., 
2012; Roychowdhury, 2006). Thus, corporate governance mechanisms are an essential 












managers, which lead to the increased integrity and credibility of the financial report’s 
information. 
 
The issues of corporate governance are vital in emerging markets like Malaysia. The 
Asian financial crisis was the articulation point to improve the corporate governance 
system in Malaysia. In the subsequent periods, the Security Commission of Malaysia 
(SC) and relevant regulatory agencies delivered MCCG 2000, 2007, and 2012 to 
improve the roles and responsibilities of governance mechanisms, especially the 
composition of the BOD, AC and external auditors. Recently, MCCG 2017 aimed to 
strengthen the internalisation of the culture of corporate governance with an emphasis 
on accountability and transparency.  
 
Previous studies such as Farrell et al. (2013) have investigated the relationship between 
the BOD independence and managerial ownership with accretive share buyback. In 
Malaysia, Chandren et al. (2015) examined the association between the characteristics 
of BOD (independence, size, meetings, CEO duality, multiple directorships) with 
accretive share buybacks. Their results revealed a significant role for corporate 
governance mechanisms in mitigating accretive share buybacks activities. Chandren et 
al. (2015) recommended future studies to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and accretive share buyback in the scope of MCCG 2012.  
 
For the contributions of this current study to the literature, MCCG 2012 and BMLRs 
state that the quality of financial reporting is the main responsibility of AC. The AC 
can mitigate agency problems by reducing the information asymmetry between insiders 
and minority shareholders (García, Barbadillo, & Pérez, 2012; Vafeas, 2005). 
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Consequently, an opportunity exists to extend the literature on AC effectiveness and 
accretive share buyback. Thus, this study combines four features of AC including 
independence, size, meetings, financial expertise as one variable called AC 
effectiveness to investigate the synergistic effect of AC effectiveness on accretive share 
buyback as a tool for real earnings management. That is because corporate governance 
is an interrelated system and is effective only in particular combinations rather than 
isolated best practices (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & Jackson, 2008; Bin-Ghanem 
& Ariff, 2016). 
 
Besides AC, this study examines the association between the BOD features and 
accretive share buybacks. The BOD is considered a primary mechanism of internal 
corporate governance (Cremers & Nair, 2005). It is responsible for monitoring the 
manipulative actions of management and ensuring that best interests of shareholders 
are promoted (Abor & Fiador, 2013; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Previous studies have 
revealed that BOD effectiveness relies on several primary attributes, which include 
BOD independence, size, expertise and efficiency of the BOD  (Abidin, Kamal, & 
Jusoff, 2014; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; S Chandren et al., 2015; De Andres, 
Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; DeZoort, Hermanson, & Houston, 2003; Fama & French, 
2001). This current study considers four key features of the BOD, which include 
independence, size, meetings, and financial expertise. However, to be different from 
the study of Chandren et al. (2015), these features of the BOD are combined to create 
a composite score that represents the BOD effectiveness to determine the nature of the 
relationship with accretive share buyback as a proxy of real earnings management.  
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In addition, audit quality is an external mechanism of corporate governance to improve 
the quality of a financial report and to protect investors from misleading information. 
Effective audit quality is likely to mitigate earnings management practices. The 
managerial discretion in managing earnings can be constrained if the firm is audited by 
qualified auditors as proxied by Big 4 auditors (Becker et al., 1998; Chiang et al., 2011; 
Francis et al., 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009). Big 4 auditors have more skills and 
experience to audit the financial activities of clients and detect the violations in financial 
reports as well as having more knowledge about the clients and their specialisations in 
relative to non-Big 4 auditors (Francis & Yu, 2009; Krishnan, 2003). Accordingly, 
detecting real earnings management is a substantial challenge for external auditors 
compare to accruals-based earnings management (Burnett et al., 2012). Consistently, 
accretive share buyback is a mechanism of real earnings management as mentioned 
above. Thus, this study examines the nature of the association between audit quality 
proxied by Big 4 audit firms and accretive share buyback activities. 
 
Furthermore, the Malaysian market is highly characterised by individual investors and 
family groups (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010a; Claessens et al., 2000; Ibrahim & Samad, 
2011; Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011). Unlike the developed market in which inside 
shareholders serve as an active monitoring device because of the widespread equity 
(Mohd Ali, Mohd Salleh, & Hassan, 2008; Yeo, Tan, Ho, & Chen, 2002), controlling 
shareholders in emerging markets with highly concentrated ownership like Malaysia 
may pressure management to realise their own interest at the expense of other 
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002; Mohd Ali et al., 2008). Prior studies have empirically 
found that dominant shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings 
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management to handle the negative effects of their self-serving actions (Kim & Yi, 
2006).  
 
Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren et al. (2015) have found an effective role for 
managerial shareholdings in limiting accretive buyback activities. Foreign ownership 
is substantial in the Malaysian market and may have significant effects on firms 
governance and strategy (David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006). Zakaria et al. 
(2013) have mentioned that limited studies exist on the relationship between ownership 
structure and share buyback activities in emerging markets. Despite of the substantial 
existence of family ownership in Malaysian market, which represent about 70% of 
listed firms on the Bursa Malaysia (Amran & Ahmad, 2010b; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2011), prior studies do not examine their role in determining 
accretive share buyback as a proxy for real earnings management. Further, previous 
studies on ownership structure ,including family controlled and managerial 
shareholdings, and earnings management activities have revealed inconclusive 
outcomes (e.g., Adiguzel, 2013; Alves, 2012; Mohd Ali et al., 2010; Saleh, Iskandar, 
& Rahmat, 2005; Setia-Atmaja, Haman, & Tanewski, 2011; Wang, 2006; Warfield, 
Wild, & Wild, 1995). 
 
Thus, this current study explores more on the impact of ownership structures (family, 
managerial, foreign ownership) on accretive share buyback activities as they have been 
very significant in explaining the occurrence of share buyback activities in Malaysia. 
This study investigates the impact of ownership structure (family, managerial and 





Finally, regarding the employee stock options (ESOS). Previous studies have revealed 
that employee stock options are a significant explanation for the increased number of 
firms engaging in share buyback activities (Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002; Lamba & 
Miranda, 2010). Furthermore, existing literature documents that firms with more 
managerial stock options are more likely to manage earnings by accruals to meet 
performance forecasts (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; 
Houmes & Skantz, 2010). To the best knowledge of the researcher, no prior study in 
Malaysia has discussed the association between employee stock options (ESOS) and 
real earnings management by accretive shares buyback. Particularly, firms with a high 
magnitude of stock options are more likely to be involved in accretive share buybacks 
to enhance EPS value. Therefore, this current study extends previous research by 
examining the nature of the relationship between ESOS and accretive share buybacks.  
 
Based on the above discussion, whether the corporate governance mechanisms can 
mitigate the practice of accretive share buybacks as a mechanism to manage EPS 
remains ambiguous. Thus, this current study investigates the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms (BOD effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality, family 
ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership), on accretive share buyback. 
From the views of the stock options hypothesis, this study also examines the impact of 
stock options exercised on accretive share buybacks as a mechanism for real earnings 




1.3 Research Questions  
This study is arranged to answer questions related to examining the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms and employ stock options (ESOS) on real earnings 
management through accretive share buybacks. This study uses composite 
measurements (scores) for both the features of BOD and AC to reflect their 
effectiveness. Specifically, this study seeks to answer the following questions: 
 
1. Does BOD effectiveness (independence, size, meetings, and financial expertise) 
influence accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real earnings 
management? 
2.  Does AC effectiveness (independence, size, meetings and financial expertise) 
influence accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real earnings 
management? 
3. Does audit quality influence accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real 
earnings management? 
4. Does ownership structure (family ownership, managerial ownership and foreign 
ownership) influence accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real earnings 
management? 
5. Do employee stock options (ESOS) influence accretive share buyback used as a 
mechanism for real earnings management?  
 
1.4 Research Objectives  
Specifically, this study is conducted to fulfil the following objectives: 
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1. To examine the effect of the BOD effectiveness (independence, size, meetings, and 
financial expertise) on accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real 
earnings management; 
2. To investigate the effect of AC effectiveness (independence, size, meetings and 
financial expertise) on accretive share buyback used as a mechanism for real 
earnings management;  
3. To examine the influence of audit quality on accretive share buyback used as a 
mechanism for real earnings management; 
4. To examine the effect of ownership structure (family ownership, managerial 
ownership and foreign ownership) on accretive share buyback used as a mechanism 
for real earnings management; and 
5. To investigate the influence of employee stock options (ESOS) on accretive share 
buyback used as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
1.5 Motivations for the Study 
The researcher has several motivations for conducting this study in the Malaysian 
context. First, a share buyback phenomenon in Malaysia began during the Asian 
financial crisis 1997-1998. As mention before, the primary purpose was to stabilise the 
share price of listed firms (Isa et al., 2011). Subsequently, Malaysian listed firms 
increasingly engaged in share buyback programs from year to year. Only 12 firms 
engaged in share buybacks in 1999 (Ramakrishnan, Ravindran, & Ganesan, 2007), 
while the number grew by more than a dozen times by 2013 to reach more than 150 
firms and the Malaysian ringgit value of actual share buybacks was more than 2.4 
billion, as presented before in Figure 1.1. Further, Chandren and Nadarajan (2013)  
reported that more than 50% of actual share buyback activities in Malaysia were 
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accretive share buybacks over the period from 2001 to 2008, using shares buyback to 
manage EPS as shown in Figure 1.2. Therefore, this study is concerned with the issue 
of using accretive a share buyback as a method for real earnings management.  
 
Second, issues of corporate governance are vital in emerging markets like Malaysia. 
MCCG 2000, 2007, and 2012 were delivered to improve the roles and responsibilities 
of governance mechanisms, especially the composition of the BOD as well as the 
independence of the AC and external auditors. Recently, MCCG 2017 aimed to 
strengthen the internalisation of the culture of corporate governance with an emphasis 
on accountability and transparency.  Effective mechanisms of corporate governance are 
more able to introduce higher-quality information for investors protections. Therefore, 
share buybacks in firms with effective mechanisms of corporate governance have better 
credibility with investors than firms with weak corporate governance mechanisms 
(Babenko et al., 2012; Chahine, Zeidan, & Dairy, 2011; Wu, 2012b).  
 
The third motivation is that Malaysia has an emerging capital market with a high 
ownership concentration by family groups and dominant individuals (Abdul Rahman 
& Ali, 2006; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010a; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2013; Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Based on a view of agency theory, the dominant 
shareholders may engage in share buybacks to gain personal interests at the expense of 
minority shareholders (e.g. Fried, 2005; Wu, 2011; Wu & Wang, 2015). Controlling 
shareholders may influence managers to undertake share buybacks to manage earnings 
targets. Several existing studies on the associations between corporate governance 
mechanisms and share buyback behaviours have been conducted in countries like the 
United States (Babenko et al., 2012; Chahine et al., 2011; Jiraporn & Ning, 2006), 
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Australia (Yarram, 2013), Sweden (Jansson & Larsson-Olaison, 2010), and Taiwan 
(Huang, Wang, Lin, & Jhao, 2010; Wu, 2012b). 
 
However, limited studies have conducted in terms of using accretive share buybacks as 
a mechanism for real earnings management, especially in emerging markets like 
Malaysia. Chandren et al. (2015) found a significant relationship between the features 
of the BODs and managerial ownership with accretive share buybacks. Thus, it is 
essential to identify the nature of relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms, including the BOD, the AC, audit quality, and the ownership structure 
(family, managerial, foreign ownership) with accretive share buybacks. Thus, this study 
extends previous studies by examining the impacts of corporate governance 
mechanisms on accretive share buybacks.  
  
Finally, the primary purpose of employee stock options is to align the interests of 
management and shareholders as well as to gain their loyalty to maximise the  wealth 
of shareholders (Bickley, 2012; Katan, Ariff, Chowdhury, & Mohamad, 2013). In the 
late 1980s, Malaysian firms were permitted to be involves in employee stock options 
scheme (ESOS) and could use 15% of their issued and paid-up capital to do so. Stock 
options in Malaysia became widely prevalent starting from the 1990s (Ghazali, 2012; 
Long, Gondyah, & Musibau, 2013), and more than 250 listed firms on the Bursa 
Malaysia became involved in stock options between the years from 1999 to 2007 (Katan 
et al., 2013). Recently, descriptive analysis has revealed that around 30% of accretive 
buyback firms were involved in ESOS over the years from 2010 to 2015. This statistic 
means that stock options are more likely to become a substantial motivation for 




1.6 Significance of the Study 
This study contributes to the theoretical and practical views of corporate governance, 
accretive share buyback, and compensations policy in emerging market as follows; 
 
1.6.1 Theoretical Significance 
Prior studies like Bens et al. (2003), Hribar et al. (2006) and Myers et al. (2007) 
provided evidence that managers use share buyback programs as a device to manage 
EPS, which is called accretive share buyback. Regarding the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms on accretive buyback activities, previous studies have 
documented a significant relationship between several mechanisms of corporate 
governance and accretive share buyback. Farrell et al. (2013) in the United States 
examined the impact of firm features and BOD independence on accretive share 
buybacks. Burnett et al. (2012) examined the impact of audit quality on the trade-off 
between accruals-based earnings management and accretive share buyback. 
Furthermore, Chandren et al. (2015) explored the influence of BOD features including 
independence, size, duality, meeting and multiple directorships on accretive buyback 
activities in Malaysia.  
 
Most existing research has been conducted in developed countries where there is a real 
separation between ownership and management which, in turn, created a traditional 
agency problem between them. However, this current study is conducted in an 
emerging market with high ownership concentration in which the agency conflict is 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. From the lenses of agency 
theory and resource dependency theory, this study extends previous studies by using 
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mechanisms of corporate governance such as the BOD, AC, audit quality, family 
ownership, managerial ownership, and foreign ownership to examine their association 
with accretive share buybacks. Further, drawn from stock options hypothesis, this study 
also investigates the relationship between employee stock options exercise and 
accretive share buybacks.  
 
With respect to the association between the effectiveness of the BOD and AC with 
accretive share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management, this study 
extends previous studies like Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren et al. (2015) in two 
ways. First, this study explores the impact of AC effectiveness on accretive share 
buyback. To the best of this researcher’s knowledge, very limited studies have 
examined the relationship between the AC and accretive share buyback activities. 
Second, the study uses a composite measure (score) for the effectiveness of the BOD 
and AC (independence, size, meetings and financial expertise) rather than isolated 
measurements, which may be more reliable and produce fewer measurement errors than 
using individual features to measure effectiveness of the BOD and the AC (Srinidhi, 
He, & Firth, 2014).  
 
The present study also adds to the viewpoint of the agency theory in an emerging 
market, where the firms are controlled by major shareholders such as family groups or 
individual block shareholders, in which the agency problem is different from those of 
the developed countries where ownerships are widely dispersed. A noticeable feature 
in Malaysian market is that the ownership of firms is highly concentrated (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Despite family groups dominate the  shareholdings of 
firms on the Malaysian market (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Amran & Che Ahmad, 
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2010a; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011), very limited studies have been conducted on the 
relationship between family-controlled firms and accretive share buyback activities as 
a mechanism for real earnings management. Thus, the current study fills this gap, and 
in doing so, enriches literature on the issue. 
 
In addition, this study extends the literature by using the agency theory to explain the 
role of managerial shareholdings in restricting accretive buyback activities. The study 
is different from Chandren et al. (2015) and Farrell et al. (2013) who use direct 
shareholdings of executive directors and CEO shareholding as a measure of managerial 
ownership respectively. This study, however, uses both direct and indirect ownership 
(indirect shares refer to the shares of individual owners or firms through interests held 
in another related company or by the shares of their family members) of executive 
directors as a proxy to measure ownership directors.  
  
Further, this study explores the impact of foreign ownership on limiting accretive share 
buyback activities. Regarding foreign ownership, this study depends on the perspective 
of the knowledge spillover hypothesis that predicts the knowledge of foreign investors 
is superior relative to that of local investors, which may lead to mitigating earnings 
management through accretive share buyback activities (Guo, Huang, Zhang, & Zhou, 
2015). To the best knowledge of this researcher, very limited study has been conducted 
on the association between foreign ownership and accretive share buyback as a tool for 
real earnings management. Thus, this study is carried out to fill this gap. 
  
Finally, this study contributes to existing literature of accretive share buyback and 
compensation policies from the lens of the stock options hypothesis. Prior literature in 
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developed market reports evidence that managerial stock options induce insiders to be 
involved in a share buyback to fund the exercise of stock options or mitigate dilution in 
EPS caused by stock options exercised (Kahle, 2002; Lamba & Miranda, 2010; 
Weisbenner, 2000). This study extends the prior literature by focusing only on accretive 
share buybacks, which represent those actual share buyback that lead to managing EPS 
(Bens et al., 2003; Hribar et al., 2006). Also, this study uses more recent data to examine 
the influence of employee stock options on accretive share buybacks in Malaysia. 
 
1.6.2 Practical Significance 
From the practical perspective, the findings of this study would be useful to 
stakeholders in Malaysia such as regulators, investors, policymakers, analysts and 
academicians. All of them need more understanding of the determinations and 
motivations that lead managers to engage in share buyback programs. More 
specifically, regulators require more understanding about shares buyback programs to 
assist them in creating new rulings and guidelines related to share buyback programs to 
provide more protection for minority shareholders, especially in emerging markets with 
highly concentrated ownership by families and controlling individuals such as in the 
case of Malaysia. 
 
 In addition, the outcomes of this study would be beneficial for policymakers and 
investors in Malaysian firms. This study would provide more understanding about the 
ability of corporate governance mechanisms including the BOD, the AC and external 
auditors to monitor and control the actions of managers. Particularly, managers may 
use accretive share buyback to manage EPS to gain personal benefits and mislead 
current and potential investors. This study also enriches investors and policymakers in 
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Malaysian listed firms with a better understanding of the role played by controlling 
shareholders, family ownership, managerial ownership and foreign ownership on share 
buyback policy. Finally, the relationships of this study provide a more precise picture 
for investors and concerned stakeholders on whether share buyback programs are 
employed as a device to expropriate uninformed minority shareholders, or as a payout 
method to mitigate agency costs and to maximise firms value.  
 
1.7 Scope of the Study  
This study investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and employee 
stock options on accretive share buyback activities of Malaysian firms. This study 
focuses only on shares buybacks that are used as an earnings management device, called 
accretive share buyback. All non-financial firms with accretive share buyback listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia from 2010 to 2015 are selected to achieve this study’s objectives. 
Financial listed firms are excluded as they are subjected to Financial Service Act 2013, 
which differ regarding regulatory requirements and have unique characteristics (Abdul 
Latif & Taufil Mohd, 2014; Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Yunos, Smith, & Ismail, 
2010). To realise the objectives of this study, a quantitative approach depending on 
secondary data (collected from annual reports and DataStream database) is utilised. 
 
This study uses the annual reports of firms available on the Bursa Malaysia website 
over the period from 2010 to 2015. The study has two reasons for choosing the given 
period; the first one is to avoid the effect of the global financial crisis as well as the 
immediate recovery year of 2009, and this allows examining the market during normal 
conditions, which started in 2010. The second reason is to cover the period around the 
scope of MCCG 2012 as suggested by Chandren et al. (2015). The sample covers until 
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2015 to avoid clashing with the new code of corporate governance MCCG 2017 that 
was developed during 2016, which established new rules and guidelines to improve the 
corporate governance system in Malaysia. 
 
1.8 Organization of the Thesis 
The first chapter presents the background of the study and identification of the research 
problem, research objectives, research questions, the significance and the scope of the 
study. The second chapter reviews the literature of the dependent variable, share 
buyback programs. This chapter involves several sections that discuss definitions, 
types, and motivations for share buyback programs. It also explores trends and 
regulations of share buybacks in Malaysia. Furthermore, the second chapter discusses 
the accretive share buybacks as a tool for real earnings management.  
    
The third chapter reviews the underpinning theories, namely, agency theory, resource 
dependence theory, and the stock options hypothesis. It also has a literature review of 
the independent variables and their relationships with earnings management activities, 
including BOD effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality, ownership structure 
(family, managerial and foreign), and employee stock options (ESOS).  
 
The fourth chapter describes the research methodology used to accomplish the research 
objectives. It provides the theoretical framework, hypothesis development of the study, 
the research design, the measurement of variables, the sampling procedure and the 
procedure for data collection and finally the data analysis method. Chapter Five 
presents the descriptive statistics of the variables, diagnostic tests and regression 
results, discussions, and additional empirical analysis. This thesis concludes with 
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Chapter Six with a summary of the findings, study implications, limitations, 




2 CHAPTER TWO  
LITERATURE REVIEW (SHARE BUYBACK PROGRAMS) 
 
2.0 Overview of the Chapter 
The primary objective of this chapter is to discuss the literature on share buyback 
programs. This chapter initially enumerates and discusses share buyback as a 
phenomenon and its trends worldwide. It also reviews practices and regulations of share 
buyback in Malaysia. In addition, the current chapter discusses the motivations of 
shares buyback programs as well as the economic influence of shares buyback on share 
prices. Further, this chapter provides a review of the literature on using accretive share 
buyback as a device for real earnings management. 
 
2.1 Share Buyback Programs  
Share buyback is a mechanism to return excess cash to the shareholders by which a firm 
buybacks its shares from targeted shareholders, individuals or groups at a specific price 
(Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). Firms make an announcement to inform shareholders of 
their intentions to engage in shares buyback programs; this process is named a share 
buyback announcement. Then, after a specific period, the firms begin buying their 
shares from shareholders; this action is named the trading or implementation of shares 
buyback. There are three primary methods firms use to undertake share buyback 
programs, namely, open-market share buyback, fixed-price tender offers and Dutch 
auction tender offers (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000).  
 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) and Rau and Vermaelen (2002) have indicated that over 
the last decade, open market share buyback has become the primary method of 
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corporate payout policy used by public listed firms. With an open market share buyback 
program, firms announce the total number of shares authorised for potential buybacks 
but offer no commitments about price, timing or even implementation of shares 
buyback  (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). In recent years open market share buyback 
programs have become a significant payout method for many US firms. According to 
the data from Compustat, between the years 1984 and 2000 firms spent approximately 
26% of their total annual earnings on buybacks. More than 90% of these buybacks are 
open market buyback programs (Grullon & Michaely, 2004).  
 
Second, a fixed price tender offer is an off-market share buyback method (Zhang, 
2008). Firms begin by making an announcement to invite shareholders for the tender 
of shares buyback over a period of time at a specified price reflecting some premium 
usually around 15 to 20% above the prevailing price in the market (Grullon & 
Ikenberry, 2000; Zhang, 2008). 
 
Third, the Dutch-auction is also a fixed-price deal for a share buyback (Grullon & 
Ikenberry, 2000). Through this method, firms start the tender by announcing that it is 
looking for tendering specified proportion of its shareholding by the shareholders at a 
range of premium above the shares’ market value (Comment & Jarrell, 1991; Grullon 
& Ikenberry, 2000). The shareholders respond to the tender through informing the firm 
within a specified time the price and the number of shares they are willing to sell 
(Zhang, 2008). At the close period of the offer, the firm collects the individual offers 
and categorises them based on the price to determine the precise price level at which 
the buyback is completed (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). The price stops at the point 
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when the aggregate number of shares equals the identified magnitude of the share 
buyback  (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000).  
 
Recently, accelerated share buyback has become an innovative method of share 
buyback that has become popular (Chemmanur, Cheng, & Zhang, 2010). In this type 
of share buyback, investment banks play the role of mediator between a firm and 
shareholders, wherein the investment bank borrows the shares from its customers or 
lenders and trades the borrowed shares to firms (Bargeron, Kulchania, & Thomas, 
2011). There are two separate transactions that should be applied for an accelerated 
share buyback, which include acquisitions of treasury stock and a forward contract of 
corporate stock settlement (Chemmanur et al., 2010). 
 
2.2 Trends of Share Buyback Programs Worldwide 
During the last decades the firms involving in share buyback programs have 
dramatically increased around the world. Share buybacks initially appeared in the 
United States in the late 1960s and became very popular by the mid-1980s (Cook, 
Krigman, & Leach, 2003) and have become an economically significant payout method 
(Ben-Rephael, Oded, & Wohl, 2011). In 1985, only 129 open-market share buyback 
programs were announced in the United States, whereas by 1996 they had reached 
1,319 announcements in  (Jagannathan & Stephens, 2003). Prior studies have reported 
that firms in the United States have spent more money annually on share buybacks than 
on dividend payments over the last two decades (Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon 
& Michaely, 2002; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Haw et al., 2011; Skinner, 2008). 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) reported that the volume of share buybacks had increased 
from 4.8% relative to earnings in 1980 to 41.8% in 2000. 
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Share buyback programs have become popular also in other developed countries 
besides the United States. For instance, in the United Kingdom, share buybacks  started 
in the early 1980s and now occur with considerable frequency. Of the 489 share 
buyback announcements made by European firms from January 1980 to June 1998, 
firms in the United Kingdom alone accounted for 60% (293) of such buybacks 
(Benhamouda & Watson, 2010). Further, for the period from 2001 to 2004, the value 
of share buyback programs in the United Kingdom was more than 68 billion Euros 
(Benhamouda & Watson, 2010). In the Canadian market, only 62 open-market share 
buyback were announced in 1993 with a total value of 1,458.7 million Canadian dollars. 
However, there were 172 buyback programs with a total value of nearly 10 billion 
Canadian dollars in 1997 (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 2000). According to 
Ginglinger and Hamon (2007), more than 350 firms embarked in share buyback over 
the period from 2000 to 2002 in France, with a value higher than 33,925 million Euros.  
 
In the late 1990s, share buyback were initially allowed in Asian countries such as 
Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Korea and Taiwan (Abdul Latif, 2010). Although share 
buybacks are new in these countries, the listed firms engaging in share buyback 
programs have significantly increased over time. For example,  Wang, Lin, Fung and 
Chen (2013) show that an average 261 listed firms announced share buybacks each year 
from the inception year in 2000 until 2012 in Taiwan. Park and Jung (2005) showed 
that more than 990 firms engaged in share buyback activities from 1994 to 2000 in 
Korea. In the Japanese market, Zhang (2002) indicated that only 2 share buyback 
programs were announced in 1995 involving a total value around 25 billion Yen, while 
in 1997 more than 35 share buyback activities were announced with a total value of 
394.2 billion Yen. Similarly, Hatakeda and Isagawa (2004) indicated that share 
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buyback announcements dramatically increase in Japan for the period from 1995 to 
1998. Brockman and Chung (2001) observed that only 8 Hong Kong share buyback 
programs were announced in 1992, while in 1995 there were 100 share buyback 
announcements. 
 
2.3 Share Buyback Programs in Malaysia    
In September 1997, share buyback programs were allowed by the Malaysian market 
authority. The primary purpose of permitting share buyback programs was to stabilise 
the share price of firms during the Asian financial crisis (Isa et al., 2011).  During the 
beginning period, only a limited number of firms embarked on open market share 
buybacks. However, in  subsequent years, Malaysian firms started to gain sufficient 
knowledge related to buybacks, and, since then, firms have actively engaged in open 
market share buybacks activities in Malaysian market (Ramakrishnan et al., 2007).  
 
Studies conducted by Ramakrishnan et al. (2007) and Abdul Latif (2010) showed that 
more than 300 Malaysian listed firms that represented 30% of all firms listed on the 
Bursa Malaysia engaged in share buyback announcement from 1997 to 2005. Table 2.1 
sets out the number of firms involved in shares buyback during the years 2007 to 2013, 
as well as the Ringgits spent on buyback programs. As it appears in the table, listed 
firms embarking on actual share buyback activities significantly increased through the 
years from 2007 to 2013. Only 133 firms were engaged in buying back their shares in 
2007, whereas more than 150 firms involved in buying back their own shares in 2013. 
The Malaysian ringgit value of treasury shares in 2013 was RM 3.597 billion which is 





Number of Share Buyback Firms and Value RM of Treasury Shares of Malaysian Listed 
Firms from 2007 to 2015 
Year Numbers  
of Share 
Buyback Firms 
Total RM Value 
of Treasury Shares (million) 
2007 133 2,484 
2008 162 3,169 
2009 170 3,030 
2010 142 2,959 
2011 139 2,401 
2012 153 3,044 
2013 154 3,597 
2014 123 3,371 
2015 125 3,386 
Source: Firms’ annual reports and DataStream.  
 
 
In July 1998, Malaysian Accounting Standards Board Technical Release (MASB-TR1) 
was launched to prescribe the appropriate accounting treatment for share buybacks and 
treasury shares (Abdul Latif, 2010). Shares buyback through open the market is the 
only buyback method allowed for firms listed on Bursa Malaysia (BMLRs, 2013). In 
the Malaysia environment, many statutory bodies are responsible for the establishment 
and implementation of share buyback programs, namely, the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia (SC), the Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM), the Malaysian 





The Companies Act 1965 in section 67A required that several conditions are met before 
Malaysian listed firms were allowed to engage in share buyback programs. First, the 
company must be solvent at the announcement date. Second, buyback activities must 
be an open market buyback. The third is that the buyback is made with honest intention 
and the best benefit for the firm. Recently, section 112 (2) of the Companies Act 2016 
that has been enforced since January 2017 stated that engaging in share buyback should 
not lead to the firm being insolvent or its capital becoming impaired at the date of the 
solvency statement and the firm must still be solvent for six months after share buyback 
declaration.  
 
The Companies Act 2016 in section 113 (5) also stated that the directors of the firm 
offering to become involve in a share buyback program shall make a declaration that 
the share buyback action is necessary for the firm and made in an honest intention and 
the interests of the firm. The Companies Act 2016 states that listed firms with actual 
share buybacks have three choices for shares to be bought back, namely, to cancel the 
shares bought, to retain the shares bought under treasury shares or to both cancel part 
or retain the others. The directors of a firm are allowed to distribute treasury shares to 
shareholders in the form of a share dividend or resell the treasury shares on the market 
of the stock exchange as provided in Subsection (3B) of the Act. 
 
In addition, the Company Regulation Act 1966 in regulation 18A, part IIIA required 
the BOD of firms to meet to announce the intention of share buyback, which would be 
valid for six months from the date of the announcement. In addition, Regulation 18B 
requires the directors to get the approval of its intention from the Bursa Malaysia within 
seven days after the declaration of the intention. 
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Furthermore, the Malaysian Financial Reporting Standard, (MFRS 132 Financial 
Instrument: Presentation) requires firms that reacquire their shares from the open 
market to deduct those shares from the equity of the firm.  The gain or loss should not 
be recognised in profit or loss on the shares repurchased, sold, issued or cancellation of 
the firm’s equity. However, if the treasury shares are acquired and held by the 
companies or by other affiliates of the consolidated group, consideration paid or 
received shall be recognised directly in the equity section. In addition, MFRS 132 also 
set out that the number of treasury shares held should be disclosed separately either in 
the statement of financial position or the notes. 
 
2.4 Motivations for Share Buyback Programs 
The following subsections discuss various hypotheses that consider the motivations for 
managers to engage in share buyback activities. 
 
2.4.1 Undervaluation Signalling Hypothesis  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that firms can convey information related to future 
cash flow through adjusting payout policy in case of imperfect financial markets. That 
is managers are better informed about the firms’ real value than outside investors are. 
This information asymmetry may lead to instances in which the  management of firms 
has good news about future profitability, which means the current stock prices cannot 
reflect this because outside shareholders have access only to public information 
(Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). Firms may engage in 
buyback activities for signalling undervalued shares to the market, which can lead to a 
positive reaction in share prices around the events of shares buyback (Wu, Kao, & Fung, 
2008). According to prior studies (e.g., Babenko et al., 2012; Dittmar, 2000; Abdul 
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Latif & Taufil Mohd, 2013; Louis & White, 2007; Vermaelen, 1981), firms engage in 
share buyback programs to signal whether the shares of firms are currently undervalued. 
 
Dittmar and Dittmar (2008) conducted a survey that revealed that about 86% of 
managers supported the notion that undervalued shares were the most substantial 
motive for share buyback. Makasi and Kruger (2013) provided evidence that managers 
use buyback policy to signal undervaluation for investors. However, Rau and 
Vermaelen (2002) provided evidence that the signalling hypothesis is debatable 
because open market share buyback is not a cost signal and carries no obligation for a 
firm to buy back  shares. 
 
In the Malaysian context, Isa et al. (2011) reported evidence that pre‐buyback period 
experiences consecutive price declines, which is consistent with the undervaluation 
signalling hypothesis. In addition, Abdul Latif and Taufil-Mohd (2013) empirically 
supported this hypothesis. Their results show that Malaysian firms buy back their shares 
relatively for signalling the undervaluation of stock prices and for better operating 
performance. 
 
2.4.2 Free Cash Flow Hypothesis 
In addition to undervaluation hypothesis, the free cash flow hypothesis posits that firms 
tend to exercise shares buyback when these firms hold a high level of free cash flows 
and have poor investment opportunities so that they can  mitigate agency costs caused 
by free cash flow surplus (Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 1986). Jagannathan and Stephens 
(2003) indicated that high level of free cash flow may negatively affect the efficiency 
of a firm’s capital operations. In other words, share buyback programs allow firms to 
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avoid investing in under-profit investments and signal the reduction in agency costs to 
the market, thereby leading to a positive price reaction following share buyback 
announcements. The association between the firm and the market is increased by 
distributing cash to shareholders when a firm has strong market monitoring, which leads 
to reducing agency costs (Wu et al., 2008).  
 
Prior studies  (e.g., Abdul Latif & Taufil-Mohd, 2013; Dittmar, 2000; Evans et al., 
2003; Fenn & Liang, 2001; Grullon & Michaely, 2002b; Jensen, 1986; Jiang et al., 
2013; Tsetsekos, Liu, & Floros, 1996) support the hypothesis of free cash flow.  Dittmar 
(2000) found that US managers are more likely to buy back shares if they have high 
expected and unexpected cash flows. Furthermore, Fenn and Liang (2001) provided 
strong support for the excess cash flow hypothesis; the predicted signs were statistically 
and economically significant with three payout level regressions (share buyback, 
dividends, and total payouts). Chahine, Zeidan and Dairy (2011) reported evidence 
supporting the free cash flow hypothesis. However, Chan, Ikenberry and Lee (2004) 
examined free cash flows as an incentive to share buyback announcements but failed to 
find significant support for the free cash flow hypothesis.  
 
2.4.3 Tax Saving Hypothesis 
According to Miller and Modigliani (1961) in the absence of taxes, transaction costs, 
agency costs and informational asymmetries among managers and shareholders, the 
impacts of share buybacks and dividends are indifferent. Their model established the 
foundation of subsequent studies on corporate payout policies, namely, share buybacks 
and dividends. The difference in tax treatment between capital gains and dividends are 
one of the factors allowing investors to distinguish between dividends and share 
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buybacks in refunding free cash to shareholders. For example, a Malaysian ringgit of a 
dividend will be more valuable than a Malaysian ringgit of capital gains when the tax 
on the dividend is lower. Likewise, when the tax rate on capital gains is lower, investors 
are more likely to prefer share buybacks than dividends.  
 
Chen (2006) argues that investors may have a biased evaluation of a company’s value 
due to their discernment between dividends and capital gains. The tax advantage 
hypothesis assumes that investors may prefer to invest in a firm whose corporate payout 
policy aligns with their best interests. Consequently, managers would attempt to make 
a decision related to payout policy to be consistent with the best interests of their 
shareholders (Kawano, 2014). Lie and Lie (1999) investigated the impact of 
shareholder taxes on the choices for corporate payouts within various tax systems in 
the United States. They found that firms with a low tax rate for both dividends and 
capital gains tend to pay out cash to investors via shares buybacks rather than in the 
form dividends.  
 
In a survey of 384 financial executives, Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) 
showed that more than 65% of the respondents said that dividend distribution decisions 
would not be affected by the decrease in dividend tax rates. In the United Kingdom, 
Rau and Vermaelen's (2002) study report evidence to support the tax saving hypothesis 
of share buyback programs. However, Oswald and Young (2004) replicated Rau and 
Vermaelen’s  (2002) study during the same period while using a more comprehensive 
sample. They showed a different picture in that the tax advantages failed to explain the 
surges in share buyback activities. They found that undervaluation issue still 




Moreover, Jacob and Jacob (2013) investigated the taxation effect on corporate payout 
choices for 25 countries. They claimed that taxation on dividend and capital gains were 
significant determinants of corporate payout choices internationally. Unlike developed 
countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom, tax treatments of share 
buyback and dividends in Malaysia are indifferent (Abdul Latif, 2010). According to 
the Single-Tier Tax System issued in the budget of 2008, shareholders are exempted 
from payment of personal income tax on the dividends; hence, dividends are paid after 
corporate income tax (Isa et al., 2011). 
 
2.4.4 Dividend Substitution Hypothesis  
Share buyback and cash dividends are mechanisms used by management to return cash 
to shareholders (Grullon & Michaely, 2002). The substitution hypothesis indicates that 
managers utilize share buybacks as a substitute payout method for dividends (Dittmar, 
2000). Theoretically, when a firm paid cash dividends, its shares price would come 
down proportionally with an amount of dividends paid (Benhamouda & Watson, 2010). 
The announcement of corporate intention to buy back shares increasingly pushes the 
share price by an average return of 3 to 4% during the announcement period (Dittmar, 
2000; Fama & French, 2001; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Jiang et al., 2013). Positive 
price repercussions after buybacks certainly creates a strong inclination for a firm to 
choose buybacks rather than cash dividends. 
 
 Bagwell and Shoven (1989) indicated that managers learn to substitute share buyback 
for dividends to reduce the tax burden. Grullon and Michaely (2002) investigated the 
relationship between dividend forecast errors and buyback yields; the dividend forecast 
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errors turned to the negative as buybacks yield increased. The evidence also shows a 
negative relationship between share buyback expenditures and forecast errors of 
dividends. Along the same line, Brown, Handley, and O'Day (2015) tested the 
association between share buybacks and dividend changes in an environment without 
tax variation between capital gain and dividend payments. Their findings supported the 
substitution hypothesis between dividends and share buybacks.  
 
Nevertheless, Dittmar's (2000) study provided weak evidence to support the hypothesis 
that suggests a company buys back its shares as a substitute for dividends. A survey by 
Brav et al. (2005) showed that, for managers, dividend decisions are a priority to 
investment decisions, which are, in turn, prioritized over buyback decisions. Whereas, 
Abdul Latif and Taufil-Mohd (2013) found that firms consider shares buyback as a 
complement to dividends but not as a substitute in Malaysia. 
 
2.4.5 Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis  
The principle of target capital structure has a primary role in several approaches to 
corporate financing (Hovakimian, 2004). This hypothesis argues that managers may 
employ share buybacks to adjust the company's capital structure intentionally. For 
instance, a survey conducted by Dixon et al. (2008)  provided empirical evidence that 
the primary motive for share buybacks in the United Kingdom was to accomplish an 
optimal capital structure. 
 
When a firm’s leverage is lower than the target ratio, a company is more likely to buy 
back their shares to reduce the level of equity and consequently increase the debt ratio 
(Abdul Latif, 2010; Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013; Dittmar, 2000; Dixon et al., 2008). 
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Fried (2005) found evidence that firms may use shares buyback to discharge the 
required changes in capital structure between equity and debt. Hovakimian (2004) 
assumed that firms prefer an equity adjustment (issuing or share buyback) over debts 
to reach their target leverage. However, the results showed that company uses issuing 
debt rather than issuing equity or using a share buyback to achieve the target leverage. 
 
2.4.6 Liquidity Changes Hypothesis 
There are two competing arguments concerning how share buyback programs can 
influence the liquidity of the shares (Chemmanur et al., 2010). The first argument 
suggests that a share buyback may create competition for market producers and 
potentially increase the liquidity of the shares. The second argument is that, because 
managers have an informational advantage over outside investors, they would trade 
strategically on this information when engaging in open-market share buyback 
programs. This can widen the bid-ask spreads of the firm’s stock and then reduce firm’s 
liquidity (Chemmanur et al., 2010). 
 
Consistent with the second argument, Barclay and Smith (1988) propose that US firms 
prefer to pay dividends to shares buybacks, despite dividend tax disadvantages, because 
shares buybacks reduce liquidity. Using the annual bid-ask spread as a proxy for 
changes in liquidity, Barclay and Smith (1988) found that the bid-ask spread during 
open market announcements increases, which means that liquidity has decreased. 
Decreased liquidity implies that an increase exists in a firm’s cost of capital, which, in 




However, McNally and Smith (2011) investigated the impact of Canadian open market 
share buybacks on liquidity and provided evidence that supports the role of share 
buybacks in making stocks of the firms more liquid in a comparison of the periods 
before share buybacks and non-share buyback days. Hillert et al. (2012) studied the 
association between share buyback and liquidity. They showed evidence that a small 
share buyback consumes liquidity whereas more significant buyback enhance liquidity.  
 
2.4.7 Stock Options Hypothesis 
The innovation of using a firm’s stock as compensation for executives and employees 
under stock options schemes may be considered as one factor that helps explain the 
increase in buyback trends (Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002; Lamba & Miranda, 2010). Wu 
et al. (2008) documented two reasons for firms with stock options to embark on share 
buyback programs, namely, to fund outstanding executive-employee stock options and 
to get positive reactions for the price of stock options that are exercisable in the near 
future. The relationship between stock options and accretive share buyback is discussed 
in more detail in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.8. 
 
2.4.8  Takeover Deterrence Hypothesis   
All previously mentioned hypotheses of share buybacks are related to the internal 
decisions of firms that affect the company and its shareholders (Dittmar, 2000). 
Managers may employ share buyback activities to influence the relationship between 
the company and outsiders (Bagwell, 1991; Billett & Xue, 2007; Dittmar, 2000; Hai & 
Doan, 2012). Dittmar (2000) argued that share buyback can increase the acquisition 
price because shares with the lowest reservation value have been selected in share 
buyback activities by shareholders. Therefore, a share buyback can be employed as a 
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tool to prevent a takeover because undertaking in share buyback behaviour may lead to 
increased share prices (Bagwell, 1991). 
 
2.5 Economic Effect of Share Buyback Programs 
As mention before, prior studies have reported that the primary motivations for share 
buyback programs are undervaluation and the free cash flow hypotheses, which explain 
the positive performance of shares for share buyback events (Albaity & Said, 2016; 
Dittmar, 2000; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 2002; Kahle, 2002; 
Su & Lin, 2012). The extant literature indicates that share buyback programs mostly 
serve as positive economic signals that are beneficial to investors (Abdul Latif, Taufil-
Mohd, Wan Hussin, & Ku Ismail, 2014; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & 
Michaely, 2004; Oswald & Young, 2004; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009; Pradhan & 
Kasilingam, 2016). 
 
Numerous studies have focused on the short run period to examine the initial effect of 
a buyback announcement on share price performance (Abdullah, 2007; Haw, Ho, Hu, 
& Zhang, 2011; Ikenberry, Lakonishok, & Vermaelen, 2000; Isa, Ghani, & Lee, 2011; 
Isa & Lee, 2014; Khin, Tee, & Ying, 2011; Pradhan & Kasilingam, 2016; Zhang, 2005), 
whereas others have focused on the long-term performance of firms (Abdul Latif et al., 
2014; Albaity & Said, 2016; Lie, 2005; McNally & Smith, 2007; Pradhan & 
Kasilingam, 2016; Su & Lin, 2012; Yook, 2010). Zhang (2005) examined the effect of 
an actual share buyback on share price performance. The study found that small firms 
are more likely gain higher abnormal returns in immediate market reactions to the event 
of a buyback in comparison to large firms. Further, Mudipalli and Ramana (2014) 
investigated the impact of open market share buyback announcements on the 
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performance of shares and found that shares are undervalued before the announcement 
of share buyback programs. They also provided evidence that positive abnormal returns 
after share buyback announcements indicate that market is reacting positively to the 
news of share buybacks announcements.  
 
2.6 Share Buyback as a Real Earnings Management Device  
Healy and Wahlen (1999) said that earnings management occur “when managers use 
judgment in financial reporting and structuring transactions to alter financial reports to 
either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the 
company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting 
numbers” (p. 368). Earnings management is defined as an accounting technique 
practised by the managers of firms who rely on their discretion to manipulate or manage 
earnings reported in financial reports (Chandren, 2016). Commonly, managers are 
involved in earnings management actions to achieve certain objectives.  
 
Prior literature reveals that the managers of firms engage in earnings management for 
several reasons, which are: to meet analyst’s forecasts (Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 
2015a; Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2015b; Gunny, 2010; Skinner & Sloan, 2002), to 
maximise stock price before security issuance (Graham, Harvey, & Rajgopal, 2005; 
Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998a; Teoh, Welch, & Wong, 1998b), and to increase 
manager’s wealth (Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Healy, 1985). Based on the guidelines of 
the capital markets, analyst-expected EPS is considered as a performance benchmark 
(Burnett et al., 2012). Firms that constantly meet or beat analysts’ EPS expectations 
experience higher credibility and valuation premiums (Brown & Caylor, 2005; Graham 




Managers have two broad types of mechanisms to engage in earnings management 
(Chandren, 2016). First, accrual-based earnings management arises when managers 
decisively select influencing earnings using accounting choices and estimations 
(Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Leuz, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Second, real earnings 
management involves managerial decisions affecting both cash flows and reported 
earnings, such as capital investment decisions, research and development expenditures 
and share buyback programs (Burnett et al., 2012; Chandren, 2016). Both mechanisms 
of earnings management are questionable because managers employ them to change  
outcomes of firms to mislead investors or to influence accounting-linked contractual 
provisions (Healy & Wahlen, 1999).  
 
Real earnings management occurs through manipulating operational activities that 
directly influence cash flows (Sun, Lan, & Liu, 2014). Roychowdhury (2006) has 
defined the activities of real earnings manipulation as “departures from normal 
operational practices, motivated by managers’ desire to mislead at least some 
stakeholders into believing specific financial reporting goals have been met in the 
ordinary course of operations” (p. 337.) Cohen et al. (2008) provided evidence that real 
earnings management practice increased in the period after SOX, which means that 
firms have substituted accrual-based earnings management by the methods of real 
earnings management. 
 
Share buybacks that are potentially increasing reported EPS are typically in the form of 
open market share buybacks, occurring when firms buy back their shares from the open 
market (Lin, Chen, You, & Chang, 2009; Vermaelen, 2005). This kind of share buyback 
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is named accretive share buyback (Burnett et al., 2012; Hribar et al., 2006). The net 
impact of share buybacks on EPS depends jointly on three elements, namely, the timing 
of the buyback, the number of shares in the buyback and forgone future returns from 
the cash used to buy back shares (Horan, 2012; Hribar et al., 2006).  
 
The first two elements, the timing of the buyback and the number of shares bought 
back, increase EPS by decreasing the denominator of EPS equation. The timing of 
buyback matters, because when the share buybacks happen at the beginning of the 
financial period, these shares are usually removed from outstanding shares for the 
whole period, whereas if the shares buyback happens at the end of the fiscal period,  the 
EPS denominator is unaffected in that period (Farrell et al., 2013). However, the third 
element decreases EPS by reducing the numerator because of foregone returns of cash 
used in the buyback. Share buyback programs are accretive only when the timing and 
the amount are sufficient to outweigh the decretive impact of the foregone returns 
(Horan, 2012; Hribar et al., 2006). 
 
Bens et al. (2003) examined employing share buybacks to mitigate EPS dilution caused 
by the exercise of employee stock options. They found that share buybacks increase in 
the years when managerial stock options related to EPS dilution increases and annual 
earnings are below the level required to sustain past EPS growth rates. Along the same 
line, Hribar et al. (2006) indicated that firms engage in share buyback programs to meet 
analysts’ EPS forecasts. Furthermore, Burnett et al. (2012) provided evidence that high 
audit quality firms are more likely to use share buyback programs to manage EPSs and 
are less likely to use accrual-based earnings management because the risk for deducting 




In Malaysia, Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) examined whether firms listed on the 
Bursa Malaysia engage in activities related to accretive share buybacks. The authors 
also attempted to identify the nature of the association between the amount of accretive 
share buyback and EPS analysts’ forecast under the lens of prospect theory. The results 
showed that 251 of the sample observations of 453 share buyback firm-observations 
over the years from 2001 to 2008 were accretive shares buyback, which represents 55% 
of actual buyback activities as presented in Chapter One, Figure 1.2. The results also 
show that firms engage in accretive share buybacks to match analysts’ EPS 
expectations.  
 
Moreover, Abdul Latif, NishamTaufil, and Kamardin (2016) found that Malaysian 
firms frequently bought back their shares to manage reported EPS. Recently, Chandren, 
Ahmad, and Ali (2017) examined the impact of accretive buyback activities on firm 
performance and found no adverse effects for accretive buyback on the long-term 
performance of firms. The current study investigates the role of corporate governance 
mechanisms and stock options (ESOS) in limiting the practices of real earnings 
management, proxied by accretive share buyback activities of Malaysian firms. 
 
2.7 Summary 
This chapter comprised a review of the definitions and types of share buyback 
programs. It also displayed the trends of share buybacks activities in some developed 
countries and many Asian markets. This chapter discussed share buyback activities in 
Malaysia in terms of trends and regulations. Further, the motivations and the economic 
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effect of share buyback programs were discussed in this chapter. Finally, the current 























3 CHAPTER THREE:  
UNDERPINNING THEORIES, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
MECHANISMS, OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE, AND ESOS 
 
3.0 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter mainly reviews the theoretical and empirical literature that has been 
carried out in the area of this study. This chapter starts with a discussion of the 
underpinning theories of the current study including agency theory, resource 
dependence theory and the stock options hypothesis. It also discusses the connections 
of corporate governance mechanisms, namely, BOD effectiveness, AC effectiveness 
and audit quality with share buybacks and earnings management activities. The chapter 
also contains a debate about ownership structure variables including family, managerial 
and foreign ownership with share buybacks and earnings management. Finally, the role 
of employee stock options in accretive share buyback is presented in this chapter. 
   
3.1 Underpinning Theories 
This section highlights the theories utilised in the current study. Although several theories 
are related to corporate governance mechanisms, this study focuses on agency theory and 
resource dependency theory, which has become prominent in the recent times. This study 
also considers the stock options hypothesis as motivation for accretive share buybacks. 
 
3.1.1 Agency Theory  
Berle and Means’s (1932) study regarding the separation between shareholding and 
control of great corporations is a fundamental source of agency theory (Walsh & 
Seward, 1990). Jensen and Meckling (1976) established the agency theory to clarify the 
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association between the principal (shareholders) and the agent (managers). Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) explained the agency relationship as a contract between the owners 
and management authorising the second party (management) to make decisions 
pertaining to the benefits of the first party (owners) and then maximising the value of 
the firms. However, the agency theory suggests that a manager would tend to maximise 
their personal interests at the expense of maximisation of shareholders’ wealth due to 
the information asymmetry among the managers and owners (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
 
However, in countries having a high ownership concentration, agency problems stem 
from the interest conflicts between insider shareholders (majority) and outside 
shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Controlling shareholders who are also the managers of a 
firm may exert manipulation actions to achieve personal interests rather than 
maximising the wealth of shareholders especially those of minority shareholders (Omar 
& Mohd-Saleh, 2011). Because insiders hold more information on a firm’s positions 
than outside shareholders, agency theory predicts that insiders may choose the method 
and amount of payout policy that maximises their interests instead of maximising the 
wealth of shareholders (Jensen, 1986).  
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argued that the ownership structure may affect the 
structure and amount of corporate payout policy under the existence of agency costs. 
Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) provided evidence that the agency problem in Asian 
countries exists between minority shareholders and controlling shareholders because 
family and individual investors highly concentrate the ownership in those countries. 
54 
 
Jiraporn (2006) argued that a strong protection mechanism for shareholders has a 
significant and positive influence on share buyback programs whereby they force 
managers to return cash via share buyback programs. For example, corporate managers 
may engage in share buyback programs to gain personal benefit from a positive 
performance of share price (Chan et al., 2010; Wu, 2012a) or a modification of EPS 
(Burnett et al., 2012). 
 
A share buyback is a method to return cash from the firm to shareholders (Dittmar, 
2000; Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000; Grullon & Michaely, 2002). Prior studies have 
suggested that share buyback programs are commonly realised as positive economic 
signals that are beneficial to investors (Abdul Latif et al., 2014; Grullon & Ikenberry, 
2000; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Oswald & Young, 2004b). Therefore, when 
managers are under substantial pressure to raise share price, they may announce share 
buyback programs to send a false signal to investors (Chan et al., 2010; Wu, 2012a). In 
addition, the discretion provided by regulations grants managers the flexibility to 
employ share buyback programs as a method to manipulate EPS to match analysts’ 
forecasts (Bens et al., 2003; Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Farrell et al., 2014; Hribar 
et al., 2006).  
 
Furthermore, De Cesari, Espenlaub, Khurshed, and Simkovic (2012) provided evidence 
that share buyback programs are timed for achieving benefits for non-selling 
shareholders, and these benefits are significantly linked to ownership structure. Fried 
(2005) disputed that non-selling owners gain benefits from the buyback process pro rata 
to their pre-share buyback shareholdings. Fried (2005) found that the larger the 
ownership of insiders, the more they benefit and the greater are their motivations to 
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time a share buyback. In Malaysia, Abdul Latiff and Taufil Mohd (2014) reported a 
strong relationship between managerial ownership and actual share buyback activities. 
Siew-Peng and Isa (2015) conducted a survey about managers’ incentives to be 
involved in share buyback activities in Malaysia and indicated that 23% of the managers 
engaged in buyback activities to manage reported EPS. Recently, Abdul Latif, 
NishamTaufil, and Kamardin (2016) provided evidence that Malaysian firms were 
frequently involved in share buyback activities to manipulate reported EPS. 
 
Overall, agency theory utilises the concern concept in reviewing the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms to oversee managers of the public listed firm worldwide. 
Agency theory considers corporate governance mechanisms, internal mechanisms, 
external auditing and ownership as reducing agency problems created from the 
separation of the ownership of the firms and their control, as well as the agency problem 
between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in the case of an 
emerging market with high ownership concentration (Claessens et al., 2000; Epps & 
Ismail, 2009; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Saleh et al., 2005). Corporate governance 
mechanisms mitigate the opportunistic behaviours of management, which leads to 
decrease agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; McKnight & Weir, 2009; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
 
Based on the agency theory and the above scenario, corporate governance through the 
BOD, the AC, and external auditing is a device for shareholders to monitor 
management’s actions accurately. Weak monitoring of the management may provide 
chances for managers and dominant shareholders to satisfy their own interests. As 
mentioned above, share buyback programs are employed by firm managers to manage 
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EPS. Therefore, this current study assumes that effective corporate monitoring through 
good corporate governance may minimise management’s accretive shares buyback 
activities. In addition, this study purposes that a firm’s ownership structure may 
substantially influence the accretive shares buyback activities. 
 
3.1.2 Resource Dependence Theory 
In addition to agency theory that explains the role of corporate governance attributes in 
monitoring firm management, the resource dependence theory is another important 
theory that clarifies the role of external directors with relevant knowledge and 
experience in enhancing firms’ control and performance. Pfeffer (1972) and Pfeffer and 
Salancik (1978) developed this theory to highlight the function of non-executive 
directors (external directors). The theory presumes that non-executive directors on the 
BOD provide more choices of resources for a firm and enhances its ability to contact 
with the external environment, which leads to a decrease the uncertainty in the market 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kassim, 2013; Pfeffer, 1972).  
 
Much of the existing literature that employs resource dependency theory examines the 
BOD focusing on BOD composition and BOD size as indicators of the ability of the 
BOD to provide value-added resources for control and performance (Dalton, Daily, 
EllstrandL, & Johnson, 1998; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Ho & Williams, 2003; Ishak & 
Manaf, 2013; Sultana et al., 2015; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Dalton et al. (1998) 
conducted a meta-analysis regarding the role of BOD attributes such as size and 
composition in relationship to firm performance and concluded that the success of firms 
depends on their interactions with the external environment. Hillman, Cannella, and 
Paetzold (2000) advocated that directors provide various valued-added resources a firm 
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including unique skills, special information and access to key constituents such as 
suppliers, educators, environmental groups and government policymakers. Those 
resources provided by external directors may assist firms in mitigating the 
management’s manipulation actions and improving a firm’s value. 
 
According to resource dependence theory, a larger size of AC provides a chance to 
appoint members with various value-added qualities including knowledge, expertise 
and experience (DeZoort et al., 2003; Turley & Zaman, 2007). Experienced members 
enable the AC to hold power over financial accounting information and linked 
disclosures instead of relying on corporate management and the external auditors 
(Sultana, Singh, Der Zahn, & Mitchell, 2015). For instance, Ghafran and O’Sullivan 
(2013) also reported that a consensus existed among previous studies that the 
independence and financial expertise of ACs have a positive effect on the quality of 
financial statements and alleviation of manipulation behaviours. 
 
Finally, based on the dependence resource theory, a large proportion of external 
directors on the BOD and its sub-committee may provide firms with skills, experience 
and knowledge that would mitigate managerial behaviours related to earnings 
manipulation. Prior studies have shown that share buyback programs are often 
employed by insiders for opportunistic purposes like managing EPS (Hribar et al., 
2006) or the expropriation of rights and benefits of minority shareholders (De Cesari et 
al., 2012; Massa et al., 2007). Thus, this current study proposes that a large number of 
outside directors on the BOD and its committees with relevant skills and experience in 




3.1.3 Stock Option Hypothesis  
The most mainly debated hypotheses of share buybacks are the signalling 
undervaluation hypothesis and free cash flow hypothesis. However, they are not enough 
to explain the dramatic increase in the share buyback programs. The innovations of 
using the stock of firms as compensation for executives and employees under stock 
options schemes may be considered to be one of the factors that explain the increase in 
buyback trends (Kahle, 2002). Two reasons exist for the firms with stock options 
scheme to embark on share buyback programs (Kahle, 2002; Wu et al., 2008). The first 
reason is that, when firm executives have a large number of stock options, they have 
incentives to engage in share buybacks, which leads to improving the price of 
undervalued price. The second reason is to avoid a reduction of EPS caused by stock 
options (Wu et al., 2008). Managers may frequently be involved in share buyback 
activities to increase stock prices that might benefit managerial stock options (Franks 
& Mayer, 2017). 
 
Dittmar (2000) and Weisbenner (2000) provided evidence that firms use shares 
buyback to decrease the dilution of EPS caused by stock options. Consistently, Kahle 
(2002) presented evidence that the total stock options of a firm have a positive 
association with share buyback programs. Kahle (2002) also found that exercisable 
stock options are significantly and positively associated with share buyback, whereas 
unexercisable stock options are not related share buyback, which means that firms 
embark on buyback programs to fund exercisable stock options. Bens, Nagar and Wong 
(2002) and Bens et al. (2003) focused on the dilutive impact of employee stock options 
(ESOS). Their results indicate that a share buyback is a managerial response to dilution 
in reported EPS caused by the stock options that are exercised.  
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Lamba and Miranda's (2010) study showed that the higher percentage of executive 
stock options outstanding, the more probable it is for firms to undertake larger open-
market share buyback programs. Lamba and Miranda (2010) also found that firms with 
a greater amount of executive stock options have less negative abnormal returns before 
a share buyback announcement. Conversely, Dominguez (2010), who examined the 
impact of employee stock options on share buybacks in the Swedish market, found no 
relationship between stock options and the magnitude of the payout policy (dividends 
payment and share buyback activities).  
 
This current study employs the stock options hypothesis, which assumes that firms with 
a significant level of stock options are more likely to exercise accretive shares buyback 
activities. As mentioned before, firm managers use share buybacks to mitigate the 
dilution of EPS incurred by the use of stock options. 
 
3.2 Corporate Governance in Malaysia  
The Asian financial crises1997-1998 has been considered as a wake-up call for the need 
for high-quality corporate governance in Malaysia (Liew, 2007; Sulong & Nor, 2008). 
The corporate landscape in Malaysia has been blemished by several cases of bad 
corporate governance firms such as Malaysia Airlines System, Renong and Perwaja 
Steel (Norwani et al., 2011). Several reasons are behind the failure of firms listed in the 
Malaysian market, which led to a weakness in investors’ confidence. Among these 
reasons were a lack of good corporate governance, insufficient transparency and the 
ineffectiveness of regulatory agencies in enforcing legislation in punishing offenders 




Therefore, the Financial Committee of Corporate Governance (FCCG) established the 
Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) to increase awareness and 
practices of good corporate governance in Malaysia (Muhamad Sori & Karbhari, 2005). 
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG) was published in March 2000. 
MCCG 2000 is divided into three parts, including principles and best practices and 
principles and best practices for other corporate participants, which firms should 
implement in their processes to help realise ideal governance framework. The code 
discusses several issues including the composition of the BOD and procedures of for 
the recruitment and remuneration of directors as well as the structure and functions of 
BOD committees. Some recommendations by the MCCG 2000 have already been 
adapted into the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements (BMLRs). Furthermore, the 
MCCG 2000 intended to enhance independence of the BOD and foster the transparency 
of relevant information in business procedures to support investors’ confidence and 
sustain integrity and accountability. 
 
The MCCG 2000 was revised in October 2007 by the Securities Commission of 
Malaysia (SC). The primary aims of the revised code (MCCG 2007) were to strengthen 
the BOD and ACs (SC, 2007). According to MCCG 2007, the BOD should undertake 
procedures to be carried out annually for assessing its effectiveness, individual director 
the BOD’s committees. The revised code in 2007 also provided several attributes for 
proposed directors such as knowledge, skills, expertise, integrity, professionalism and 
the ability of those directors to discharge their responsibilities (Kamardin & Haron, 
2011). Regarding ACs, MCCG 2007 requires the AC to comprise at least three 
members from the directors of the BOD, all of whom must be non-executive directors 
and the majority must be independent. Furthermore, MCCG 2007 recommends all 
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members of the AC should have financial expertise and at least one director serving on 
the committee should have a membership in an accounting association or have 
experience in the relevant bodies.  
 
In July 2011, the Securities Commission announced a new five-year Corporate 
Governance Blueprint (CG Blueprint). The Blueprint outlines an action plan to boost 
Malaysian corporate governance standards by strengthening market discipline and 
progressing greater internalisation of the culture of good corporate governance (SC, 
2011). The CG Blueprint comprises six chapters covering the role of BODs, 
institutional investors and gatekeepers, shareholder rights, disclosure and transparency 
and public and private enforcement (SC, 2011). The CG Blueprint was followed by the 
issuance of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance. 
 
3.2.1 The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG 2012) 
The MCCG 2012, which was officially established in March 2011, is considered a 
landmark in Malaysian corporate governance reform. MCCG 2012 is the first 
deliverable of the Corporate Governance Blueprint (CG Blueprint) and supersedes 
MCCG 2007. Unlike the previous codes, MCCG 2000 and MCCG 2007, that mainly 
focused on formations of governance packages, the BOD and its committees as well as 
the internal audit function, MCCG 2012 was intended to improve the effectiveness of 
internal mechanisms of Malaysian corporate governance.  
 
The main aim of MCCG 2012 was to improve the role and the responsibility of 
directors, to promote directors’ commitment and to foster effectiveness of the BOD’ 
structure, as well as to foster internal and external auditing. Compliance with the 
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MCCG 2012 by listed firms in Bursa Malaysia is voluntary, but corporate governance 
statements are subject to mandatory disclosure in an annual financial report (SC, 2012). 
MCCG 2012 focuses on clarifying the role and responsibilities of directors and 
improving directors’ commitment to discharging monitoring functions effectively. The 
code also attempts to foster auditing functions including an internal and external audit. 
 
MCCG 2012 contained eight principles, and each principle comprised numerous 
recommendations, which are standards expected to be adopted by Malaysian listed 
firms. The code also contains a commentary for each recommendation, which provides 
more details to help firms to understand and implement the recommendations.  The first 
principle is establishing clear role and responsibilities of the BOD. It requires the BOD 
to clarify and provide more details about; functions that are delegated to managers, 
ethical standards, sustainability, procedure allowing directors access information and 
devices and BOD charter. The second principle focuses on the composition of the BOD. 
This principle requires the BOD to establish a nomination committee, which is 
responsible for nominating appropriate directors for the BOD and its committees. 
 
The third principle is aimed at reinforcing the independence of directors, which requires 
the BOD to evaluate the independence of directors each financial year. It also limits the 
period of service of an independent director to no more than nine years as well as the 
majority of directors on the BOD should be independent in case of the BOD’s chairman 
is not independent. Principle four is about fostering the commitment and expertise of 




The fifth principle is concerned with AC effectiveness. The BOD must create an 
effective AC with a view to ensuring that a financial statement is reliable and relevant 
for investors and other related parties and is prepared in according to the applied 
financial reporting standards. This principle also covers the responsibilities of the AC 
in reviewing and monitoring independence and rationalizing an external audit. The AC 
should take a written assertion from external auditor to confirm its independence 
throughout audit process based on the professional and regulatory requirements. 
Principles six to eight are concerned with risk management and internal audit functions, 
including a timely and high-quality disclosure and enhancing the relationship between 
the firm’s management and its shareholders. 
 
In summary, the MCCG 2012 establishes broad principles and detailed 
recommendations on governance’s structures and processes, which are recommended 
for firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia to follow to create sufficient corporate 
governance. The MCCG 2012 enhances the effectiveness of a BOD’s leadership role 
by strengthening its structure and reinforcing its independence. It is also concerned with 
the role of the AC in assuring the integrity and quality of financial statements as well 
as independence and the suitability of an external audit.  Furthermore, the MCCG 2012 
encourages firms to create corporate disclosure policies that symbolise values of 
sufficient disclosure. 
 
3.2.2 The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2017 (MCCG 2017) 
Recently, the Securities Commission of Malaysia (SC) released a projected draft of the 
new code on corporate governance. The new code differs from the last one by adopting 
a different approach. This is an innovative approach that aims to inspire progression 
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and offers greater utility for firms and relevant stakeholders. The draft classifies 
corporate governance practices into two groups, which called Core and Core+ practices. 
Based on these rules, Firms must disclose their adherence to the Core practices or justify 
the use of an alternative basis. The Core+ contains exemplary practices that firms 
should follow to realize good governance practices (SC, 2016). The Securities 
Commission of Malaysia (SC) issued the final draft of MCCG 2017 on 26 April 2017. 
All listed firms with the financial year's end of 31 December 2017 are required to fulfil 
its requirements. The principal objective of MCCG 2017 is to strengthen the 
internalisation of a culture of good corporate governance with an emphasis on 
accountability and transparency.  
 
MCCG 2017 comprises three broad principles, which are related to a firm’s BOD, audit 
and risk management and stakeholders. The code also contains 36 practices and 
guidance in support of those principles. The new code is different from the previous 
one (MCCG 2012) in several ways. First, the MCCG adopts the “apply or explain the 
alternative” approach. BOD should apply MCCG 2017 with regard to the environment, 
size, and the nature of risks. If the BOD realizes difficulties in applying code practices, 
the BOD has the choice of applying a suitable alternative practice to achieve the same 
outcomes but must explain why they did so.  
 
Second, MCCG 2017 states that a two-tier voting process is required for the 
appointment of long-serving independent directors, which gives the same voting power 
to minority and majority shareholders. The new code also states that the BOD must be 
comprised of at least half of independent directors. Nevertheless, more than 50% of 
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BOD members have to be independent for large firms included in the Top 100 Index or 
firms with a minimum RM2 billion market capitalisation. 
 
Third, The MCCG 2017 states that firms must establish a strategy on gender diversity 
and openly disclose their strategies for assigning more women to the BOD, and large 
firms should assign a minimum of 30% women to the BOD. Fourth, the code requires 
firms to appoint independent directors to the AC, and the chairman of the AC should 
not be the chairman of the BOD. Finally, MCCG 2017 requires firms to disclose the 
remuneration of each director, including fees, salaries, bonuses and other payments. 
Similarly, the remuneration senior managers must be disclosed in bands of RM50,000 
(SC, 2017). 
 
3.3 Corporate Governance and Shares Buyback Programs 
Corporate governance, in the simplest aspect, means several procedures for governing 
a firm’s actions to safeguard the welfare of all shareholders. Andres and Vallelado 
(2008) mentioned that corporate governance is a set of mechanisms employed by 
stakeholders to confirm that directors and managers manage corporate resources in an 
efficient manner to achieve the best interests of firms. The separation between the 
owners and control has created the need to employ suitable governance instruments to 
confirm a sufficient alignment between the benefits of owners (principals) and 
management (agents). A substantial concern in corporate governance and corporate 
finance is the design of an effective mechanism of internal monitoring control that 




The corporate scandals of large firms, for example, Enron and WorldCom in United 
States and the United Kingdom in 2001 and 2002 have reduced investor’s confidence 
in the integrity of corporate disclosure, resulting in the questioning of corporate 
reporting. The collapses of high profile businesses around the world have highlighted 
the attention for reforms of corporate governance worldwide (Norwani et al., 2011). 
The primary attention has been placed the main players in the body of corporate 
governance such the BOD, the AC, managers, and auditors under a microscope 
(Norwani et al., 2011). The financial failure of several firms in Asia has led to the 
decline of investor’s confidence in the integrity of corporate disclosure and 
management acts (Hasnan, Rahman, & Mahenthiran, 2013; Johari, Saleh, Jaffar, & 
Hassan, 2009; Norwani, Mohamad, & Chek, 2011). 
 
Weakness in corporate governance systems and Asian financial crisis were  primary 
factors in shaking the confidence of  investors (Sawicki, 2009). Weak corporate 
governance and poor standards were blamed in part of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 
(Nam & Nam, 2004). Leng (2004) reported that, because of weak confidence of foreign 
investors in Asian countries, the authorities planned corporate governance reforms to 
recover investors’ trust. Corporate governance is an essential issue in developing 
countries because corporate governance is intrinsically linked to economic 
development (Pergola & Joseph, 2011).  
 
Corporate governance devices have a vital role in the monitoring function of firms in 
emerging markets because of weak market controls in developing countries (Lei & 
Song, 2004). Cohen et al. (2004) showed that internal mechanisms of corporate 
governance can improve financial reporting quality and decrease information 
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asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. Bujaki and McConomy (2002) indicated 
that investors typically consider the governance system of the firm when making 
investment decisions, and investors prefer to put higher investments in firms with good 
corporate governance. 
 
Several theories have been advanced to diminish the assumptions of perfect capital 
markets (Jiraporn, Kim, & Kim, 2011); one critical theory that has been extensively 
examined in the literature and has received supporting evidence is the agency theory. 
This theory concerns the agency problems created from the segregation of ownership 
(principal) from the control (agent) of firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Thus, due to 
information asymmetry arising between insiders and outsiders, managers may tend to 
the method and amount of payout policy to maximise their interests rather than 
maximizing the wealth of shareholders (Faccio et al., 2001; Jensen, 1986). Agency 
theory has been employed in existing academic studies to clarify the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms in reducing the manipulative actions of managers. In addition, 
resource dependence theory highlights the significant role of governance mechanisms 
in supporting and monitoring firm management  (Hillman et al., 2009). Kamardin and 
Haron (2011) found that non-executive directors and managerial ownership were 
positively related to the dimensions of the monitoring role of the BOD.  
 
To engage in share buyback programs, regulatory bodies in Malaysia, as mentioned in 
the last chapter, required the directors on the BOD first to propose share buybacks and 
then to receive approval from shareholders to exercise share buyback activities.  In 
other words, the BOD has the responsibility form making decisions regarding shares 
buyback, which dominant directors can exploit to achieve personal benefits. Corporate 
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governance mechanisms have the responsibility for monitoring the actions of 
management to align with the interests of all shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Prior 
studies have documented that good corporate governance has a positive connection with 
the economic effect of share buyback announcements on the market (Chahine et al., 
2011; Wu, 2012b), on the credibility of share buyback announcements (Wu, 2012b). 
These findings are in line with the notion that investors in firms with good governance 
and adequate minority protection are more informed and more confident in outcomes 
and decisions making of firms than their counterparts with weak governance (Wu, 
2012b; Wu & Wang, 2015).  
 
Based on the perspective of agency theory, majority shareholders may employ 
mechanisms or policy such as share buyback activities to achieve personal interest at 
the expense of outside shareholders (Wu, 2012a). Using share buyback activities to 
mitigate agency conflicts or otherwise as an earnings management device is widely 
dependent on the country-level investor protection environment (Haw, Ho, Hu, & 
Zhang, 2011). Prior studies have provided empirical evidence that share buyback 
activities are used to mislead investors (Chan et al., 2010) as well as to mimic the 
performance of good firms (Massa, Rehman, & Vermaelen, 2007). Furthermore, Farrell 
et al. (2013) found that firms with effective BOD are less likely to exercise accretive 
share buyback activities. Therefore, Wu (2012b) recommends examining the influence 
of corporate BOD on the managerial decision of share buyback programs. 
 
In Malaysia, several studies have examined the effect of internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance (BOD and AC features) on earnings quality and financial 
reporting quality measured by earnings management (e.g. Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 
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2016; Ahmed Hussein Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Chandrasegaram, Rahimansa, 
Rahman, Abdullah, & Mat, 2013; Hashim & Devi, 2008a). Abdul Latif et al. (2016) 
examined the impact of mechanisms of the BOD including BOD size and ethnic 
diversity on frequency of share buybacks and have found that a large-sized BOD can 
reduce the frequency of buyback activities. They also found that firms with a less 
diverse BOD are more likely to be involved in a share buyback to improve reported 
EPS frequently.  
 
Overall, the flexibility of the share buyback process through open market share buyback 
programs is related to firms in markets with high ownership concentration. This may 
motivate firm managers to use accretive share buybacks as a tool to manage EPS. 
Several prior studies have supported this notion, using accretive shares buyback as a 
mechanism to manage EPS (Bens et al., 2003; Bryan & Mason, 2016; Chandren & 
Nadarajan, 2013; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et al., 2006).  
 
However, to the best knowledge of this researcher, limited studies have been conducted 
on the association between corporate governance mechanisms and real earnings 
management by accretive share buyback activities. Thus, this study examines the 
impact of the BOD effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality, family ownership, 
managerial ownership, and foreign ownership on accretive shares buyback activities as 
a device for real earnings management. 
 
3.4  Board of Directors’ (BOD) Effectiveness   
The BOD is considered as a primary mechanism of internal corporate governance. The 
BOD is the key mechanism of corporate governance since it is expected to monitor and 
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protect the welfares of shareholders (Kassim, Ishak, & Manaf, 2013). The BOD is a 
monitoring device that assists in mitigating agency problems through executing due 
diligence on behalf of shareholders (Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Webb, 2008). 
The BOD has the responsibility for monitoring firm managers and to constrain their 
opportunistic behaviours and ensure that the rights of all shareholders are promoted 
(Abor & Fiador, 2013; Andres & Vallelado, 2008). Lefort and Urzúa (2008) argued that 
the BOD is the key monitoring device to control the actions of manager and to align 
them with shareholders’ interests. Fama and Jensen (1983) and  Jensen (1986) indicated 
that the key role of the BOD is to supervise and monitor management actions on behalf 
of the shareholders, veto poor investment-production decisions and give advice.  
 
With respect to views of  agency theory and resource dependence theory, the BOD is 
responsible for ensuring that managers run firm activities to maximise the wealth of 
shareholders rather than their own benefits (Ishak & Manaf, 2013; Al Matari, Al Swidi, 
& Fadzil, 2014; Saleh et al., 2005; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). Regarding share buybacks, 
Webb (2008) indicated that little evidence exists on whether the BOD features reduce 
the probability of insider trading with share buybacks. Moreover, Wu (2012b) 
suggested examining the role of the corporate BOD in the managerial decisions 
regarding share buyback programs. 
  
In emerging markets with high ownership concentration, the key role of the BOD is to 
monitor and control the controlling shareholder's actions to safeguard the rights of 
minority shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Fooladi (2012) reported that the 
corporate governance model in Malaysia is a one-tier system, in which the highest 
governing body in the firms is the BOD because shareholders do not hold complete 
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control over management’s decisions. The success of BOD in achieving its fiduciary 
responsibilities and monitoring roles can mitigate the manipulative behaviours of 
managers and hence increase a firm's value and boost the wealth of shareholders 
(Abdullah, 2004). Abdul Latif et al. (2016) found that a BOD with a large size and 
ethnic diversity can limit the frequency of share buyback activities used by managers 
for opportunistic purposes. Thus, an effective BOD is more likely to mitigate real 
earnings management such as accretive share buyback activities.  
 
According to MCCG 2000, the BOD should comprise a balanced structure including 
executive directors and independent non-executive directors to confirm that the 
decision making on the BOD is not dominated by a specific party. The code also 
recommended best practices in which the tasks of chairman of the BOD and chief 
executive officer (CEO) should not be held by the same person to enhance balance of 
power and authority (Abidin, Kamal, & Jusoff, 2014). MCCG 2012 has focused on the 
role and responsibilities of the BOD to reinforce its effectiveness in performing its 
responsibilities for protecting the interests of firm shareholders. MCCG 2012 primarily 
focuses on enhancing the effectiveness of the BOD through strengthening its 
composition and reinforcing its independence (SC, 2012). 
 
Okon and Amran (2014) indicated that, because the BOD holds the function of 
monitoring the interests of shareholders, they ought to have a greater interest in the 
appointment of directors to ensure that qualified, experienced and educated directors 
are appointed. The effectiveness of the BOD relies mainly on three of its attributes 
including: 1) composition, 2) size and 3) internal structure (De Andres et al., 2005). 
Abdullah (2004) and Fama and Jensen (1983) claimed that BOD leadership structure 
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and independence are essential characteristics that determine its effectiveness. Conger, 
Finegold and Lawler (1998) mentioned that independence, meetings and the expertise 
of the BOD are the main components necessary for the BOD effectiveness in 
discharging its monitoring role.  
 
Prior studies have developed composite governance scores to measure the BOD 
effectiveness. A composite score is utilised based on the viewpoint that argues that 
corporate governance is an interrelated system and is effective only in particular 
combinations rather than in isolated best practices (Aguilera, Filatotchev, Gospel, & 
Jackson, 2008; Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016). In addition, using a composite score for a 
corporate governance mechanism is a better research approach as particular 
mechanism’s effectiveness depends on other mechanisms (Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 
2009). Consequently, considering corporate governance mechanisms as a package 
gives a stronger outcome for measurement than just examining them individually 
(O’Sullivan et al., 2008).  
 
Previous studies have focused on several features representing the effectiveness of the 
BOD, which include independence, size, meeting and the financial expertise of the 
BOD, in exploring their relationship to earnings management activities (Abdul Latif et 
al., 2016; Ahmed, 2013; Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Chandren, Ahmad, & Ali, 2015; 
Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005; Xie, Davidson, & Dadalt, 2003). For the purpose of 
this current study, the score of the BOD effectiveness is represented by the most 





3.4.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Independence  
Chapter One of Bursa Malaysia Listing requirements (BMLRs) define an independent 
director as “a director who is independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgement 
or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer” (p. 105). An 
independent director is an individual director who is not an executive director, not a 
major shareholder, not a family member of any major shareholder, executive director 
or officer, not acting as representative or a nominee of any major shareholder or 
executive director and not engaging as an officer or advisor for the said firms (BMLRs, 
2015).  
 
The BMLRs state that a BOD of listed firms must comprise at minimum two 
independent members or one-third of the directors must be independent, whichever is 
the higher. The independence of the BOD is one main measure of the quality and the 
effectiveness of the BOD (Al-Matar, Al-Swidi, & Bt Fadzil, 2014). The independence 
of the BOD becomes a significant issue because the BOD represents the key mechanism 
of governance to monitor and control management actions, (Abdullah, 2004). Abidin 
et al. (2014) argued that the larger proportion of independent directors on the BODs, 
the more is the monitoring and control of the manipulation actions of managers and the 
more protection is provided for shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Previous studies  have documented that BOD independence has a positive influence on 
its effectiveness as a monitoring device for firm managers, whereby independent 
directors assist in protecting the wealth of shareholders (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Perry & Shivdasani, 2005; Song & Windram, 2004a). Fama and Jensen (1983) argued 
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that independent directors are important because they can control and make decisions. 
Therefore, the existence of independent directors on the BOD may assist in disclosing 
all relevant information to shareholders, monitoring and controlling the manipulative 
behaviours of management and objectively contributing in the assessment of the 
management (Abidin et al., 2014; Norwani et al., 2011).  
 
MCCG (2000) recommends that the BOD structure should be balanced with at least 
one-third of the directors to be independent directors to maintain objectivity in 
decisions of the BOD. MCCG (2012) was aimed to reinforce the independence of the 
BOD through recommending that the majority of directors must be independent in a 
situation in which the chairman of the BOD is non-independent director. It also limits 
the tenure of independent directors to be no more than nine years. Furthermore, the new 
code MCCG (2012) requires the BOD to evaluate the independence of independent 
directors annually. Abdul Latif, Kamardin, Taufil Mohd, and Adam (2013) claimed 
that, in countries with high ownership concentration such as Malaysia, the role of 
outside directors is extremely crucial for protecting the benefits of the minority 
shareholders. In firms with highly concentrated shareholding, the controlling 
shareholders are at the same time the executives and senior managers (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). 
 
3.4.1.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Independence and Earnings Management  
Agency theory argues that the separation between the principal (ownership of firms) 
and the agent (management) would hand managers the opportunity to achieve their 
benefits at the expense of the interests of owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Agency 
theory also highlights the significance of the existence of independent directors serving 
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on the BOD to effectively monitor management actions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In 
addition, resource dependence theory assumes that, when the BOD has external 
members, this representation would enrich the flow of relevant information, diminish 
the uncertainty of the market and secure resources for firms (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; 
Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
Prior studies have revealed empirical findings that enhance the role of independent 
directors serving on the BOD in limiting managerial practices of earnings management 
(Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent, 2005; Peasnell, Pope, & Young, 2000; Peasnell, 
Pope, & Young, 2005; Song & Windram, 2004a). Xie et al. (2003) also provided 
evidence that the larger percentage of independent directors serving on a BOD, the 
lower level of accrual-based earnings management. Further,  Siagian and Tresnaningsih 
(2011) found that, when the BOD has a large number of independent directors, the 
fewer are practices of accrual-based earnings management.  
 
Shiri, Vaghfi, Soltani and Esmaeli (2012) documented a negative connection between 
the percentage of independent directors serving on the BOD and discretionary accruals 
practices. This is in line with the contention that independent directors offer more 
monitoring for the BOD and lessen activities of earnings manipulation (Shiri et al., 
2012). Consistently, Alves (2014) provided evidence that independent directors on a 
BOD have a positive connection with earnings quality via decreasing earnings 
management. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) documented that a higher proportion of 
independent directors serving in family firms leads to less earnings management. 
However, Sun et al. (2014) failed to provide evidence supporting the role of 




In the Malaysian context, Saleh et al. (2005) found that the percentage of independent 
directors serving on the BOD had a significant and positive relationship with 
discretionary accruals projected to avoid losses. Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) and 
Abdullah and  Nasir (2004) revealed that a large percentage of independent directors 
on the BOD was not significantly associated with practices of earnings manipulation. 
In addition, Hashim and Devi (2008b) also showed a significant and positive 
relationship between the BOD independence and higher income-increasing earnings 
management. Recently, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015a) also documented a positive 
connection between BOD independence and discretionary accruals as a measure of 
earnings quality. These results are inconsistent with the estimations of agency theory.  
Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) and Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015a) justified the 
unexpected findings via insufficient expertise of independent directors and the effect of 
the ownership structure in Malaysia, which has a highly concentrated ownership 
system.   
 
In the field of share buyback activities, only a few studies have examined the 
association between BOD independence and share buyback policy and these show 
inconclusive findings. Webb (2008) investigated the influence of the percentage of 
outside directors on the BOD on the proportion of shares announced to be repurchased 
scaled by outstanding shares in US banks. The results show that a significant and 
positive effect of outside directors serving on BOD with the proportion of shares 
repurchased in the banks. However, using a sample of 255 listed firms in Australian 
market over the years from 2004 to 2010, Yarram (2013) found no strong connection 




 Further, Wu (2012b) documented a positive association between independent directors 
serving on the BOD and the credibility of share buyback announcements. Farrell et al. 
(2013) showed that firms with more independent directors serving on the BOD were 
less likely to practice earnings management through accretive share buybacks. 
Recently, Alquhaif et al. (2017) found a significant relationship between BOD 
independence and accretive share buyback activities in the Malaysian context. 
Chandren et al. (2015) documented a positive association between BOD independence 
and accretive share buybacks. They justified these unexpected results as being the effect 
of management dominance on independent directors as well as their insufficient 
knowledge about real activities manipulation through accretive share buybacks.  
 
In summary, the evidence of the effectiveness of independent directors on earnings 
management activities and earnings quality is mixed. Specifically, most evidence of 
earnings management and BOD independence in Malaysia is insignificant and positive 
with earnings management as mentioned before, which is a conflict with agency theory 
and resource dependence theory. Several studies have justified these results by means 
of ownership concentration as well as the features of the independent directors (Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Hashim & Devi, 2008a). 
Therefore, this current study focuses not only on the percentage of independent 
directors, but also focuses on the other features such as the size of the BOD, the 
frequency of their meetings and the financial expertise of BOD members to investigate 





3.4.2 Board of Directors (BOD) Size  
BOD size or the number of directors serving on BOD is a major factor in the 
effectiveness of the BOD (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Ismail, Dunstan, & Van Zijl, 
2010). BOD size is an important characteristic of the BOD that affect its effectiveness 
and the financial reporting quality (Beasley, 1996; Salihi & Jibril, 2015; Xie et al., 
2003). Jensen (1993) opined that the optimal number of directors serving on a BOD is 
about eight directors, as any larger number is more likely to limit group dynamics and 
constrain BOD performance. In Malaysia, MCCG (2000) recommends that the impact 
of the number of directors on the effectiveness of the BOD should be considered, but 
the code does not recommend any identified size (Hashim & Devi, 2008a). Existing 
studies have revealed that the average number of members on the BOD in Malaysian 
firms is eight members (Abdullah, 2004; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2011; Germain, Galy, 
& Lee, 2012; Wan Abdullah, Shahnaz, & Nurasyikin, 2008).  
 
Theoretically, two opposing arguments viewing of the impact of BOD size on BOD 
effectiveness. Agency theory generally supports a negative association between the 
BOD size and its effectiveness, arguing that problems of poor communication, 
coordination and decision making are more likely to dominate BODs with a large 
number of directors (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Epps & Ismail, 
2009; Pathan & Faff, 2011). Additionally, the excessive CEO control is more likely to 
dominate BODs with a large number of directors and, thus, constrain the monitoring 
and control functions of the BOD, which then increases the chance for manipulation 




On the other hand, resource dependency theory argues that large BODs increase a 
firm’s opportunity to access more resources and improve the information processing 
capabilities of BODs that, in turn, improve the quality of advice provided to firm 
management (Dalton et al., 1999; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Furthermore, larger BODs provide more balance to BOD discussions, promote the 
process of decision making and increase the harmony among stakeholders of firms (Ho 
& Williams, 2003). Xie et al. (2003) claimed that a large number of directors serving 
on a BOD may limit practices of earnings manipulation relative to a BOD of a smaller 
size because larger BODs have more chances to hold more independent members with 
a high level of corporate and financial skills. 
 
3.4.2.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Size and Earnings Management  
Previous studies have provided empirical evidence that BOD efficiency can decline if 
the BOD size is too large (Epps & Ismail, 2009), which supports the assumption of 
agency theory. For example, Epps and Ismail (2009) found that BODs with a small size 
limit accruals-based earnings management. Dimitropoulos (2011) showed that the size 
of the BOD had a positive association with earnings manipulation practices. Chekili 
(2012) found a positive association between the BOD size and earnings management. 
Furthermore, Kumari and Pattanayak (2014) and Zgarni, Halioui, and Zehri (2014) 
documented that the BOD size was positively and significantly related to earnings 
management practices. Recently, Salihi and Jibril (2015) provided evidence that a 
larger number of directors on the BOD is not efficient in mitigating the tendency for 
earnings management. In Malaysia, Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) documented that 
earnings management activities have positive connections with BOD size. Hashim and 
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Devi (2008a) also provided evidence that BOD size and accruals quality were 
significantly and negatively associated at the 10% level. 
 
Conversely, several studies have supported the argument of resource dependency 
theory that a large BOD size enhances the ability of the BOD in the monitoring and 
supervision of management. Andres and Vallelado  (2008) claimed that a large number 
of directors in the BOD provides sufficient monitors and advisors who contribute to 
lessening the discretionary power of corporate managers. Andres and Vallelado (2008) 
also argued that a large number of monitors enhances the quality of strategic decisions 
through providing the integrated skills and expertise of directors with the experience of 
CEO and senior managers.  
 
Aygun, Ic, and Arvas (2010) also reviewed the connection between the BOD features 
and managing earnings activities. The result showed a negative association between the 
BOD size and accounting manipulation. Ghosh, Marra, and Moon (2010) also found 
that firms having a smaller BOD size practice larger discretionary accruals, suggesting 
that a larger number of directors on the BOD holding a greater range of knowledge is 
more effective in oversight and monitoring financial reporting. However, Sun et al. 
(2014) failed to provide evidence that supports the role of the BOD size in constraining 
real earnings management. 
 
Regarding share buyback activities, only a few researchers have examined the 
association between BOD size and share buyback activities. The findings are also 
inconclusive. Wu (2012) revealed a positive and significant relationship between BOD 
size and share buyback announcement. This result means that investors consider and 
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appreciate the role of a large BOD in monitoring share buyback decisions. Further, 
Yarram (2013) found that no significant linkage between BOD sizes and share buyback.  
 
Abdul Latif et al. (2016) examined the impact of the size of the BOD on the frequency 
share buybacks activities and provided evidence that a large-sized BOD more likely to 
mitigate the frequency of buyback activities that managers employ to adjust reported 
EPS. However, Chandren et al. (2015) documented a positive association between BOD 
size and real earnings management by accretive share buyback. Recently, Alquhaif et 
al. (2017) examined the linkage between BOD size and accretive share buyback as a 
device for real earnings management and found an insignificant connection between 
BOD size and accretive share buyback activities in the Malaysian context.  
 
The discussions show mixed results on the influence of BOD size on the practice of 
earnings management. Ghosh, Marra, and Moon (2010) have mentioned that the effect 
of BOD size on the ability of the BODs in monitoring functions is ambiguous. Thus, 
this current study extends previous research by investigating the influence the size of 
the BOD on mitigating accretive share buybacks. 
 
3.4.3 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Meetings 
The main manner in which directors acquire needed information is by attending BOD 
meetings (Adams & Ferreira, 2012). According to Adams and Ferreira (2009), BOD 
meetings and attendance by members at these meetings is an important channel by 
which directors find specific relevant information for assisting in fulfilling their 
controlling and monitoring role. Furthermore, Wincent, Anokhin, and Ortqvist (2010)  
have argued that more frequent meetings of the BOD provide more chances to translate 
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BOD knowledge, expertise and skills into promoting a firm’s outcomes. In other words, 
frequent BOD meetings could help to overcome the problems related to a large BOD 
and provide directors with adequate time to discuss and rationalise a firm’s strategic 
decision making (Al-Musali, 2013). 
 
Xie et al. (2003) indicated that a BOD with more frequent meetings may be able to 
mitigate behaviours of earnings management. Along the same line, Adams (2005) and 
Vafeas (1999) mentioned that BOD meetings allow directors to play their important 
role of better monitoring and supervising effectively because providing rational advise 
to management is a primary role of the BOD. At the same time, directors can have easy 
access to information that may assist in bringing about effective monitoring and fair 
financial reporting (Vafeas, 1999).  
 
MCCG (2000) said that BODs should meet at regular times and disclose the number of 
meetings throughout a financial year with details of attendance for each director 
(Hashim & Devi, 2008a). Recently, MCCG (2012) aims to improve the monitoring role 
and the responsibility of directors and to promote their commitment to enhancing BOD 
effectiveness. Consequently, the BOD needs sufficient meetings for discussions and 
decisions making. 
 
3.4.3.1 Board of Directors (BOD) Meetings and Earnings Management  
From the perspective of agency theory, BOD meeting frequency is associated with the 
effectiveness of corporate BODs (Vafeas, 1999). Previous studies have provided 
empirical evidence on the role of BOD meetings in enhancing monitoring tasks of the 
BOD. For example, Sarkar, Sarkar, and Sen (2008) examined the effect the number of 
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BOD meetings by directors on opportunistic earnings manipulation. Using a sample of 
500 large Indian firms, the result showed that diligent directors effectively assist in 
reducing absolute discretionary accruals as a measure to limit opportunistic earnings 
management. Similarly, Klein (2002) claimed that the effectiveness of outside directors 
in reducing the earnings management actions of managers depends on the commitment 
of directors to attend BOD meetings. 
 
Moreover,  Vafeas' (1999) provided evidence that the frequency of the BOD meetings 
was an essential element of BOD oversight functions, which is associated with 
corporate governance and ownership features. Xie et al. (2003) found that BOD 
meeting frequency is negatively related to the level of discretionary accruals. Recently, 
Zgarni et al. (2014) found a negative effect for BOD meeting on real earnings 
management through sales and overproduction. However, Sukeecheep, Yarram, and 
Farooque (2013) failed to find evidence of the association between BOD meetings and 
earnings management in emerging market of Thailand.  
 
In the Malaysian context,  Mohamad, Abdul Rashid, and Shawtari (2012) documented 
that the BOD meetings negatively affected earnings management activities, suggesting 
that BOD meeting frequency is an effective governance mechanism that limits 
opportunistic activities of firm management. However, Hashim and  Devi (2008a) 
found no significant relationship between accruals quality and the frequency of BOD 
meetings. Chandren et al. (2015) documented an insignificant connection between the 





Based on the above discussion, the frequency of BOD meetings is essential because 
more frequent meetings may provide more sufficient time for expert directors to limit 
the manipulative actions of managers such as using share buyback programs to achieve 
personal benefits at the overall expense of shareholders’ interests. Thus, this current 
study investigates whether the frequency of BOD meetings contributes to mitigating 
accretive share buybacks. 
 
3.4.4 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Financial Expertise  
A director is an expert when that director has substantial skills, experience and 
knowledge of a firm’s business. MCCG (2007) recommends that the nominating 
committee should consider the skills, qualifications and expertise in recruiting 
directors. BMLRs (2013) also stated that the nominating committee must give regard 
to the mix of independence, expertise and diversity that are needed for a listed firm. 
BOD with relevant expertise and experience may be better at both monitoring and 
providing resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Empirical evidence reveals that BOD 
must comprise directors with good financial expertise to enhance the ability of the BOD 
to monitor the management (Yunos, Smith, & Ismail, 2012). 
 
Financial and accounting expertise is necessary for the directors to be able to monitor 
management actions to mitigate earnings management (Yunos et al., 2014). Directors 
with relevant expertise represent influential governance instruments to alleviate agency 
costs and safeguard shareholders’ wealth (Li, 1994). Amran and Che Ahmad (2011) 
mentioned that directors with professional expertise in relevant fields, such as finance, 
accounting, law and consultations, support managers in decision making. The shortage 
of financial and accounting knowledge and the experience of the BOD members was a 
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main factor that contributing to the financial failure of Enron and WorldCom 
(Lanfranconi & Robertson, 2002). 
 
BOD members expertise is critical in ensuring that the BOD has an effective monitoring 
role (Yunos et al., 2012). Carcello, Hermanson, Neal, and Riley (2002) examined the 
efficacy of governance mechanisms regarding auditing services and concluded that 
directors with financial expertise are crucial to create effective monitoring. Along the 
same line, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) reported evidence that aligns with the argument 
that the financial expertise of independent directors is significant in conducting 
oversight of a company’s financial reporting practices.  Abdullah and Nasir (2004) 
claimed that the independent directors who are nominated by the BOD must be financial 
and accounting experts to carry out oversight functions effectively.  
 
3.4.4.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Financial Expertise and Earnings 
Management  
Based on agency theory, the primary role of the BOD is to monitor managers and 
controlling shareholders to safeguard the benefits of minority shareholders (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Resource dependence theory also predicts that external directors will 
provide valuable expertise and advice for strategic areas and monitoring functions 
(Hillman et al., 2009). Prior empirical studies have documented that financial expertise 
of the directors on the BOD is a significant factor for assuring that the BOD’s 
monitoring role is effectively satisfied to reduce manipulative actions and, hence, 
improve the quality of financial statements (e.g., Al-Jaaidi, 2013; Burak Güner et al., 




Empirically, Xie et al. (2003) showed a negative relationship between the existence of 
financial experts on the BOD and the practice of earnings management. Burak Güner 
et al. (2008) explored several kinds of financial expertise, namely, finance professors, 
financial executives and bank executives. The study’s results revealed that nonbank 
financial executives promoted better governance. Custódio and Metzger (2014) found 
that financial expertise in the top management is particularly useful for firms with high 
information asymmetry. Recently, Martínez-Ferrero, García-Meca and García-Meca 
(2017) explored whether directors with financial expertise enhance earnings quality and 
provided evidence that financial expert directors have an effective role in improving 
earnings quality. However, Sun et al. (2014) failed to provide evidence that supports 
the effectiveness of financial expertise of directors in constraining real earnings 
management. 
 
In Malaysia, Yunos et al.'s (2012) study showed a significant connection between the 
financial expertise of BOD members and asymmetric timeliness, suggesting the 
accounting knowledge held by directors is important for controlling manipulative 
actions and producing transparent financial information. Yunos et al. (2014) found that 
directors with accounting knowledge played a vital role in limiting the manipulative 
actions of a firm’s management, which led to producing high transparency financial 
information. Recently, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) found that directors with 
financial expertise have an insignificant direct relationship with accruals earnings 
management. 
 
Because most studies primarily concentrate on financial expertise on the AC, only 
limited studies have explored the role of financial expertise on the BOD (Yunos et al., 
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2012). Based on the existing literature, directors should be more knowledgeable and 
expert in financial and accounting fields to improve the BOD’s ability to monitor and 
control firm management and, hence, reduce the probability of managing earnings such 
as using share buyback programs in managing EPS or expropriating minority 
shareholders. Therefore, the current study investigates the influence of the financial 
expertise of the BOD in constraining accretive share buybacks. 
 
3.5 Audit Committee (AC) Effectiveness  
The AC is a sub-committee of the BOD (Salleh & Che Haat, 2013), its members are 
nominated from the members of the BOD. The AC is a communication channel among 
the BOD, the internal auditor, the external auditor, and executive officers (Song & 
Windram, 2004). An effective AC assists to improve corporate governance practice of 
firms (Sori, Hamid, & Nassir, 2006). This ACs can alleviate agency problems by 
decreasing the information asymmetry between managers and outside shareholders (Al-
Najjar, 2011; Klein, 1998; Madi et al., 2014), and also among controlling shareholders 
and minority shareholders in countries with high ownership concentrations (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). The primary role of ACs is to act as an internal control mechanism to 
monitor the financial reporting process effectively (Salleh & Che Haat, 2014; Song & 
Windram, 2004). Thus, an effective AC may be able to mitigate the involvement of 
managers in real earnings management through accretive share buybacks. 
 
The role of the AC is to protect a firm by its authority to ask top management about the 
handling of financial reporting responsibilities, as well as to verify that corrective and 
relevant actions are made (Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin, 2015). Based on the 
perspective of agency theory, AC effectiveness in achieving its duties depends on its 
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features (García et al., 2012; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Song & Windram, 2004a). 
Resource dependence theory also explains the role of non-executive independent 
directors in providing more choices of resources for the firm and in improving its ability 
to contact with the external environment, which leads to a decrease in market 
uncertainty (Kassim, 2013; Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
In the Malaysian context, MCCG 2000 required the BOD to establish the AC which 
comprises at least three members and a majority of whom are independent members. 
However, revised MCCG in 2007 required that entire members of the AC should be 
non-executive directors (Salleh & Che Haat, 2013). MCCG (2000) points out that AC 
with adequate independence may enhance the oversight role of governance 
mechanisms. The AC also improves the independence of external auditors (Liew, 
2007). Subsequently, MCCG (2007) reinforces the role of AC by requiring all listed 
firms to establish an internal audit function. It also supports the independence of 
internal audit functions by regulating that head of internal audit should report directly 
to the AC (Ghazali & Manab, 2013). 
 
Chapter Fifteen of BMLRS states that an AC must comprise a minimum of three 
members of non-executive directors, and the majority of them must be independent 
directors (BMLRS, 2013). Based on BMLRs, AC’s functions are to review and report 
to the BOD regarding: 1) procedures and activities related to external auditors such as 
the audit plan, evolutions of internal control system, the external audit report and the 
processes of internal audit functions, 2) capability of functions, resource and reports of 
the internal audit functions, 3) quarterly and annual financial statements and 4) the 




 MCCG (2012) in principle four and its recommendations outlines the role and function 
of the AC. It highlights that an AC should confirm financial statements prepared in 
complying with applicable financial reporting standards; it also has the responsibility 
to evaluate the independence and suitability of external auditors. Furthermore, MCCG 
(2012) considers the serving tenure of independent directors to be a maximum nine 
years and recommends assessing the independence of independent directors each year. 
 
The prior empirical literature mentions that the AC effectiveness relies on its 
independent, its size, its frequency of meetings and the financial expertise of its 
members (Beasley et al., 2009; Davidson et al., 2005; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013; 
Goodwin-Stewait & Kent, 2006). Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2013) also examined 
attributes of the AC as indicators of its effectiveness, including independence, financial 
expertise and the frequency of meetings.  However, a lack of literature existed on the 
relationship between the AC and accretive share buyback practices. This study 
examines the effect of AC effectiveness, proxied by independence, size, meeting and 
financial expertise, on accretive share buybacks. 
  
3.5.1 Audit Committee (AC) Independence 
AC Independence has been recognised as one of the main factors that improve AC 
effectiveness (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013; Klein, 2002). MCCG 2007 attempted to 
reinforce the role of ACs by recommending that an AC should comprise completely 
non-executive directors. All members of the AC should have the ability to read, analyse 
and interpret financial statements, which lead to successfully fulfil their functions 
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(Ghazali & Manab, 2013). BMLRs (2013) stated that all members of the AC must be 
non-executive directors, and the majority of members must be independent directors.  
 
Klein (2002) opines that AC members are nominated to perform independently to 
handle conflicts between inside and outside players and that the independent directors 
of AC assist in improving the integrity of financial reporting. A meta-analysis 
conducted by Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) observed that an independent AC is more 
efficient in improving the quality of auditing, which, in turn, reduces the opportunity 
for manipulating earnings. Because independent directors are not directly affiliated 
with management, they would discharge their role and responsibilities more effectively, 
and, hence, they are more likely to be objective in their decisions (Abdullah, 2004; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
 
3.5.1.1 Audit Committee (AC) Independence and Earnings Management  
The agency theory explains the role of independent members in monitoring the agent’s 
activities and reducing the withholding of information (Apadore & Noor, 2013). 
Consistent with the view of resource dependence theory, Cohen, Dey, and Lys (2008) 
argued that the presence of a substantial number of independent directors is suitable for 
firms that need efficient access to relevant resources and knowledge that enhance the 
ability of AC members to perform their roles effectively. Several empirical studies have 
investigated the role of independent directors of the AC with respect to the quality of 
earnings (e.g., Abdul Latiff & Taib, 2011; Cohen et al., 2004; Ismail, Dunstan, & Van 




Klein (2002) found that independent members of the AC were negatively related to 
abnormal accruals while reductions in this independence led to increasing abnormal 
accruals. Additionally, Ghafran and O’Sullivan (2012) documented that an AC with a 
larger number of independent members is more likely to seek a higher level of audit 
quality. Bukit and Iskandar's (2009) study indicated that the independence of an AC 
supports large surplus free cash flow firms to decrease earnings management practices. 
Further, Shiri et al. (2012) provided evidence that proportion of independent members 
in AC had a negative association with abnormal accruals. The above results indicated 
that an ACs’ effectiveness is higher when the committee has more independent 
directors. 
 
Conversely, Xie et al. (2003) had results that did not support the role of independent 
members of the AC in constraining earnings management practices. Felo, 
Krishnamurthy and Solieri (2003) also documented that independence of AC had no 
relationship with accruals earnings management. Along the same line,  García et al. 
(2012) found no significant connection between the percentage of independent 
members who served on an AC and earnings manipulation. Adiguzel (2013) also 
reviewed the role of independent members performing in the committee in limiting the 
earnings management behaviours of family-controlled firms in emerging markets. The 
outcomes of the study showed that that proportion of AC’s independent members was 
not significantly connected with earnings management actions. 
 
In the Malaysian context, Saleh et al. (2007) documented that the independence of the 
AC had a negative linkage with earnings management. Yunos (2011) provided 
evidenced that a significant and negative relationship existed between the number of 
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independent members serving on the AC and discretionary accruals. Hussain Alkdai 
and Hanefah (2012) also found that directors who are independent, non-executive and 
serve on the AC had a significant and negative connection with the practice of 
discretionary accruals employed as a measure for earnings management.  
 
Salleh and Che Haat (2014) examined the impact of AC independence on earnings 
management pre and post MCCG 2007 and found that AC independence in the post 
revised MCCG 2007 period was more effective in limiting earnings management 
compared to pre revised MCCG 2007 period. However, Chandrasegaram et al. (2013) 
used discretionary accrual as a measure for earnings management and found that firms 
with either an AC with 100% independent members or non-100% had an insignificant 
relation with discretionary accruals. Recently, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) found 
that AC independence had a significant and direct relationship with accruals earnings 
management. However, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) found an insignificant 
association between independence of AC and real earnings management. 
 
In summary, the results of previous studies on the relationship between earnings 
management activities and presence of independent members of the AC have been 
mixed. Furthermore, an insufficient number of studies have been conducted on the 
connection between AC and accretive shares buyback. Therefore, this study examines 
the influence of independent members of the AC on mitigating accretive share 






3.5.2 Audit Committee (AC) Size 
BMLRs states that an AC must comprise a minimum of three members, none of whom 
must be executive directors, and the majority of the members must be independent 
directors of the BOD. Regulators and policymakers are aware of the importance of a 
the number of directors and the relationship with AC effectiveness (Bédard & Gendron, 
2010). Ismail et al. (2010) reported that the AC size has an important impact on its 
decisions, and an AC with a small number of directors has better coordination. Bédard 
and Gendron (2010) conducted meta-analysis to highlight the role that AC size plays 
on the effectiveness of the committee and found that most studies supported the major 
role of the size of the AC on effective monitoring. 
 
3.5.2.1 Audit Committee (AC) Size and Earnings Management  
From the perspective of resource dependence theory, a significant number of 
independent members on an AC would provide a good mixture of expertise, skills and 
experience as well as a valuable network with relevant parties, which, in turn, enriches 
the capability of an AC to discharge its functions effectively (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 
2015b). Previous studies have found a negative association between the size of the AC 
and earnings management actions. For example, Xie et al. (2003) documented a 
negative connection between the magnitude of members serving on an AC and earnings 
management. Felo et al. (2003) indicated that there was a positive association between 
AC size and the quality of financial reporting. 
 
Ghosh et al. (2010) found that discretionary accruals are significant in firms with small 
ACs, suggesting that an AC with a large number of members possessed sufficient skills 
and knowledge and is more effective in monitoring financial reporting. Salihi and Jibril 
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(2015) documented that an AC with a large size had a negative and significant 
connection with the magnitude of earnings management. However, Inaam, Khmoussi, 
and Fatma (2012) found that the number of AC members was positively connected to 
real earnings manipulation through both sales manipulation and overproduction. 
However, Sun et al. (2014) failed to provide evidence supporting the role of AC size in 
constraining real earnings management. 
 
In the Malaysian context, several prior studies have documented positive connection 
between the size of the AC and earnings management actions, which suggests that the 
size of an AC is not effective in limiting management manipulations. Abdul Rahman 
and Ali’s (2006) study shows that the manipulation of the accounting process was 
positively associated with the size of the AC in a sample of 97 firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia over the period from 2002 to 2003. However,  Ismail et al. (2010),  using 1625 
observations of Malaysian firms for the period from 2003 to 2007, found that the 
number of AC members had a positively and significant relationship with the level of 
earnings quality. Similarly, Ahmad-Zaluki and Wan-Hussin (2010) documented a 
significant and positive association between the number of members serving on the AC 
and the earnings quality of Malaysian initial public offering (IPO) firms.  
 
Nelson and Jamil (2012) used 120 government-linked observations of Malaysian firms 
over the years from 2003 to 2009 to test the link between AC size and the earnings 
management. The result of the study aligns with Chandrasegaram et al.'s (2013) view 
that no significant association existed between the size of the AC and earnings 
management, using discretionary accruals to measure earnings management. 
95 
 
Additionally, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) documented an insignificant 
association between the size of the AC and real earnings management. 
 
As presented by the above discussion, previous studies focusing on the effect of AC 
size on earnings quality and earnings management have shown inconclusive results. 
Additionally, to the best knowledge of this researcher, no study has explored the role 
of AC effectiveness such as the size of the AC in accretive share buyback activities. 
Therefore, this research aims to fill the gap in the literature of accretive shares buybacks 
as a proxy for real earnings management. 
 
3.5.3 Audit Committee (AC) Meetings  
The frequency of AC meetings is seen as metric to the level of diligence and monitoring 
that members of an AC exercise (Ghosh et al., 2010; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). 
More frequent meetings performed of AC as seen as an indicator of higher effectiveness 
whereas a low frequency of meetings is seen as an indicator of the lower effectiveness 
of an AC (Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). MCCG (2007) outlines the guidelines on 
the formation and functions of the AC, which include frequent AC meetings to ensure 
effective practices of corporate governance. Subsequently, the requirements of the AC 
structure are authorised in the BMLRs, which stated that all firms listed on the Bursa 
Malaysia must comply with these requirements or face sanctions (Chandrasegaram et 
al., 2013). 
 
Saleh et al. (2007) indicated that frequent meetings of an AC are a vital factor in 
realising its tasks. Agrawal and Chadha (2005) argued that it may be difficult for a small 
group of external members to detect accounting irregularities or fraud in complex firms 
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in a short time. Additionally, Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) opined that more frequent 
meetings would provide more time for ACs to monitor the process of a firm’s corporate 
reporting more effectively.  
 
3.5.3.1 Audit Committee (AC) Meetings and Earnings Management  
Previous studies have indicated a substantial connection between AC meetings and 
earnings manipulation (Beasley et al., 2009; Saleh et al., 2007). García et al. (2012) 
focused on the effect of the number of AC meeting on enhancing its effectiveness. The 
study provides evidence of a negative association between the frequency of the 
activities of the committee and practice of abnormal accruals, which means that the 
more often ACs meet, the greater the opportunity to detect potential mistakes in 
financial statements. Xie et al. (2003) also documented that a larger number of meetings 
conducted by AC is connected with a lower level of earnings manipulation. Further, 
Inaam et al. (2012) found that an AC that meets more often has a better chance to limit 
real earnings management as measured by sales manipulation. 
 
In Malaysia, Saleh et al. (2007) examined the relationship between the number of 
meetings by the AC and behaviours related to earnings manipulation. The study’s 
findings showed a negative linkage between earnings manipulation and meetings 
frequency of the AC. Salleh and Che Haat (2014) examined the impact of AC meetings 
on earnings management pre and post MCCG 2007 and provided evidence that AC 
meetings in the post revised MCCG period was more effective in limiting earnings 
management compared to pre revised MCCG period. However, Abdul Rahman and Ali 
(2006) documented no significant connection between the frequency of AC meetings 
and earnings manipulation behaviours. Along the same line, Chandrasegaram et al. 
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(2013) provided evidence that a very low relationship existed between the frequency of 
meetings of the AC and earnings manipulation as measured by discretionary accruals.  
Recently, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) found an insignificant association 
between the number of meetings of the AC and real earnings management. 
 
The above discussions demonstrated that inconclusive results are present in prior 
studies about the role of AC meetings with respect to earnings quality, which were 
measured through discretionary accruals. To the best knowledge of the researcher, no 
study has investigated the relationship between AC meeting frequency and share 
buyback programs, in particular, the accretive shares buyback. Therefore, the current 
study considers filling this gap. 
 
3.5.4 Audit Committee (AC)’s Financial Expertise 
MCCG 2007 says that all directors selected to serve on an AC should be about 
financially literate, and, at a minimum, one of them should have expertise in financial 
accounting. Recently, the Bursa Malaysia in 2013 adopted the same condition in its 
listing requirements (BMLRs). More precisely, BMLRs states that at least one member 
of AC either must be registered in the Malaysian Institute of Accountants as a member 
or otherwise the member should have working experience including “at least three years 
with (i) academic qualifications as listed in Part I of the First Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967, or (ii) a member of one of the recognised bodies list out in Part 
II of the First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967” (BMLRs). The definition of AC 
financial expertise used in Malaysia focuses only on the qualifications and experience 




The United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) considers a director as 
a financial expert when the director has expertise in the fields of accounting or finance, 
and supervisory skills also considered as relevant expertise (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
Accounting expertise is acquired from experience in work field as a qualified public 
accountant, auditor, accounting officer, chief financial officer or financial controller. 
Additionally, financial expertise is acquired from experience working in a finance field 
as a financial analyst or any other role related to financial management. Furthermore, 
supervisory expertise is acquired from supervising the preparation of financial reporting 
in the role of CEO or firm president (Dhaliwal et al., 2010).  
 
A financial expert serving on the AC with clear authority supported by sufficient 
regulations may constrain the earnings manipulative actions of firm managers 
(Badolato, Donelson, & Ege, 2013). Beasley et al. (2009) indicated that AC members 
should be experienced and knowledgeable in accounting principles and the procedures 
of auditing to enhance their oversight functions. In addition, Bédard and Gendron 
(2010) and Krishnan and Lee (2009) claimed that high-level managers and academics 
aware of the importance of an AC with financial expertise improve and enhance the 
effectiveness of financial reporting. Moreover, Emmerich, Racz and Unger (2005) 
documented that AC members need to have sufficient understanding of accounting and 
finance to act as effective monitors of the integrity of company’s financial reporting 
process and its disclosure practices. 
 
3.5.4.1 Audit Committee (AC) Financial Expertise and Earnings Management  
Agency theory explains the monitoring functions of expert directors in mitigating 
agency conflicts between managers and owners (Dalton et al., 1999; Nelson & Devi, 
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2013). Resource dependence theory also suggests that directors holding knowledge and 
expertise provide vitally, relevant resource and advice to improve a firm’s monitoring 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Existing empirical literature supports 
notion that AC financial expertise helps in limiting earnings management activities and 
improves the quality of financial reporting (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013). For instance, 
Xie et al. (2003) found that the percentage of AC members with corporate or investment 
banking backgrounds was negatively related to the magnitude of earnings management.  
 
Felo et al. (2003) also tested whether directors with financial expertise serving on an 
AC are associated with the quality of financial reporting. After controlling for the size 
of the company, the BOD’ composition, the existence of an ethics program, and 
institutional ownership, the results provided evidence that the proportion of AC 
members with accounting or financial management expertise was positively associated 
with the quality of financial reporting. Consistent with this Baxter and Cotter (2009) 
showed that a negative and significant association existed between the financial 
experience of the AC and accruals-based earnings management.  
 
Dhaliwal et al. (2010) found a positive relationship between the presence of an 
accounting financial expert on the AC and accruals quality, which was employed as a 
proxy for the quality of financial information. These results are in the same direction 
with Bedard et al. (2004), which reported a negative relationship between the presence 
of a financial expert on the AC and aggressive earnings management. Furthermore, 
Badolato et al. (2013) examined the effect of interactions between an AC member with 
both financial expertise and status on earnings management. The results show that ACs 
with both high relative status and financial expertise have more ability to constrain 
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earnings management actions, measured by abnormal accruals and accounting 
irregularities.  
 
Krishnan, Wen and Zhao (2011) examined whether an AC with legal expert members 
enhanced financial reporting quality, using two measurements of financial reporting 
quality, namely, accruals quality and discretionary accruals. The study found that the 
percentage of AC members with legal expertise had a positive association with financial 
reporting quality. Hassan and Ibrahim (2014) found that the financial literacy of AC is 
effective in limiting real earnings management actions. However, Sun et al. (2014) 
found an ineffective role for the financial expertise of AC members in constraining real 
earnings management. Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2017) explored whether financial 
experts on an AC improved earnings quality and found an effective role for the financial 
experts on an AC in enhancing earnings quality. 
 
In Malaysia, Saleh et al.'s (2007) study revealed that an AC more knowledgeable and 
experienced members recorded less earnings management, which is consistent with the 
argument that the more financial expert directors on AC the higher the quality of 
financial reporting and earnings. Yunos et al.'s (2012) study showed that a substantial 
association between AC financial expertise and asymmetric timeliness signified the 
significance of accounting knowledge for controlling the manipulative actions of 
managers and for producing transparent financial information.  
 
The results of previous studies support the value of legal requirements such as BMLRs 
and MCCG 2012, which required that all AC members should be financially literate 
with at least one being a member of a professional accounting body. Recently, 
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Bamahros and Bhasin (2016) focused on the role of former auditors in the effectiveness 
of an AC, and the results indicated that former auditors serving on an AC reduce the 
practice of discretionary accruals. 
 
However, Yeh and Chou (2014) failed to find a statistically significant connection 
between the existence of independent members with financial expertise in ACs and 
discretionary accruals as a measure of earnings quality. Along the same line, Al-Rassas 
and Kamardin (2015b) found no significant connection between the proportion of 
financial expert members on the AC and discretionary accruals. Haji-Abdullah and 
Wan-Hussin (2015) documented a low and significant association between the financial 
expertise of AC and real earnings management. Recently, Al-Rassas and Kamardin 
(2016) found that AC financial expertise had an insignificant direct relationship with 
accruals earnings management.  
 
From this research and the often conflicting results, the outcomes of the association 
between the financial expertise of an AC and earnings management activities are mixed 
especially in Malaysia. Thus, this current study examines the influence of the financial 
and accounting expertise of AC members on mitigating accretive share buybacks as a 
mechanism for real earnings management.  
 
3.6 Audit Quality  
Audit services are required as monitoring mechanisms to align the likely conflicts of 
interest between insiders (managers and controlling shareholders) and outsiders 
(minority shareholders) (DeAngelo, 1981; Watts & Zimmerman, 1981). An auditor is 
an independent person who is employed to review financial reports, internal control 
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mechanisms, and accounting information systems (Dandago & Binti Zamro, 2012). The 
ability of managers to use their discretion to achieve opportunistic purposes are limited 
when a company is audited by Big 6 auditors (Becker et al., 1998). Bedard and Biggs 
(1991) opined that the more  knowledge and experience auditors have, the more likely 
they have the ability to detect data mistakes in financial reporting.  
 
Qualified auditors assist in reducing information asymmetries among insiders and 
outsiders through improving the credibility of financial reports (Becker et al., 1998).   
The employment of qualified auditors assists in reducing the violations of accounting 
standards and limiting restatements of financial reports (Elshafie & Nyadroh, 2014; 
Romanus et al., 2008) and is positively correlated with the quality of disclosure (Dunn 
& Mayhew, 2004). The more an auditor is industry-specific, the more likely that auditor 
can recognise extraordinary transactions, have more experience in industry best 
practices and have better ability to determine control and inherent risks (Krishnan, 
2003). 
 
Large audit firms provide higher audit quality and provide more credibility to financial 
statements of clients than small audit firms (Lennox, 1999).  Francis and Yu (2009) and 
Francis, Maydew, and Sparks (1999) claimed that international brand of big audit firms 
is associated with the ability to effectively monitoring and achieve better audit quality 
than non-Big 6 audit firms. In addition, the largest audit firms are more commonly 
independent of their clients (Becker et al., 1998). Thus, previous studies employed Big 
6 firms as a proxy for audit quality (Becker et al., 1998). Nowadays, the audit firms 
include the Big 4 firms, namely, Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young, 




Many factors support using large audit firms as a measure of audit quality. Firms 
audited by Big 4 audit firms have low information asymmetry, better market prices and 
less aggressive earnings manipulation than firms using non-Big 4 audit firms (Francis 
& Yu, 2009; Thoopsamut & Jaikengkit, 2009). Big 4 audit firms have more experience 
and knowledge related to their clients and their specialisations. Hence,  Big 4 auditors 
are more likely to detect mistakes in financial reporting and the opportunistic 
behaviours of clients in comparison to non-Big auditors  (Francis & Yu, 2009; 
Krishnan, 2003).   
 
In Malaysia, in the period after the financial crisis of Asian countries 1997-1998, the 
role of auditors in ensuring the credibility of financial reporting has obtained more 
devotees (Johl, Jubb, & Houghton, 2007). The quality of audit services operated by Big 
4 auditors working in Asia has been criticised by World Bank (Johl et al., 2007). 
According to Che Ahmad, Houghton, and Yusof (2006), Malaysian market for audit 
services is dominated by international Big 4 firms.  
 
3.6.1 Audit Quality and Earnings Management Activities 
Several prior studies have provided evidence that audit quality acts as a significant 
constraint for the practice of accrual-based earning management (Becker et al., 1998; 
Chiang et al., 2011; Francis et al., 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Van 
Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008). Krishnan (2003) also indicated that discretionary 
accruals are low in the firms audited by Big 6 auditors. In addition, Balsam, Krishnan 
and Yang (2003) and Elshafie and Nyadroh (2014) indicated that firms employing 
qualified auditors are associated with constrained accruals intended for earnings 
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management. These studies document that clients with industry specialists and large 
auditors have less discretionary accruals than clients of non-industry specialists and 
non-large audit firms. These studies argue that firms with high audit quality potentially 
constrain the practise of accruals-based earnings management because qualified 
auditors are more likely discover such practices. Furthermore,  Chiang, Huang, and 
Hsiao (2011) showed that the firms audited by low-quality CPAs experience high level 
of earnings management.  
 
Another view exists on the role of an auditor in real earnings management activities 
such as accretive share buybacks. Real earnings management is not usually inspected 
by external auditors because they are responsible for providing a reasonable assertion 
that financial statements are prepared according to generally accepted accounting 
principles (Burnett et al., 2012). More particularly, the main responsibility of auditors 
is to confirm that the financial statements faithfully represent the real financial positions 
and performance of firms. However, they are not obligated to evaluate motivations of 
managers for decisions on real activities (Burnett et al., 2012). Roychowdhury (2006) 
said that real earnings management potentially causes greater long-term costs on firms 
due the negative affect on future cash flows, whereas earnings management based on 
accruals imposes larger short-term costs on firms. Therefore, real earnings management 
is an attractive choice to be used by managers to accomplish short-term earnings 
objectives (Roychowdhury, 2006). 
 
Empirical evidence regarding the relationship between audit quality and the trade-off 
between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management is mixed. 
Chi, Lisic, and Pevzner (2011) showed that Big 4 auditors and auditor specialisation 
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are positively related to real earnings management, but have a negative relationship 
with earnings management based accruals. Similarly, Cohen and Zarowin (2010) found 
that firms audited by Big 4 auditors are more likely to undertake real earnings 
management than accrual-based earnings management when involved in a seasoned 
equity offering. However, Zang's (2012) study failed to find a positive relationship 
between Big 4 auditors and the practise of real earnings management. This result is in 
line with the suggestion that the effect of large auditors may reflect fundamental 
differences in client characteristics rather than differential audit quality (Lawrence, 
Minutti-Meza, & Zhang, 2011).   
 
Burnett et al. (2012) investigated the impact of audit quality on the trade-off of 
practising earnings management between discretionary accruals and share buyback 
activities. The study hypothesises that firms have the incentive to manage EPS (EPS), 
meet or beat consensus analysts’ forecasts, by engaging in accretive share buyback 
when accruals-based earnings management is constrained by the high quality of audit 
in the United States. In line with the hypothesis, the results of the study showed that 
firms with high audit quality are more likely to use accretive share buyback and less 
likely to use accrual-based earnings management. Bryan and Mason (2016) examined 
whether earnings management through accretive share buybacks affected auditor 
perceptions of risk. They argued that auditors are likely to view activities of earnings 
management through accretive share buybacks as a signal of boost risk, which, in turn, 
lead to increase audit fees. Consistently, the results showed a significant and positive 
connection between the use of accretive share buybacks as an earnings management 




Empirical evidence on the association between audit quality and earnings management 
from emerging markets is mixed. Muttakin et al. (2017) indicated that the level of 
discretionary accruals in Bangladesh is negatively associated with audit quality, and 
this relationship is affected by the level of investors’ protection and a complicated 
ownership structure. Houqe et al. (2017) also documented that firms appointing a high-
quality auditor practice a lower level of earnings management. Furthermore, Khalil and 
Ozkan (2016) found evidence that is consistent with the argument that high-quality 
auditors are effective in mitigating practices of earnings management. However, 
Habbash and Alghamdi (2017) found only an insignificant linkage with earnings 
management. They justify this result by the argument that auditors are incapable in the 
presence of managerial opportunistic activities. 
  
In the Malaysian context, prior studies related to the effect of Big 4 audit firms in the 
audit quality have uncertain outcomes. For instance, Johl et al. (2007) used a sample of 
596 observations of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over the period from 1994 to 
1999. The result showed that the Big 5 auditors were more likely to issue a qualified 
audit opinion in the presence of aggressive abnormal accruals than non-Big 5 audit 
firms, but no evidence for industry-specialist audit firms. However, Abdul Rahman and 
Ali (2006) documented no significant association between employing Big 5 auditors 
and the practise of earnings management by the auditees. Furthermore, Carlin, Finch, 
and  Laili (2009) examined audit quality of Big 4 audit firms operating in Malaysia. By 
using 34 Malaysian firms in 2006, the outcomes of the study revealed a substantial 
cross-sectional variation among the sample of Big 4 Malaysian auditors and reported 
obviously low compliance levels. Chandren et al. (2015) indicated a positive 




Based on the discussion above, Big 4 audit firms are more able to detect and limit 
accruals-based earnings management than non-Big 4 auditors. However, to the best 
knowledge of researcher,  limited studies exist on the ability of Big 4 auditors to detect 
and control real earnings management activities including accretive shares buybacks 
especially in emerging markets like Malaysia. Therefore, this study was conducted to 
fill this gap.  
 
3.7 Ownership Structure   
Ownership structure can influence firms’ decision making as it is related to different 
degrees of risk aversion and a firm‘s resource endowment (Chen & Hsu, 2009; 
Fernández & Nieto, 2006; Moradi, Aldin, Heyrani, & Iranmahd, 2012). In emerging 
markets where the ownership is highly concentrated in families groups or individuals 
(high ownership concentration), agency problems stem from the conflicts of interest 
between outside shareholders and insider shareholders (agency problem type II) (Fan 
& Wong, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Ownership structure in emerging market is 
considered to be a vital determinant of agency problems between controlling insiders 
and outside shareholders (Kamardin & Haron, 2011). Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan 
(2007) indicate that the influence of corporate governance mechanisms on earnings 
quality varies by ownership structure. 
 
Firm ownership in Asian countries is highly concentrated relative to developed 
countries like the United States and the United Kingdom (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & 
Wong, 2002). Faccio et al. (2001) provided evidence that the agency problem in Asian 
countries is related to expropriation of the rights of minority outside shareholders by 
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the dominant shareholders because family and individual investors highly concentrate 
the ownership. The Malaysian capital market is characterised by high ownership 
concentration by family domination and individual investors (Amran & Che Ahmad, 
2010a; Claessens et al., 2000; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011; Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011). 
The ownership concentration raises the information asymmetry between insiders and 
outsiders, which may motive the managers of firms to practice and amount of payout 
policies that maximise their interests rather than the wealth of overall shareholders 
(Faccio et al., 2001).  
 
The ownership structure of Malaysian listed firms may influence their share buybacks 
activities significantly. Stringent rules and regulations govern share buyback activities 
in Malaysia. Firms must also satisfy a minimum shareholding spread of 25% before a 
request for share buyback programs can be approved by Bursa Malaysia, which expects 
that only firms with satisfactory directors' ownership would engage in share buybacks 
activities (Abdul Latif, 2010). Then, directors with high ownership have a better 
opportunity to affect the decisions of management to embark on share buyback 
programs (Abdul Latif, 2010). Managers engage in shares buyback programs to reach 
their desired level of ownership structure (Fried, 2005; González & González, 2004). 
Abdul Latif and Taufil Mohd (2014) provided empirical evidence that the level of 
managerial ownership of Malaysian firms is positively associated with their actual share 
buyback programs.  
 
Previous studies (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; 
Mohd Ali et al., 2010; Shayan-Nia et al., 2017) have classified ownership structure into 
essential four different types, namely, family ownership, managerial ownership, 
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governmental ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership. Further, 
Yunos et al. (2010) suggest that it is better to classify ownership into the family, 
individuals, and institutional ownership. Ghazali (2010) also groups the ownership 
structure into foreign ownership, director ownership and government ownership to 
study their effects on the performance of Malaysian firms. 
 
Pertinent to  the discussion above, this study investigates the effects of ownership 
structure (family, managerial and foreign ownership) of Malaysian listed firms on 
accretive share buyback as a real mechanism for earnings management.  
 
3.7.1 Family Ownership 
To recognize a firm as a family controlled, three requirements must exist: 1) the 
founders and descendants hold positions in the high-level management like CEO or 
successor of the CEO, 2) serve on the BOD or 3) are among the firm’s largest 
shareholders (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2013, 2011; Mohd-Saleh & Omar, 2014; Wang, 
2006). Family ownership or family-controlled firm is the most common form of the 
business body in the world (Burkart, Panunzi, & Shleifer, 2003; Ibrahim & Samad, 
2011). Family-owned or controlled businesses account for one-third of the S&P 500 
and hold approximately 18% of equity stake of firms (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003). 
Faccio and Lang (2002) reported that family-related shareholders control 44% of firm 
ownership in the United Kingdom and Ireland.  
 
Family-controlled ownership is dominant in East Asian countries (Claessens et al., 
2000; Faccio et al., 2001). Filatotchev et al. (2005) revealed that two-thirds of the 
ownership of firms listed in East Asian countries is controlled by single owners, and 
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60% of the managers of these firms are family members belonging to the controlling 
owners. In Malaysia, family-controlled firms are prevalent (Amran & Che Ahmad, 
2010b; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2011; Wan-Hussin, 2009). About 70% of Malaysian 
firms are family-controlled firms (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010b; Claessens et al., 2000; 
Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). Twenty-eight of the 40 richest people in Malaysia are family 
related (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). 
 
3.7.1.1 Family Ownership and Earnings Management Activities 
Existing literature shows two different arguments concerning the influence of family 
ownership on firm management, namely, the entrenchment hypothesis and the 
alignment of interest hypothesis. According to the entrenchment hypothesis, firms 
controlled by family ownership are more likely to engage in earnings management 
(Wang, 2006). This hypothesis is in line with agency theory (type II), which predicts 
that the agency conflict of interest exists between majority shareholders and minority 
outside shareholders in a market with highly concentrated shareholdings (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Family-controlled firms have low efficiency due to the 
ownership concentration that creates motives for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate the rights of minority shareholders (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Burkart 
et al., 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011).  
 
Family members in such businesses commonly hold vital roles in management and on 
the BOD, and these may reduce the effectiveness of corporate governance especially in 
monitoring the BOD. The information asymmetry between families members and other 
shareholders may also negatively affect the monitoring duties of corporate governance 
and, hence, encourage management to engage in manipulative activities (Bin-
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Muhamed, 2013; Wang, 2006). More particularly, high controlled shareholders such as 
family ownership may pressure the BOD to embark in share buybacks to realise 
manipulative actions such as mimicking good firms (Massa et al., 2007), manipulating 
EPS (Hribar et al., 2006) and occasionally increasing share prices (Chan et al., 2010).   
 
 Empirically, several studies support the entrenchment view of family ownership. For 
example, Faccio et al. (2001) assume that family-controlled ownerships tend to 
expropriate wealth when their cash flow rights are less than control. Faccio et al. (2001) 
study was consistent with their assumptions  in both European and Asian family-
controlled firms, which employ payout policy to expropriate the rights of minority 
outside shareholders. Similarly, Huang, Chen, and Kao (2012) found a positive 
association between the cash flow rights of controlling families and the level of payout. 
Huang et al. (2012) also revealed that, when family control is at a low level but holds a 
higher level of cash flow rights, the associations are positive because the threat of losing 
control leads them to claim more payouts. However, when family control is at a 
moderate level, the connection with payout payment is negative due to the 
entrenchment effect in which family control becomes more robust. 
 
Fan and Wong (2002) investigated the association between earnings informativeness 
and the concentrated ownership in East Asian countries. The empirical outcomes of the 
study were  in line with the entrenchment and the information affect views. The 
concentrated ownership that usually includes family controlled raise agency conflicts 
between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. Subsequently, controlling 
shareholders are perceived to report accounting information for self-interested 
purposes, reducing the credibility of reported earnings. Fan and Wong (2002) also 
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found that concentrated ownership related with low earnings informativeness due to 
concentrated ownership may limit access to the information about the rent-seeking 
activities, which are widespread in East Asia.  
 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) documented that listed family-controlled firms exercise 
earnings management and practise greater levels of private interests of control than non-
family firms. The results also showed that the greater proportion of independent 
directors in family firms, the less earnings management was experienced. Chi, Hung, 
Cheng, and Tien (2014) provided evidence that family firms are positively associated 
with the practice of earnings management. Recently, Tai (2017) examined the trade-off 
between accrual-based and real earnings management in family-controlled firms and 
provided evidence that family firms were more likely to be involved in accruals-based 
earnings management than in real earnings management.  
 
On the other hand, the alignments interest hypothesis argues that family-controlled 
firms have motivations to limit the different types of manipulation behaviours engaged 
by the management (Wang, 2006). Family-controlled firms could diminish the ability 
of management to exercise earnings management because family members possess 
sufficient knowledge of the activities of their firms, which, in turn, may assist in 
detecting abusive actions like the manipulation of accounting numbers (Anderson et al., 
2003). This view of family ownership is consistent with stewardship theory that 
assumes controlling owners like family members and managers act as stewards to 
achieve a firm’s objectives rather than demonstrate their propensity to behave 
destructively for individualistic and self-serving objectives (Amran & Che Ahmad, 




The results of several empirical studies are on the same path as the alignment of interest 
hypothesis. For example, Adiguzel (2013) documented that the magnitude of accruals- 
based manipulations is less in family-controlled firms than in non-family controlled 
firms. Jaggi and Leung (2007) showed that the significant relationship between the AC 
and constraining earnings management was reduced in family-owned firms, 
particularly when family members dominate the BOD. Along the same line, Wang 
(2006) provided evidence that, in general, founding family ownership has significant 
relationship with higher earnings quality as measured by abnormal accruals.  
 
Ali et al. (2007) replicated the study of Wang (2006) using US data. However, the study 
applied a different group of earnings quality measures on the same selected sample of 
S&P 500 firms. Despite the fact that Ali et al. (2007) used substitute measures for 
earnings quality,  the results were similar to those of Wang (2006),  showing that 
family-controlled firms had better earnings quality. Cascino, Pugliese, Mussolino, and 
Sansone (2010) examined earnings quality between family and non-family firms and 
found that family firms generally reported high-quality earnings compared to non-
family firms. 
 
Moreover, Li and Hung (2013) examined the moderating effect of family ownership 
between overconfident managers and earnings management. The findings of the study 
revealed that overconfident managers are more aggressive in engaging in earnings 
management and family ownership indeed lessened the motivations for earnings 
management in family-controlled firms. Siregar and Utama (2008) examined the 
influence of family ownership on efficient and opportunistic earnings management. The 
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study’s results revealed that firms with a high proportion of family ownership had more 
of a tendency to select efficient earnings management than non-family owned firms.  
 
Achleitner, Günther, Kaserer, and Siciliano (2014) provided evidence that family firms 
were involve in real earnings management and exhibited more earnings-decreasing in 
abnormal accruals as compared to non-family firms. They further found that family-
controlled firms as compared to non-family firms treated real earnings management as 
a substitute for accruals-based earnings management rather than as complementary 
tools. Alzoubi (2016) found a statistically significant adverse association between 
family ownership and accruals-based earnings management. 
  
Although family-controlled business are widely present on the Malaysian capital 
market, where family members dominant sensitive positions on BOD and top 
management (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010a; Chen, 2013; Haji, 2014; Hasnan, Rahman, 
& Mahenthiran, 2013), only a few studies have discussed the association between 
family dominance and earnings management practices in the Malaysian market. 
Hashim and Devi (2008a) examined the association between the percentage of family 
members on the BOD and earnings quality, their results revealed a positive connection 
between family control and the accrual quality. However, the majority of the existing 
literature focuses on the relationship between family controlled ownership and firm 
performance (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2009; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010b; Amran & 
Ahmad, 2011; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2013; Goh, Rasli, & Khan, 2014; Ibrahim, Abdul 




In addition, a study of Wan-Hussin (2009) found that family ownership (proxied by the 
proportion of family members on the BOD) were more inclined to disclose all the 
required items for the primary basis of segment reporting, with more corporate 
transparency. Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) documented that family-owned firms were 
more likely to recognise the impairment loss of goodwill than non-family owned firms. 
Abdullah and Ismail (2016) failed to find a significant effect for family ownership that 
interacted with women serving on the BOD to mitigate earnings management. 
However, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) documented that family-controlled 
firms restricted real earnings management through related party transactions, which 
supports the alignment role of family ownership.  
 
From the discussion above, a high level of family ownership of Malaysian firms may 
affect managers’ decisions regarding share buybacks, which may be used as tools to 
mislead and expropriate the rights of outside minority shareholders. Academically, 
Ibrahim and Samad (2011) claimed that the previous studies in the field of family-
controlled ownership in Malaysia and corporate governance remain limited. To the best 
knowledge of the researcher, limited studies have discussed the relationship between 
family ownership and share buyback policies, especially in the Malaysian context. 
Thus, the current study examined the effect of family ownership on accretive share 
buyback as a tool for real earnings management. 
 
3.7.2 Managerial Ownership 
The classic agency theory claims that managerial ownership assists in aligning the 
interest of managers and shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). However, in the 
case of an environment with high ownership concentration like East Asia, managerial 
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ownership is not a solution to the agency conflict because another agency problem (type 
II) is raised between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Based on the entrenchment hypothesis, controlling 
shareholders who are at the same time a firm’s managers may take advantage of their 
controlling power to extract firm resources for their interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders (Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011; Wu, 2009). Shleifer and Vishny (1986) 
indicate that the controlling shareholders have a motivation for engaging in 
expropriation activities in order to protect their investments. 
 
The managerial entrenchment becomes highly complex through the deviation between 
controlling owners’ control rights and cash flow rights (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & 
Wong, 2002). When entrenchment influence rises, the protection of minority 
shareholders' interests is diminished because their voting rights cannot represent their 
interests (Wu & Wang, 2015). Consequently, minority shareholders and other outside 
stakeholders may consider a company’s level of controlling ownership when reacting 
to corporate decision making, which may negatively affect their trust in the judgement 
of management. This current study focuses on share buyback activities because share 
buyback programs are not only a method to distribute funds to shareholders but also a 
mechanism to manage EPS as well as adjusting a firm’s’ ownership structure. 
Therefore, controlling owners may use a share buyback program to support their power 
over minority owners.  
 
3.7.2.1 Managerial Ownership and Shares Buyback Activities   
According to Abdul Latiff and Taufil Mohd (2014), managerial entrenchment has two 
hypotheses that affect the share buyback programs of Malaysian firms. The first 
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hypothesis suggests that, because Malaysian regulators have allowed only 10% of the 
outstanding shares to be repurchased at any regular time, it is suspected that low 
ownership managers must repeat share buyback programs many times (years) to gain 
control of their firms. Furthermore, if a firm’s shareholders sense that the intention of 
managers is to engage in a share buyback is for control purposes, the shareholders may 
refuse to approve the share buyback process suggested by the firm’s management.  
 
Consequently, low ownership managers have less incentive to initiate share buyback 
programs. Along the same path, the second hypothesis of managerial entrenchment 
predicts that, when the managers have more than 50% of a firm’s equity, the likelihood 
of a takeover threat from outsiders or other owners is not relevant. Therefore, those 
managers are less likely to engage in share buyback programs (Abdul Latif & Taufil 
Mohd, 2014). Zakaria et al. (2013) predicted that ownership concentration may affect 
share buyback activities of Malaysian listed firms positively. Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2005) claimed that a significant fraction of managerial shareholdings of a firm could 
create other motivations, such as entrenchment activities to save their positions and 
money, for engaging in share buyback programs. Thus, firms with high managerial 
ownership are more likely to undertake share buybacks.  
 
Abdul Latiff and Taufil Mohd ( 2014) found a positive association between the amount 
of share buyback and both the percentage of directors’ ownership and the percentage 
square of directors’ ownership in Malaysia. Wu (2011) provided evidence that 
Taiwanese firms with less managerial entrenchment have larger buyback 
announcement returns than those with a high entrenchment of management. Further, 
Wu (2012b) documented a significant and positive association between insider’s 
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ownership and the credibility of a share buyback announcement measured by the 
change in shareholdings of insiders around share buyback activities. This result is 
consistent with the argument that share buyback programs announced by a well-
governed company are more likely to signal the under evaluation of a firm rather than 
to support short-term share prices. 
  
However, Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) documented that insiders with low 
shareholdings incentives undertake share buyback programs from two aspects: 1) 
reducing agency costs of the separation of owners and management and 2) increasing 
the existing value of managerial shareholding via a declining the number of outstanding 
shares. Mitchell and Dharmawan (2007) also explored the motivation of share buyback 
in Australia and compared them with those in the United States. The finding showed 
that managerial motivations for undertaking a share buyback were negatively 
associated with a firm’s level of controlling ownership. Webb (2008) indicated no 
significant impact for insider ownership on both the proportion of share buybacks 
announcement and the share values surrounding announcements of share buyback. 
Whereas, Webb (2008) found that the ownership of insider directors in small banks was 
positively associated with the magnitude of shares buyback. 
 
Moreover, Farrell et al. (2013) investigated the factors that are related to firms using 
share buybacks to manipulate EPS. The result of the study showed that firms with a 
high percentage of CEO ownership were less likely to exercise earnings management 
through share buybacks, suggesting that managerial ownership assists in mitigating 
agency conflicts. Moore (2017) examined whether insiders use timing and strategy with 
respect to share buyback to gain personal benefits. The results suggest a positive 
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association between CEO equity sales and share buyback activities. Along the same 
line, Olbe and Nyman (2017) investigated the change in CEO equity around share 
buyback involvement and found that the fraction of CEO equity increased as a result in 
the decline of outstanding shares caused by the actual share buyback. 
 
3.7.2.2 Managerial Ownership and Earnings Management Activities   
Two fundamental theoretical views of managerial ownership exist concerning the effect 
on earnings quality (Masmoudi Ayadi & Boujelbène, 2014; Warfield et al., 1995). The 
first view is the alignment of interest hypothesis, which predicts that managers with 
higher ownership have stronger incentives to act in line with the benefits of 
shareholders (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011). More specifically, the convergence effect 
suggests that the higher managerial ownership, then the less opportunistic earnings 
management actions. Conversely, the second view is the managerial entrenchment 
effect hypothesis, which predicts that managers holding higher ownership are more 
likely to possess greater control over firms and, therefore, have more freedom to behave 
in a manner benefitting their private interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Yeh & Chou, 
2014).  
 
Previous studies provide empirical evidence that supports the convergence of interest 
hypothesis. For instance, Warfield et al. (1995) documented a negative relationship 
between managerial ownership and the magnitude of abnormal accruals. Alves (2012) 
also found that earnings management measured by discretionary accruals was 
negatively connected to managerial ownership as well as to concentrated ownership. 
Ramadan (2016) provided evidence that managerial ownership is related inversely to 
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earnings management. Recently, Alzoubi (2016) found a significant influence of 
managerial ownership on mitigating accruals-based earnings management. 
 
On the other hand, Gopalan and Jayaraman (2012) conducted a comprehensive study 
to investigate practices of earnings management by firms with insider controlling 
ownership over 22 countries. The results of the study provided evidence that insider 
controlled firms in weak minority protection countries have a significant and positive 
relationship with the absolute value of discretionary accruals compared with firms that 
are non-insider controlled. This result is along the same path with the entrenchment 
argument that a high discrepancy between the control rights and cash flow rights of 
controlling shareholders are related to more earnings management. Leuz et al. (2003) 
also found that firms that are insider-controlled are more aggressive in practising 
earnings management than those firms with lower insider control in environments with 
less investor protection.  
 
In addition, Johari et al. (2009) provided evidence that managerial shareholding of more 
than 25% are associated with earnings management practices. Similarly, Halioui and 
Jerbi (2012) showed that firms with a high level of controlling ownership manipulate 
their earnings more than firms with a low level of controlling shareholders. 
Furthermore, Al-Fayoumi, Abuyazed, and Alexander (2010) indicated that firms with 
15% managerial ownership have a significant and positive relationship with earnings 
management. More recently, Masmoudi and Boujelbène (2014) found that managerial 
ownership had a significant and positive influence on practices earnings management. 
Recently, Oluku (2017) explored the impact of managerial ownership and earnings 
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management and found that firms with a high level of equity held by managers were 
more likely to practice earnings management.  
 
In Malaysia, Saleh et al.'s (2005) study found that discretionary accruals as a proxy for 
earnings management were negatively related to management ownership. Mohd Ali, 
Mohd Salleh and Hassan (2010) also indicated that managerial shareholdings had a 
significant and negative relationship with the absolute value of accounting accruals. 
Mustapha and Ahmad (2011) found that managerial ownership in various segments had 
a converse association with total monitoring expenditures as assumed in agency theory. 
These findings are consistent with prior studies in developed market and consistent with 
the convergence of interest hypothesis.  
 
Shayan-Nia, Sinnadurai, Mohd-Sanusi, and Hermawan (2017) suggested that distressed 
firms with a high managerial ownership practice real earnings management more than 
the distressed firms with less managerial ownership. The findings, however, indicate 
that the size of real earnings management is not significantly related to the level of 
managerial ownership. Similarly, Chandren et al. (2015) examined the impact of 
managerial ownership on real earnings management proxied by accretive share 
buyback. The result of their study reveals that executive directors with a high level of 
shareholdings are less likely to be involved in accretive share buyback activities for the 
purpose of managing reported EPS.  
 
Based on the discussion before, mixed inconclusive results have been found related to 
the influence of managerial ownership on share buyback policies or earnings 
management activities. Whereas, only very limited studies have focused on share 
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buybacks as a tool for earnings management. Therefore, the current study examines the 
association between managerial ownership and accretive share buybacks that are 
engaged in to manage reported EPS. 
 
3.7.3 Foreign Ownership 
David et al. (2006) advised that research in the field of foreign ownership worldwide is 
needed especially for its effect on corporate governance, strategic decisions, and 
performance. David et al. (2006) claimed that foreign ownership may affect the 
allocation of a firm’s resource among strategic investments. Firms with foreign 
ownership usually have strong oversight and monitoring of managers actions (Stulz, 
1999). Choi, Park, and Hong (2012) opined that foreign investors commonly have a 
competitive scientific advantage that may lead to the transfer their specific knowledge 
to domestic firms. Additionally, Bayrakdaroglu, Ersoy, and Citak (2012) indicated that 
foreign ownership may become an active corporate governance device in emerging 
markets. Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) mentioned that foreign ownership is 
considered an efficient mechanism of corporate governance to monitor management 
actions to limit non-value maximising activities as they are mostly institutional 
investors.  
 
Lin and Shiu (2003) indicated that foreign investors prefer firms with a large size to 
minimise the undesirable effect of information asymmetry because the degree of 
informational asymmetry is higher for foreign investors than for local investors. As 
noted in the literature, foreign investors need more information disclosure and adequate 
transparency to avoid expropriation by inside shareholders (Ben-Nasr, Boubakri, & 
Cosset, 2015a). Jiang and Kim (2004) said that foreign shareholding was associated 
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with low asymmetric information and higher corporate transparency. More specifically, 
foreign shareholders are less likely to invest in firms with large family controlled and 
managerial ownership (Leuz et al., 2010). Therefore, this study expects that firms with 
a high level of foreign ownership are less likely to engage in earnings management 
activities because their insiders do not have too much to conceal from outsiders.  
 
In Malaysia, Foreign investment has been oscillating between US Dollars 9 billion and 
US Dollars 12 billion since 2010, which make Malaysia one of the highest recipients 
of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in its region. Based on data from the Malaysian 
Investment Development Authority (MIDA), the majority of investments came from 
China, the Netherlands, and the United States (Standard Trade Portal, 2017). Many 
Malaysian firms are controlled by foreign-owners from European countries, 
particularly the United Kingdom (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). Based on a study of Mohd 
Ghazali (2010), foreign investors in Malaysia hold between 13% and 80% of the equity 
of firms and 23% is the  average. The majority of foreign shareholdings are through a 
foreign candidate or direct shareholdings by foreign firms (Mohd Ali et al., 2010). 
 
3.7.3.1 Foreign Ownership and Shares Buyback Activities  
According to adverse selection hypothesis, foreign shareholders prefer to invest in firms 
with high dividend payments, but have no significant interest in share buyback 
programs of domestic firms because foreigners tend to put their major orders on firms 
with overvalued stocks (Jeon, Lee, & Moffett, 2011). Choe, Kho, and Stulz (2005) in 
Korea and Dvorak (2005) in Indonesia provided evidence that foreign shareholders 
have an information limitation in trading local stocks relative to domestic investors. 
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Consequently, the trades of foreign investors conversely respond to shares buyback 
programs (Jeon et al., 2011).  
 
Foreign investors are willing to place their investment orders only when the price of 
shares is overvalued (Jeon et al., 2011), supporting the notion that foreign investors 
prefer cash dividends over shares buyback programs. Jeon et al. (2011) examined the 
relationship between foreign ownership and the decisions of payout policy in the 
Korean stock market. The findings indicate that foreign investors prefer firms that pay 
high dividends. Additionally, when foreign investors have substantial shareholdings in 
the firms, they push the company to pay more dividends rather than engaging in share 
buyback activities. However, Franks and Mayer (2017) documented that higher levels 
of foreign ownership are significantly related to share buyback increases. 
 
3.7.3.2 Foreign Ownership and Earnings Management Activities  
According to the knowledge spillover hypothesis, the superior knowledge of foreign 
investors is likely to limit real earnings management (Guo et al., 2015). Existing 
literature reveals that foreign investors put their investments in the firms with good 
corporate governance and investor protections. For example, Leuz et al. (2010) 
conducted a comprehensive study across twenty-nine countries and found that 
foreigners invest less in firms that exist in countries with poor protection and disclosure 
and have ownership structures that raise governance problems. Jiang and Kim (2004) 
also provided empirical evidence that foreign investors are likely to be efficient 




Guo et al. (2015) documented that proportion of foreign ownership had a significant 
and negative relationship with practices of real earnings management. A study of Ben-
Nasr et al. (2015) documented that foreign ownership is related to higher earnings 
quality measured by discretionary abnormal accruals. The result also showed the effect 
of foreign shareholdings on earnings quality, with the country’s institutional 
environment, whereby foreign ownership is related to higher earnings quality in an 
environment with a higher level of investors protection. Moreover, Wu, Shen, and Lu 
(2015) found evidence that a high level of foreign investment in banks enhances 
earnings smoothing.  
 
Poli (2015) also found a statistically significant impact on foreign ownership on 
earnings management practices proxied by earnings minimization, and earnings change 
minimization. Further, Yasser et al. (2016) found that foreign ownership had a 
significant and positive association with the quality of financial reporting. Du, Jian, and 
Lai (2017) examined the role of foreign members serving on the BOD in mitigating 
earnings management practices and found that the presence of foreign directors on 
BOD was significantly and negatively associated with earnings management. 
 
In the Malaysian context,  Mohd Ali et al. (2010) reviewed the relationship between 
different types of shareholdings and earnings management activities with regard to the 
size of firms. The results revealed that a low magnitude of relationship between foreign 
ownership and practices of earnings management. Additionally, Anum Mohd Ghazali 
(2010) provided evidence that substantial foreign and government ownership had a 
positive relationship with corporate performance. Yasser, Mamun, and Ahmed (2016) 
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found that foreign ownership is positively associated with the financial reporting 
quality.  
 
To the best knowledge of the researcher, limited studies have contemplated the effect 
of foreign ownership on accretive share buyback policy, especially on emerging 
markets such as Malaysia. Although the significant role of foreign shareholders in 
monitoring management and limiting manipulation behaviours of management has 
been shown (Bayrakdaroglu et al., 2012; Ben-Nasr et al., 2015a). Guo et al. (2014) 
indicate that existing empirical research on the association between foreign ownership 
and earnings quality is relatively scarce. Therefore, this study investigates the effect of 
foreign ownership on accretive shares buyback as a mechanism for real earnings 
management. 
 
3.8 Employee Stock Options (ESOS) 
Employee stock options are an innovative device of compensation policies that assist 
in aligning the interests of the executives and employees with those of firm shareholders 
(Bickley, 2012). These options provide their holders with the right to purchase a 
particular amount of stocks by a specified date at an identified price. However, the 
exercise of stock options may raise the number of outstanding shares and, hence, dilute 
the EPS figure (Abdul Latif, 2010). Therefore, managers would try to alleviate the 
dilution of earnings caused by the exercise of stock options, and share buyback 
programs are one of the ways that may be employed by managers to solve problems of 




Since the late 1980s, Malaysian firms have been allowed to exercise stock options as 
ESOS to ordinary executives and employees (Katan et al., 2013). ESOS in Malaysian 
market became widely prevalent starting from the 1990s (Ghazali, 2012; Long et al., 
2013). The number of firms adopting ESOS in Malaysia was more than 250 from 1999 
and 2007 (Katan et al., 2013). Unlike developed countries such as the United States 
where the stock options are unlimited, listed firms in Malaysia has been permitted to 
issue stock options only 15% of the issued and paid-up capital (Katan et al., 2013). As 
mentioned before, Malaysia is a country with high ownership concentration, where 
family and highly concentrated individual ownership is widely prevalent. Therefore, 
the controlling shareholders may use ESOS to support their position and gain private 
interest at the expense of outside shareholders. 
 
3.8.1 Employee Stock Options and Shares Buyback Activities  
Previous studies (e.g., De Cesari & Ozkan, 2015; Dittmar, 2000; Jagannathan, 
Stephens, & Weisbach, 2000) have documented that the dramatic growth of share 
buyback activities during the recent decades is due to an essential change in payout 
policy, which increasingly uses managerial stock options as a means of compensation. 
Kahle (2002) argued that the undervaluation and free cash flow hypotheses are not 
adequate to explain the dramatic rise in share buyback programs. Dittmar (2000). Bens 
et al. (2003) and Weisbenner (2000) mentioned that firms engage in share buybacks to 
handle the dilution in EPS that have occurred through the exercise of stock options.  
 
Chan, Ikenberry, Lee, and Wang (2006) suggested that managers might employ share 
buyback programs to influence investors’ perceptions and take advantage of the 
positive price reaction typically related to sharing buyback. Moreover, the incentives to 
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engage in shares buyback is strong when executives hold exercisable stock options 
(Balachandran et al., 2008). According to the stock options hypothesis, managers have 
two motivations to engage in shares buyback programs. The first one is the options-
funding hypothesis, suggesting firms that participate in share buybacks to fund stock 
options that are exercised (Kahle, 2002).   
 
The second is that managers undertake shares buyback programs to avoid dilution in 
EPS caused by the exercise of stock options, while executive stock options provide an 
incentive to limit dividend payments due to their effects on decreasing the value of both 
exercisable and unexercisable stock options held by executives (Bens et al., 2003; 
Kahle, 2002). In the Malaysian context, only Abdul Latif (2010) has examined the 
relationship between employee stock options and actual share buyback activities. 
However, the result showed no significant association between employee stock options 
and actual share buyback programs.  
 
Empirical evidence on the association between stock options and share buyback 
programs have mostly supported their effect as an incentive of undertaking shares 
buyback activities. Bens et al. (2003) found that managers engage in share buyback 
programs for several aims: 1) handling the EPS dilution related to stock options 
schemes and 2) meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts of earnings. Their findings, 
however, showed that actual employee stock options are not related to share buyback 
activities, suggesting they are related to diluted earnings but not to basic EPS.  
 
Kahle (2002) documented a significant association of stock options with share buyback 
programs. The results provide evidence that firm managers are most probably to declare 
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a share buyback when the proportions of exercisable stock options are high, as well as 
when a large number of stock options have been exercised recently. These results are 
consistent with assumptions that managers with a high level of stock options have more 
incentives to manage EPS through share buyback programs (Bens et al., 2003). 
 
Moreover, Fenn and Liang (2001) have found that management stock options 
significantly influence the composition of payout policy. Their results showed that 
dividend payments have a strong negative association with management stock options, 
whereas share buyback was positively related to managers’ stock options, which can 
explain the increase of share buyback programs at the expense of dividends in recent 
decades. Similarly, Lamba and Miranda (2010) found that the more proportion of stock 
options held by executives, the more likely firms are to embark on open market share 
buyback programs, suggesting that managers with higher executive stock options 
would have more incentives to embark on share buybacks to align the dilution of EPS 
affected by their options (Lamba & Miranda, 2010). 
 
3.8.2 Employee Stock Options and Earnings Management Activities  
Previous studies (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Houmes 
& Skantz, 2010) have found that managers holding large stock options are more likely 
to manipulate earnings to meet performance forecasts. Literature also documents that 
stock options of CEO and other executives constitute a significant incentive to practice 
earnings management. For example, Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson (2007) provide 
evidence that the proportion of CEO’s stock options is associated with the likelihood 
of financial report restatements. More specific, their results revealed that the association 
become stronger when unexercisable and exercisable stock options are combined. 
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Additionally, Cheng and Warfield (2005) and Bedard et al. (2004) viewed that 
managers with more stock options and shareholdings are more likely to manage 
earnings to meet or beat analyst forecasts when the probability of negative earnings 
surprise is diminishing. 
 
Bartov and Mohanram (2004) empirically confirmed that firm managers manipulate 
earnings through discretionary accruals before the exercise of stock option. Lin, Chen, 
You, and Chang (2009) provided evidence that managerial stock options affect the 
magnitude of actual shares buyback positively. Their findings also showed that 
managers use shares buybacks as a substitute device for discretionary accounting 
accruals in their earnings management behaviour. Furthermore, Lin et al. (2009) found 
that managerial exercisable options have a significant and positive relationship with the 
level of earnings management through discretionary accruals. Consequently, managers 
with high stock options would be more likely to utilise share buyback programs to 
handle the dilution effects of EPS caused by their stock options. Kadan and Yang (2016) 
explored the impact of the grants of executive stock options on the magnitude of 
earnings management. The results revealed that newly granted stock options are 
strongly associated with earnings management practices.  
 
Based on the debates before, the conclusion can be made that many empirical studies 
have reviewed the connection between employee stock options and share buyback 
activities as well as discretionary accruals, but, to the best knowledge of this researcher, 
none of them explores it with accretive shares buyback activities. Thus, this study is 
different from the previous study by focusing on the effect of stock options exercised 
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on the practice of real earnings management through actual share buyback programs. 
In other words, share buyback leads to a change in EPS (accretive share buyback).     
 
3.9 Summary 
This chapter provides a review and integrates current theories and empirical results 
presented in previous studies on the issues of the BOD features, AC features, audit 
quality, ownership structure and ESOS as independent variables, and shares buyback 
programs and earnings management activities as dependent variables. Agency theory 
and resource dependence theory were used to explain the influence of BOD and AC 
features, audit quality and ownership structure on accretive share buybacks. This study 
also employs the stock options hypothesis to describe the association between ESOS 




4 CHAPTER FOUR   
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
4.0 Overview of the Chapter 
Following the review of relevant literature, the next step is to discuss the research 
methodology. This chapter includes the research framework and hypothesis 
development. The measurements of the variables are also discussed and presented in 
this chapter. Furthermore, it proposes the research design that comprises the procedure 
of data collection, sampling and techniques of data analysis, which are used to answer 
the research questions and discharge the study’s objectives.  
 
4.1 Research Framework  
The Companies Act 1965 and BMLRs in Malaysia state that to engage in a share 
buyback, the BOD must submit the proposal for approval by the shareholders. A rich 
literature indicates that an open market shares buybacks often serves as a positive 
economic signal that is beneficial to shareholders (Abdul Latif et al., 2014; Chan et al., 
2004; Grullon & Michaely, 2004; Oswald & Young, 2004; Peyer & Vermaelen, 2009). 
However, the separation between firm’s ownership and control increases the level of 
manager entrenchment to choose the method and amount of payout policy that 
maximises their interests rather than maximising the wealth of shareholders (Faccio et 
al., 2001; Jensen, 1986). Prior studies have provide evidenced that managers are 
involved in accretive share buyback as a device for real earnings management through 
decreasing outstanding shares which represent the denominator of EPS calculation, 
outstanding shares (Bens et al., 2003; Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et 




Based on the views of agency theory and resource dependence theory, corporate 
governance mechanisms are significantly required to protect the rights of investors and 
shareholders (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Gulzar & Wang, 2011). Effective corporate 
governance can handle the conflicts between management and shareholders as well as 
the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, which consequently reduce 
agency costs (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; McKnight & Weir, 2009; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986). The BOD is the key monitoring mechanism that is responsible for 
monitoring the actions of managers to protect the interests of shareholders (Abor & 
Fiador, 2013; Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Fama & Jensen, 1983). The AC also is a 
subcommittee of the BOD, which is responsible for effectively monitoring the financial 
reporting process (Song & Windram, 2004).  
 
BMLRs and the MCCG 2012 state that the key role of the AC is to ensure that financial 
reports are prepared according to the applicable accounting standards and is responsible 
for evaluating the independence and suitability of external auditors. Previous studies 
have provided empirical evidence on the effectiveness of role of the AC in mitigating 
earnings management (Abdul Latiff & Taib, 2011; Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2016; 
Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004; Haji-Abdullah & Wan-Hussin, 2015; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Wan Ismail, Dunstan, & Van Zijl, 2010). 
 
Beside the BOD and the AC, audit quality has a vital role in mitigating managers’ 
actions related to earnings management (Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Chiang, Huang, & Hsiao, 2011; Elshafie 
& Nyadroh, 2014; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009; Houqe, 
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Ahmed, & van Zijl, 2017; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Muttakin et al., 2017). Big 4 audit firms 
can realise better audit quality and practice more effective monitoring than non-Big 4 
audit firms (Francis & Yu, 2009). The ownership structure is also considered as another 
mechanism of corporate governance, which can mitigate agency problems between 
management and shareholders.  
 
With regard to family and managerial ownership, two conflicting arguments exist: 1) 
the alignment interest hypothesis and 2) the entrenchment hypothesis. The alignment 
interest hypothesis predicts that managers with controlling shareholders such as family 
ownership and managers have stronger incentives to act in line with the benefits of 
shareholders (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011). Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren et al. 
(2015) revealed negative relationships between managerial shareholdings and using 
accretive shares buybacks to manage EPS.  
 
However, the entrenchment hypothesis assumes that controlling shareholders are more 
likely to force the management to engage in earnings management (Wang, 2006). This 
argument is consistent with the viewpoint of agency theory (type II), which argues that 
the block shareholders are more likely to exploit minority shareholders (Claessens et 
al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). Faccio et al. (2001) find that family ownership in Europe 
and Asia utilise dividend policies to expropriate the rights of minority outside 
shareholders. Fan and Wong (2002) and  Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) provided empirical 
evidence that controlling shareholders, including family owners, report accounting 




Regarding foreign ownership, prior studies argue that foreign ownership has a negative 
association with asymmetric information and higher corporate transparency (Jiang and 
Kim, 2004). Mohd Ali et al. (2008) reported that foreign shareholdings play a 
significant role in monitoring the behaviours of manager. Several previous studies 
(Ben-Nasr et al., 2015a; Guo et al., 2015; Mohd Ali et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2015) have 
provided empirical evidence that the proportion of foreign ownership is negatively 
related to earnings management practices. The stock options hypothesis argues that 
managers have an incentive to engage in shares buyback programs to avoid dilution in 
EPS caused by the exercise of stock options (Bens et al., 2003; Kahle, 2002). Prior 
studies have documented that managers with a high level of stock options are more 
likely to manage earnings (Alquhaif et al., 2017a; Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; 
Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Farrell, Yu, & Zhang, 2013; Houmes & Skantz, 2010). 
 
In summary, the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and real 
earnings management through the use of accretive share buybacks are underpinned by 
agency theory, which argues that managers would employ a firm’s resources to gain 
private benefits instead benefitting shareholders’ interests (Faccio, Lang, & Young, 
2001; Jensen, 1986; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Wu, 2012). Resource dependence 
theory is also used to explain the relationships between mechanisms of corporate 
governance and accretive share buybacks. It predicts that non-executive directors in the 
BOD would provide more choices for resources for a firm and enhance its ability to 
contact with the external environment, which leads to declining a market uncertainty 
and managers opportunistic actions (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kassim, 2013; Klein, 
1998; Pfeffer, 1972). Further, the stock options hypothesis assumes that firm managers 
undertake shares buyback programs to mitigate the dilution of EPS caused by stock 
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options exercised (Bens et al., 2003; Kahle, 2002; Lamba & Miranda, 2010). Therefore, 
this study suggests a framework for the influence of corporate governance mechanisms 
and employee stock options (ESOS) on real earnings management through accretive 
share buyback as presented in Figure 4.1. 



























Framework of the Influence of Corporate Governance Mechanisms and ESOS on 
Accretive Share Buybacks 
Accretive 
Shares 
Buybacks  Audit Quality 
AC Effectiveness (ACSCORE) 
 AC Independence 
 AC Size 
 AC Meetings 




 Family Ownership 
 Managerial Ownership 
 Foreign Ownership 
 
Control variables 
Size, Growth, Leverage, and 
Cash Level. 
 
BOD Effectiveness (BDSCORE) 
 BOD Independence 
 BOD Size 
 BOD Meetings 
 BOD Expertise  
 
 




4.2 Hypotheses Development  
Based on the study’s research model, several hypotheses have been developed to test 
the model by investigating the influence of firms’ corporate governance mechanisms 
and ESOS on accretive shares buyback. Agency theory and resource dependence theory 
are used to explain the role of corporate governance mechanisms in limiting accretive 
shares buyback. Furthermore, the stock options hypothesis explains the effect of ESOS 
on accretive share buybacks.  
 
4.2.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Effectiveness and Accretive Share Buyback 
The BOD is considered the primary mechanism of internal corporate governance. Its 
main role is to mitigate the conflict of interests among the shareholders and 
management through exercising its power for monitoring and controlling the 
management of firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The agency theory argues that 
independent directors are the main corporate mechanism that is employed to minimise 
the agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The resource dependence theory also 
assumes that independent directors can use their knowledge and experience to make 
more objective decisions at the accurate time (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
Fooladi (2012) reported that the corporate governance model in Malaysia is a one-tier 
system, in which the BOD is considered to be the highest governance mechanism in the 
firm. Previous studies document that several features of the BOD, including 
independence, size, the frequency of meetings, and expertise, reflect the BOD’s 
effectiveness for monitoring firm managers’ behaviours (Ahmed, 2013; Goh, 2009; 
Saleh et al., 2005; Xie et al., 2003). The primary role of independent directors is to 
effectively monitor and control firm’s management to minimise managerial 
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manipulative behaviours and the expropriation of firm resources (Abidin et al., 2014).  
Abidin et al. (2014) and Andres and Vallelado (2008) have argued that BODs with more 
non-executive directors may control the behaviours of firm managers and then protect 
the wealth of shareholders.  
 
Prior studies mention that the independence of the BOD plays a major role in its 
effectiveness as a monitoring task (e.g., Abdullah, 2004; Fama & Jensen, 1983). A rich 
literature provides empirical evidence that earnings management has a significant and 
negative association with a larger percentage of independent directors (Davidson et al., 
2005; Peasnell et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2005; Shiri et al., 2012; Song & Windram, 
2004a). Siagian and Tresnaningsih (2011) and  Xie et al. (2003) also provide evidence 
that the larger the number of independent directors on the BOD, the less the practices 
of accrual-based earnings management. Alves (2014) documented that independent 
directors serving on the BOD have a negative connection with earnings management. 
Recently, Alquhaif et al. (2017) found a significant and negative relationship between 
BOD independence and real earnings management through using accretive share 
buyback in the Malaysian context. 
 
According to the resource dependency theory, the large number of directors in the BOD 
increase firms’ opportunity to access more resources and improve the information-
processing capabilities of BODs that, in turn, enhance the quality of advice given to 
firm management (Dalton et al., 1998; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Zahra & Pearce, 1989). 
Previous studies (e.g. Klein, 2002; Xie et al., 2003; Zahra & Pearce, 1989) have 
indicated that BODs with a large number of members could have the sufficient 
capability to monitor the top management activities, which leads to mitigating the 
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earnings management behaviours of managers and block holders. Xie et al. (2003) 
argued that firms with a large BOD may limit earnings management relative to smaller 
BODs because a larger number of directors may include more independent directors 
holding sufficient corporate and financial expertise. 
 
Andres and Vallelado  (2008) claimed that large numbers of directors serving on the 
BOD provide adequate monitoring and advice that may lessen the discretionary power 
of corporate managers or, in other words, facilitate detecting the opportunistic 
behaviour of executives. Andres and Vallelado (2008) also argued that the presence of 
a large number of monitors enhances the quality of strategic decisions through 
providing integrated skills and expertise of directors with experience of CEO and senior 
managers. Previous studies have documented that firms with larger BODs are less prone 
to earnings management (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Aygun et al., 2010; Ghosh et al., 
2010). These findings indicate that larger BODs are more efficient in monitoring 
management actions. Abdul Latif et al. (2016) documented that a large-sized BOD is 
more likely to mitigate the frequency of buyback activities that managers use to manage 
reported EPS. 
 
Based on the perspective of agency theory, the frequency of BOD meetings is a vital 
factor to enhance the effectiveness of corporate BODs (Vafeas, 1999). Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) reported that attendance at BOD meetings is an essential channel by 
which directors find specific relevant information about the firms help fulfil the 
controlling and monitoring functions. The frequency of BOD meetings would provide 
the opportunity to utilise the knowledge, expertise and skills of members of the BOD 
to enhance the interest of total shareholders (Wincent et al., 2010). More frequent BOD 
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meetings could help overcome problems related to large BODs and provide directors 
with adequate time to discuss and rationalise a firm’s strategic decisions making (Al-
Musali, 2013). Xie et al. (2003) argued that a BOD that meets more frequently is more 
likely to constrain earnings management activities than a BOD that meets less 
frequently. 
 
Empirically, several prior studies have documented a negative association between the 
frequency of BOD meetings and earnings management experience. For example, Xie 
et al. (2003) found that the frequency of BOD meeting is negatively associated with 
discretionary accruals. Zgarni et al. (2014) provided evidence that the BOD meeting 
has a significant effect on real earnings management through sales and overproductions. 
The study of Sarkar et al. (2008) showed that diligent directors effectively help reduce 
opportunistic earnings management measured by absolute discretionary accruals. Also, 
Klein (2002) claimed that active attendance at BOD meetings is vital for outside and 
expert directors to achieve control and monitoring functions. Therefore, the frequency 
of BOD meetings is important because it provides sufficient time for expert directors 
to limit managers’ actions of real earnings management through an accretive share 
buyback, which mislead firm’s investors.  
 
Regarding financial expertise of BOD, agency theory predicts that the BOD monitors 
both the majority shareholders and management to protect the interests of minority 
shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Resource dependence theory also argues that a 
large proportion of outside directors on the BOD with relevant experience and 
knowledge may improve the ability of the BOD to limit opportunistic actions of firm 
managers. The existing literature mentions that financial expertise is a major factor for 
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directors to achieve their monitoring functions effectively (Al-Jaaidi, 2013; Burak 
Güner et al., 2008; Carcello et al., 2002).  
 
Empirically, prior studies have documented that the financial and accounting expertise 
of independent directors is significantly essential for mitigating the manipulative 
actions of top management (Abdullah & Nasir, 2004; Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; 
Carcello et al., 2002; Yunos et al., 2014). Burak Güner et al. (2008) showed that, only 
in the absence of interest conflicts, are the directors with financial expertise a factor for 
corporate decision making. Consistently, Custódio and Metzger (2014) documented 
that financial expertise in the top management is particularly useful for firms that 
experience high information asymmetry. Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2017) provided 
evidence that financial expert directors have an effective role in increasing earnings 
quality. 
 
Previous studies used a composite measurement for the effectiveness of BOD (Bin-
Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Chobpichien, Haron, & Ibrahim, 2007; Hunton, Hoitash, & 
Thibodeau, 2011; Goh 2009; Johl et al., 2013; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Srinidhi et al., 
2014). The use of a composite measure is more likely to avoid a measurement error that 
may occur in using individual features of corporate governance mechanisms (Srinidhi 
et al., 2014). Ward et al. (2009) indicated that using corporate governance mechanisms 
as a bundle is better than using them individually due to fact that the mechanisms of 
governance mechanism perform to complete each other.  
 
Consequently, this current study utilises a composite measure for the effectiveness of 
the BOD, which, as discussed before contains, four features of the BOD (independence, 
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size, meeting, financial expertise) to represent its effectiveness. Based on the views of 
agency theory and resource dependence theory as well as before discussions, this study 
posits the following hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is a negative association between BOD effectiveness (BDSCORE) and 
accretive share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.2.2 Audit Committee (AC) Effectiveness and Accretive Share Buybacks 
The primary aim of the AC is to oversee the firm’s financial reporting process (Klein, 
2002). The  AC plays a vital role as a coordinator for the firm’s outside auditors, internal 
financial managers and BOD to review firm’s financial reports, audit processes and 
internal controls (Song & Windram, 2004). From the perspective of agency theory, the 
AC has a vital oversight role with respect to a firm’s management actions, which may 
contribute to limiting the opportunism of managers (García et al., 2012; Karamanou & 
Vafeas, 2005; Song & Windram, 2004). Additionally, the resource dependence theory 
explains the role of independent non-executive directors in providing various choices 
of resource that enable firms to connect with the external environment (Kassim, 2013; 
Klein, 1998; Pfeffer, 1972). 
 
The agency theory explains the role of independent members in AC in monitoring the 
agent’s activities (Apadore & Noor, 2013). Based on the view of resource dependence 
theory, Cohen et al. (2008) argued that presence of a substantial number of independent 
directors on the BOD is suitable for firms that need efficient access to relevant resources 
and knowledge that enhance the ability of AC members to perform their role 
effectively. Previous studies revealed that a large number of independent members 
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serving on the AC constrains earnings management practices measured by abnormal 
accruals (Bukit & Iskandar, 2009; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013; Saleh et al., 2007; Shiri 
et al., 2012; Song & Windram, 2004a; Vafeas, 2005,  Yunos, 2011). The above results 
indicate that an ACs’ effectiveness is higher when independent directors dominate the 
committee. Recently, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) suggested that the independence 
of AC is significantly associated with limiting accruals earnings management. Haji-
Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) documented that an AC with a large number of 
independent directors has an insignificant association with real earnings management.  
 
According to resource dependence theory, a large number of independent directors on 
an AC would provide a good mixture of expertise, skills, experience and valuable 
network with relevant parties, which, in turn, enriches the ability of the AC to 
effectively implement its duties (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015b; DeZoort et al., 2003; 
Turley & Zaman, 2007). Previous studies have highlighted that the large size of an AC 
is a fundamental feature that enhances its effectiveness in performing the monitoring 
functions (e.g., Bédard & Gendron, 2010; Ghosh et al., 2010; Khalifa & Hanefah, 
2012). Consistently, the study of Ismail et al. (2010) reported that AC size has a vital 
effect on its decisions.  
 
Further, Bédard and Gendron (2010) reviewed the literature related to the size of the 
AC and found evidence supporting the role of the large size of the AC on effective 
monitoring whereas others had shown both negative results and insignificant 
relationships. Xie et al. (2003) provided evidence that the size of the AC had a negative 
association with managers’ actions with respect to earnings management. Felo et al. 
(2003) provided evidence that AC size has a positive association with the quality of 
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financial reporting measured by abnormal accruals. Ghosh et al. (2010) also found that 
firms with large-sized ACs are less likely to embark on earnings management actions. 
Recently, Salihi and Jibril (2015) revealed that an AC with large size had a negative 
and significant relationship with the magnitude of earnings management. 
 
Through the lens of agency theory, the meetings frequency of AC is a significant aspect 
of the committee’s effectiveness in achieving its monitoring duties (Vafeas, 2005). 
Prior studies revealed that the frequency of AC meetings is a primary indicator of the 
diligence of an AC (Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). Some have found that the more 
frequently the AC meets, the more efficient the AC in exerting its monitoring functions 
(Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Zaman et al., 2011). Saleh et al. (2007) also mentioned 
that the frequency of AC meetings is an energizing factor in helping an AC realise its 
tasks. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) said that more frequent meetings of an AC may 
provide sufficient time to achieve its monitoring and oversight functions more 
effectively, such as the process of preparing corporate reports and internal control.  
 
Empirically, Xie et al. (2003) provide evidence supporting the notion that the more 
AC’s frequent meetings, the greater the ability of AC to control and limit actions of 
earnings management. Consistently, García et al. (2010) found that the frequency of 
AC meetings has a negative connection with the level of abnormal accruals as a proxy 
for earnings management. Saleh et al. (2007) found a negative connotation between the 
practice of earnings management and AC activities frequency. Further, Inaam et al. 
(2012) documented that an AC with a greater meeting frequency has a better 
opportunity to constrain real earnings management through sales manipulation. The 
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results of mentioned studies mean that the higher the number of ACs meetings, the 
greater is the opportunity to detect potential mistakes in financial statements. 
 
Regarding financial expertise of AC, agency theory supports the notion that an AC may 
act on behalf of owners by using its knowledge, skills and expertise to perform the 
monitoring duties diligently to produce quality financial reporting (Nelson & Devi, 
2013). The resource dependence theory also suggests that outside directors provide 
valuable expertise and advice in a variety of strategic aspects (Hillman et al., 2009). 
Emmerich et al. (2005) cited that a sufficient understanding of accounting and finance 
is required for AC members to act as active monitors. Defond et al. (2005) and 
Davidson et al. (2004) empirically provided evidence that the market perceives the 
existence of a financial expert as positively enhancing the monitoring function of the 
AC. Aldamen et al. (2012) also found empirical evidence showing that financial 
expertise in ACs is positively associated with firm performance. Abbott et al. (2004) 
showed a negative association for presence of a financial expert on an AC with financial 
restatements. Martínez-Ferrero et al. (2017) found that an effective role for the financial 
expertise of AC is in enhancing earnings quality. 
 
In the Malaysian context, BMLRs stated that at a minimum one AC member must have 
a membership in the Accountants Institute of Malaysia (AIM) or otherwise have 
experience with a minimum of three working years with academic qualifications, or 
hold membership in one of the bodies that are recognised and listed in the Accountants 
Act of 1967 (Yunos, 2011). Yunos et al. (2012) is consistent with previous studies 
highlighting the importance of financial experts’ best practices in corporate 
governance. Saleh et al. (2007) revealed that a more knowledgeable and experienced 
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AC recorded fewer earnings management practices. Recently, Bamahros and Bhasin 
(2016) found a negative linkage between former auditors serving on an AC and the 
practice of discretionary accruals. 
 
In summary, the existing empirical literature provides evidence that the effectiveness 
of an AC is dependent on its independence, size, the frequency of its meetings and the 
financial expertise held by its members ( e.g. Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2016; Davidson 
et al., 2005; Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2013; Goodwin-Stewait & Kent, 2006). Bédard et 
al. (2004) documented that financial expertise is an essential feature for independent 
directors that enables them to monitor the financial reporting process. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2010) also indicated that the independence of AC members is not enough, but they 
should have financial and accounting expertise to constrain accruals-based earnings 
management. Furthermore, Sharma and Kuang (2014) and Woidtke and Yeh (2013) 
suggested that focusing on the independence of AC alone may be insufficient to restrict 
earnings quality; hence, independent members who have financial expertise could 
support the confidence in accounting information and then raise the earnings quality. 
 
Some existing literature uses a composite metric for measuring the effectiveness of an 
AC (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Brown & Caylor, 2006; Chobpichien et al. 2008; 
Habbash, 2013; Kent et al., 2010; Hunton et al., 2011; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Zaman, 
Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011). Ward et al. (2009) suggest that using a composite measure 
for corporate governance mechanisms is better than taking them individually because 
the effectiveness of a particular mechanism depends on other mechanisms. 
Consequently, considering the mechanisms of corporate governance as a package gives 
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a stronger outcome of measurement than just examining them individually (O’Sullivan 
et al., 2008).  
 
Thus, this current study combines four features of the AC, including independence, 
size, meetings and financial expertise, to create a composite measure (score) for the 
effectiveness of AC. Overall, from the viewpoints of agency theory and resource 
dependency theory as well as based on the previous empirical debates, this study 
hypothesises the following:  
 
H2: There is a negative relationship between AC effectiveness (ACSCORE) and 
accretive share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.2.3 Audit Quality and Accretive Share Buyback  
Dandago and Binti Zamro (2012) indicated that the external auditor is an independent 
individual or institution that is employed to review a firm’s financial reports, internal 
controls, and accounting information systems. Auditors with more knowledge and 
experience possess a higher ability to detect mistakes in financial reporting and improve 
its credibility, which, in turn, leads to a reduction in information asymmetries between 
firm’s insiders and outside shareholders (Becker et al., 1998; Bedard & Biggs, 1991). 
Prior studies document that the nominations of qualified auditors lead to a fewer 
mitigating restatements of financial reports (Romanus et al., 2008) and improve 
voluntary disclosure (Dunn & Mayhew, 2004).  
 
Becker et al. (1998) indicated that the ability of managers to use their discretion to 
achieve opportunistic purposes is limited when a firm is audited by a Big 6 auditor. 
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Francis and Yu (2009) mentioned that firms audited by Big 4 auditors experience lower 
information asymmetry, have less aggressive earnings management practices and have 
a better market price than firms with non-Big 4 audit firms. Big 4 auditing firms are 
auditors from internationally recognised professional accounting bodies that include 
Deloitte, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Ernst and Young and KPMG. Francis et al. (1999) 
and Francis and Yu (2009) claimed that internationally branded big audit firms have 
greater ability to effectively monitor firms and achieve better audit quality than non-
Big audit firms.  
 
Consistently, Becker et al. (1998) show that firms audited by non-Big 6 audit firms 
record accruals more often than firms audited by Big 6 auditors. Krishnan (2003) and 
Chiang et al. (2011) documented that discretionary accrual is low in the firms reviewed 
by Big 4 auditors and high-quality CPAs. The existing literature reveals that the audit 
quality serves as a significant constraint against practicing accrual-based earnings 
management (Balsam et al., 2003; Becker et al., 1998; Chiang et al., 2011; Francis et 
al., 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009; Lin & Hwang, 2010; Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 
2008).  
 
Empirically,  Zang (2012) failed to find a positive relationship between Big 4 auditors 
and the practise of real earnings management. This outcome is consistent with the 
argument that the impact of Big 4 audit firms may belong to the fundamental 
differences in client characteristics rather than differential audit quality (Lawrence et 
al., 2011). Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006) also found that employing Big 5 auditing 
firms has insignificant relationship with earnings management practices. Furthermore, 
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Carlin et al. (2009) indicated substantial cross-sectional variation (low compliance 
levels) between firms audited by Big 4 auditors in the Malaysian context. 
 
However, the opposing argument predicts that, when a firm is audited by a high-quality 
auditor, managers may practice earnings management through real earnings 
management rather than through based-accruals activities (Cohen et al., 2008; 
Rochowdhury, 2006). Cohen et al. (2008) found that firm managers moved to real 
earnings management practices after the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 
from accrual-based earnings management because the likelihood of detection of 
accrual-based earnings management was higher than in pre-SOX periods.  
 
More specifically, Burnett et al. (2012) found evidence that large audit quality firms 
are more likely to employ shares buyback for earnings management purposes and less 
likely to use accruals-based earnings management. Chi et al. (2011) also provided 
evidence that Big 4 auditors and auditor specialists were positively related to real 
earnings management positively but had a negative relationship with earnings 
management based accruals. In Malaysia, Chandren et al. (2015) found a positive 
relationship between Big4 auditors and accretive share buybacks, meaning that firms 
audited by Big4 audit firms are more likely to involve in accretive share buybacks to 
manage EPS. 
 
In summary, previous studies have revealed inconclusive evidence on the role of audit 
quality in constraining earnings management activities. Therefore, this study posited 




H3: There is a significant association between audit quality and accretive share 
buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.2.4 Family Ownership and Accretive Share Buybacks 
Regarding the influence of family ownership on earnings management, there are two 
conflicting arguments: 1) the alignment interest hypothesis and 2) entrenchment 
hypothesis. The alignment interest hypothesis assumes that family-controlled firms 
have motivations to mitigate the earnings manipulation behaviours exercised by the 
managers (Wang, 2006). Based on this opinion, family members have sufficient 
knowledge about the activities of their firms, which, in turn, may assist in detecting 
opportunistic actions such as manipulation of accounting numbers (Anderson et al., 
2003).  This argument is in line with the notion that suggests controlling shareholders 
such as family ownership and managers behave as stewards to achieve a firm’s goals 
rather than behaving destructively for individualistic and self-serving objectives 
(Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010b; Jaskiewicz & Klein, 2007).  
 
Consistently, several empirical studies have documented evidence that supports the 
alignment hypothesis. Wang (2006) provides evidence that the presence of founding 
family members has a significant association with higher earnings quality measured by 
abnormal accruals. Along the same line with the results of Wang (2006),  Ali et al. 
(2007) used discretionary accruals to measure earnings quality and found that family-
controlled firms experienced better earnings quality. Li and Hung (2013) indicated that 
family-owned firms indeed mitigated the likelihood of earnings management in the 
family-controlled firms. Furthermore, Siregar and Utama (2008) found that family-
controlled firms experienced higher quality earnings than other types of ownership of 
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firms. Achleitner et al. (2014) documented that family-owned firms are involved in real 
earnings management and exhibit more earnings-decreasing in abnormal accruals as 
compared to non-family firms. In Malaysian case, Wan-Hussin (2009) revealed that 
family-controlled firms were more transparent in complying with segmental reporting 
disclosure. 
 
On the contrary, the entrenchment hypothesis argues that family shareholdings might 
stimulate management to engage in earnings management (Wang, 2006). This 
argument is consistent with the viewpoint of agency theory (type II) that posits  agency 
problems occur between majority and minority shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; 
Fan & Wong, 2002). Prior studies have opined that firms with highly concentrated 
family ownership have less efficient monitoring functions, which provides a large 
opportunity to expropriate the interests of minority shareholders by controlling 
shareholders (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Burkart et al., 2003; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011).  
 
Numerous empirical studies provide evidence that enhances the hypothesis of the 
entrenchment argument. Fan and Wong (2002) indicated that controlling shareholders, 
including family ownership, report accounting information to gain self-interests, which 
limits the credibility of reported earnings. Faccio et al. (2001) found that family 
ownership in Europe and Asia utilise dividend policies to expropriate the rights of 
minority outside shareholders. Consistently, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) reported that 
family-controlled firms exercise earnings management to gain private interests of 
control. Moreover, Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) found that managers and controlling 
shareholders may use goodwill impairment as a tool to manage earnings. Chi et al. 
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(2014) indicated that family firms are positively associated with the practice of earnings 
management. Recently, Tai (2017) provided evidence that family firms are involved in 
both accruals based and real earnings management, but they engage more in real 
earnings management activities.  
 
Regarding share buyback programs, previous studies have documented that highly 
controlling shareholders such as family ownership may force the BOD to engage in 
share buybacks to exercise opportunistic behaviours such as mimicking good firms 
(Chan et al., 2010), to manipulate EPS (Kahle, 2002), or occasionally to increase share 
price (Wu, 2011). In summary, according to agency theory as well as the perspectives 
of the entrenchment hypothesis and alignment hypothesis, this study posits the 
following hypothesis: 
 
H4: There is a significant association between family ownership and accretive share 
buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.2.5 Managerial Ownership and Accretive Share Buyback 
The literature shows two different hypotheses related to the influence of managerial 
ownership on earnings manipulation activities. The alignment of interest hypothesis 
predicts that higher ownership managers have stronger incentives to improve 
shareholders’ interests (Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011). This viewpoint is similar to the 
basic argument of agency theory assuming that the high managerial ownership may 
align the interest of owners and management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which leads 
to limit actions of earnings management (Warfield et al., 1995). Empirically, Warfield 
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et al. (1995) documented that managerial ownership has a negative association with the 
amount of abnormal accruals.  
 
Alves (2012) also revealed that discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings 
management were negatively associated with managerial ownership. Further, Farrell et 
al. (2013) found that a high proportion of CEO ownership has a negative association 
with earnings management through accretive shares buyback. In Malaysia, Saleh et al. 
(2005) and Mohd Ali et al. (2010) found that managerial shareholdings was negatively 
related to earnings management as measured by the absolute value of accounting 
accruals and discretionary accruals respectively. Recently, Ramadan (2016) found that 
management ownership was related inversely to earnings management. 
 
On the contrary, the entrenchment hypothesis predicts that firms with high managerial 
shareholdings may use a firm’s resource to gain personal benefits at the expense of 
other shareholders. This hypothesis is consistent with the viewpoint of agency theory 
(type II) assumes that conflicts may occur between majority shareholders, who are at 
the same time a firm’s managers, and minority shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Warfield et al., 1995). Previous studies have mentioned that firms with a majority of 
controlling shareholders who are simultaneously a firm’s managers may expropriate 
the resources of a firm for their interests at the expense of the interests of minority 
shareholders (Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Wu, 2009; Yeh & 
Chou, 2014). 
 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2005) argued that a significant level of managerial ownership 
may create motivations for managers to entrench their position and wealth. The prior 
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empirical literature documents a positive association between the percentage of 
managerial ownership and the practices of earnings management measured by 
abnormal accruals (Al-Fayoumi et al., 2010; Gopalan & Jayaraman, 2012; Halioui & 
Jerbi, 2012; Leuz et al., 2003). Johari et al. (2009) provided evidence that managerial 
ownership more than 25% has a relationship with the practice of earnings management. 
Recently, Masmoudi and Boujelbène (2014) found that managerial ownership has a 
significant positive influence on practices earnings management. Recently, Oluku 
(2017) found that firms with a high level of equity held by managers are more likely to 
practice earnings management. 
 
In the field of buyback policy, Wu (2011) provided evidence that firms with less 
managerial entrenchment have more economic reactions to a buyback announcement 
than those with the high entrenchment of management. Webb (2008) found that 
managerial ownership has a positive association with the number of shares buybacks in 
small banks. Moore (2017) found a positive association between CEO equity sales and 
share buyback activities. Along the same line, Olbe and Nyman (2017) suggested that 
the size of CEO equity is increased as a result of the decrease in outstanding shares due 
to the actual share buyback. In Malaysia, Abdul Latif and Taufil Mohd (2014) found a 
positive association between the actual share buyback and directors’ ownership.  
 
Based on the previous discussion and the entrenchment hypothesis and the convergence 





H5: There is a significant relationship between managerial ownership and accretive 
share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.2.6 Foreign Ownership and Accretive Share Buyback 
Foreign investors are more likely to become an effective corporate governance device 
in emerging markets (Bayrakdaroglu et al., 2012). Choi et al. (2012) mentioned that 
foreign investors have competitive features that would help to transfer their specific 
knowledge to domestic firms. Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) indicated that foreign investors 
need more information disclosure and adequate transparency to avoid expropriation by 
inside shareholders. Jiang and Kim (2004) said that foreign shareholdings are 
associated with low asymmetric information and higher corporate transparency. 
Therefore, foreign owners are less likely to invest in firms with large family controlled 
and managerial ownership (Leuz et al., 2010). 
 
Jeon et al. (2011) documented that foreign investors prefer firms with high dividend 
payments rather than firms with share buyback programs due to perceptions of 
foreigners that firms with share buyback programs have overvalued stocks. Choe et al. 
(2005) and Dvorak (2005) provided evidence that foreign investors have an information 
disadvantage relative to domestic investors. Thus, foreign traders avoid firms that 
undertake share buyback programs (Jeon et al., 2011). This may further support the 
notion that foreign investors prefer cash dividends in comparison to share buybacks.  
 
Several studies have revealed that foreign investors put their investment in the firms 
with good corporate governance and investor protections. Jiang and Kim (2004) 
indicated that foreign investors are likely to be efficient processors of public 
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information and are attracted to firms with low information asymmetry. Mohd Ali et al. 
(2008a) report that foreign shareholdings play a vital role in monitoring firm 
behaviours. Furthermore, Anum Mohd Ghazali (2010) provided empirical evidence 
that foreign shareholdings have a positive relationship with the corporate performance 
of Malaysian firms. Many prior studies have found a negative association between the 
proportion of foreign ownership and the exercise of earnings management (Ben-Nasr 
et al., 2015; Guo et al., 2015; Mohd Ali et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2015). Recently, Poli 
(2015) and  Alzoubi (2016) provided empirical evidence that foreign ownership has a 
significant and negative association with earnings management activities. 
 
The majority of foreign ownership in Malaysian market is in the form of a foreign 
candidate or direct ownership of foreign firms (Mohd Ali et al., 2010). On average, 
foreign ownership in Malaysia is about 23% (Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2010). Numerous 
Malaysian firms are controlled by foreign owners from European countries, especially 
from the United Kingdom (Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). Shayan-Nia et al. (2017) 
documented that the size of real earnings management is significantly mitigated by 
foreign investors in Malaysian firms. Therefore, foreigners may help improve firm 
governance, leading to the limitation of the opportunistic actions of managers.  
Based on the above debates, this study posits the following hypothesis: 
 
H6: There is a negative relationship between foreign ownership and accretive share 






4.2.7 Employee Stock Option (ESOS) and Accretive Share Buyback 
The key objective of employee stock options is to align the interests of the management 
(executives and employees) with firm shareholders (Bickley, 2012).  Managerial stock 
options may play a vital role as incentives for the manipulative behaviours of managers 
and controlling stockholders (Bergstresser & Philippon, 2006; Cheng & Warfield, 
2005; Houmes & Skantz, 2010; Kahle, 2002). Cheng et al. (2010) provided evidence 
that, when a bonus of a firm’s CEO directly depends on EPS, the firm is more likely to 
engage in share buyback programs and the number of share buybacks tend to be greater. 
 
According to the stock options hypothesis, firms may engage in share buyback 
programs to fund stock options that are exercised (Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002), as well 
as to avoid a dilution in EPS caused by the exercise of a stock option (Bens et al., 2003; 
Kahle, 2002). Along the same line,  the substitution hypothesis posits that employee 
options motivate management to undertake share buyback programs to limit dividend 
payments that cause a decrease in the value of both exercisable and unexercisable stock 
options held by executives (Bens et al., 2003; Kahle, 2002). Previous studies, for 
example those of Dittmar (2000), Fenn and Liang (2001), Kahle (2002), and  Lamba 
and Miranda (2010), provide empirical evidence that firms with a high level of 
employee stock options are more motivated to engage in share buyback programs. More 
specifically, the incentive to initiate buyback programs is more likely when executives 
have large exercisable stock options (Balachandran et al., 2008). These results suggest 
that managers with higher executive stock options would be more motived to embark 
in share buybacks to reduce the dilution of EPS affected by their stock options (Lamba 




Previous studies have mentioned that firms embark in share buybacks to handle the 
dilution in EPS occurs through the exercise of stock options (Bens et al., 2003; Dittmar, 
2000; Weisbenner, 2000). Furthermore, Lin et al. (2009) provided evidence that 
managerial stock options affect the amount of actual share buyback positively. Lin et 
al. (2009) also found that managers use share buybacks as a substitute mechanism for 
discretionary accounting accruals in their earnings management practices. Furthermore, 
prior researchers have asserted that managers holding large stock options are more 
likely to manipulate earnings to meet performance forecasts (Bergstresser & Philippon, 
2006; Cheng & Warfield, 2005; Houmes & Skantz, 2010). 
 
Bedard et al. (2004) and Cadbury committees (1992) found evidence that the stock 
options of directors may limit their independence. Consistently, Efendi et al. (2007) 
provided evidence that proportion of CEO’s stock options is associated with the 
likelihood of financial report restatement. Bedard et al. (2004) and Cheng and Warfield 
(2005) indicated that managers with a high level of managerial ownership including 
stock options have more incentives to manipulate earnings to meet or beat forecasts of 
analysts, especially when the probability of a negative earnings surprise is high.  
 
Moreover, Bartov and Mohanram (2004) found that firm executives use private 
information to time abnormally large exercises follow earnings management to increase 
the price of stocks exercised. Kadan and Yang (2016) examined the association between 
the grants of executive stock options and earnings management and found that newly 
granted stock options are positively related to earnings management practices. Stock 
options (ESOS) decrease EPS. This may increase the possibility of managers being 
involved in accretive share buyback to increase EPS (offset the EPS dilution). However, 
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limited studies have proven the positive relationship between stock options and 
accretive share buyback. Thus, with the support of stock options hypothesis and 
previous debates, this study posits this following hypothesis:  
 
H7: There is a positive relationship between employee stock options exercised and 
accretive share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management. 
 
4.3 Research Design  
The research design is defined as a master plan identifying the procedures and methods 
used for collecting and analysing the particular information (Zikmund, Babin, Carr, & 
Griffin, 2013). Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009) said that a research design 
comprises a general plan on how the study will be conducted to realise its purpose. In 
other words, a research design provides a framework that facilitates planning the actions 
involved in the research project (Kassim, 2013). More specifically, a research design is 
considered as a logical plan for “dealing with at least four problems: what questions to 
study, what data are relevant, what data to collect, and how to analyse the results” (Yin, 
2009, p. 26). In this case, a quantitative research method was the most suitable method 
to explain the association between and among the measurable variables (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2010).   
 
Consequently, this study employs a quantitative approach to determine the influence of 
corporate governance mechanisms and ESOS on accretive shares buyback as a 
mechanism for real earnings management. It uses the secondary data to answer its five 
questions and achieve the relevant objectives. The data were collected from several 
sources. The annual reports of firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia were used to get data 
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for actual share buybacks, corporate governance mechanisms, ownership structure and 
ESOS over the period from 2010- 2015. The DataStream database was employed to get 
data for the control variables.  
 
4.4 Definition and Measurement of Dependent Variables: Accretive Shares 
Buybacks  
Share buyback is a method to return excess cash to the shareholders by which firms buy 
back its shares from targeted shareholders, individuals or groups at a specific price 
(Grullon & Ikenberry, 2000). According to the Companies Act 2016 and Chapter 12 of 
the Bursa Listing Requirements, share buyback via the open market is the only method 
of share buyback that is allowed in the Malaysian context; firms are limited to buying 
back a maximum of 10% of their outstanding shares. Share buybacks are used by 
managers to manage reported EPS to match earnings targets (Hribar et al., 2006; Lin et 
al., 2009; Vermaelen, 2005).  
 
This current study focuses on actual share buyback activities that cause a considerable 
change in EPS (accretive share buybacks). The net effect of share buybacks on EPS 
depends jointly on three elements, namely, 1) the timing of the buyback, 2) the number 
of shares in the buyback, and 3) the forgone future returns from the cash used for share 
buyback (Hribar et al., 2006). Shares buyback increases EPS only when a firm’s 
earnings yield (ratio of earnings to price) is greater than the foregone return (interest 
expense incurred) on the cash paid out at the time of shares buyback (Bens et al., 2003; 




This study follows previous studies (Burnett et al, 2012; Chandren et al, 2015; Farrell 
et al, 2014; Hribar et al, 2006) to calculate accretive shares buyback, where they identify 
two steps for calculating accretive buybacks. The first step is to compute EPS without 
considering the effect of shares buyback activities during the financial year (ASIF-
EPS). The study calculates ASIF-EPS by estimating the denominator and numerator 
effects of accretive shares buyback on EPS as follows: 
ASIF-EPS it = NI it / (Outstanding shares it-1 +0.5 x Shares issued it) …......….. (1) 
 
Where,  
ASIF-EPS it represents the estimated EPS in the absence of share buyback activities. 
NI it represents the reported net earnings before comprehensive income available to 
common shareholders during the firm-fiscal year.  
Outstanding shares it-1 is the reported number of ordinary outstanding shares at the 
beginning of the firm-fiscal year.  
0.50 is a time-weighted average of the number of outstanding shares during the firm-
fiscal year. 
Shares issued it is the number of ordinary shares issued during the firm-fiscal year. 
Following Burnett et al. (2012), Hribar et al. (2006), and Horan (2012),  the issued 
shares are calculated by the following equation; 
Shares issued it = ending outstanding shares it –beginning outstanding shares it-1 + 




The second step of accretive buyback calculations is to compute the EPS difference 
(EPS.DIFF) between ASIF_EPS and the reported EPS as presented in financial 
reporting. This study calculates EPS.DIFF in the following equation: 
EPS.DIFF it = Reported EPS it – ASIF_EPS it ………………………….…. (3)  
Where: Reported EPS it represents the reported EPS as it shown in the annual reports.  
 
Based on prior studies (Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2014; Hribar et al., 2006), 
share buybacks are considered as an accretive share buyback if it leads to an increase 
in EPS at least by one cent (0.01) of a Ringgit. Based on the previous calculations, this 
current study found 106 listed firms that involved at least one time in accretive share 
buybacks to increase EPS by at least one cent of Malaysian ringgit during the study’s 
sample period as presented on Section 4.6.2. 
 
Following Chandren et al. (2015), this study uses the natural logarithm of accretive 
share buyback numbers  (ABB) as a measurement for the dependent variable, accretive 
share buybacks. The number of share buybacks represents the total volume of shares 
bought back by the firm’s management during the current year. This study uses the 
volume of shares bought back rather than the Malaysian ringgit value of share buybacks 
because reported EPS is affected directly by the number of outstanding shares, which, 
in turn, are affected by the volume of shares bought back (Hribar et al., 2006; Farrell et 
al., 2013).  
 
Also, BMLRs in Chapter 12 states that firms required to submit a proposal of share 
buyback intention to Bursa Malaysia and then send circular to the shareholders for the 
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purpose of buyback implementation before conducting an annual general meeting or 
extraordinary general meeting to get the approval of shareholders (Chandren et al., 
2015). The BOD proposed the intention of buyback in terms of volume of shares to the 
shareholders and the actual value in Malaysian ringgit will not be known until the actual 
buyback activities discharge through open-market share buyback programs. Thus, this 
current study uses accretive share buyback volume as a measurement for the dependent 
variable, accretive share buybacks. 
 
4.5 Definitions and Measurements of Independent Variables  
The independent variables include the score of the BOD’ effectiveness (independence, 
size, meetings and financial expertise), the score of AC effectiveness (independence, 
size, meetings, and financial expertise), audit quality, family ownership, managerial 
ownership, foreign ownership, and employee stock options. Furthermore, the control 
variables comprise firm size, growth, leverage, and cash level. The specific variables 
are discussed in detail below. 
 
4.5.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Effectiveness  
Four features of the BOD are used to calculate the score of its effectiveness 
(BDSCORE), which includes BOD independence, BOD size, BOD meetings and BOD 
financial expertise. This study follows two steps to produce the scores of the four 
features of the BOD, which represent its effectiveness. The first step is to measure the 
four features of the BOD individually, and the second one is to calculate the composite 
score of BOD effectiveness. The score is developed by transfer the features of the BOD 
to dichotomous variables, in which the total score ranges from “0” to “4”. If the score 
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of the BOD is higher, this indicates higher effectiveness and a lower score indicates 
lower effectiveness. More details are included in the following subsections. 
 
4.5.1.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Independence 
BMLRs defined an independent director as “a director who is independent of 
management and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere with 
the exercise of independent judgement or the ability to act in the best interests of an 
applicant or a listed issuer” (p. 105). An independent director is a director who is not 
an executive director, not a key shareholder, is not a family membership with of any 
key shareholder, an executive director or officer and not a candidate for any key 
shareholder or executive director as well as not engaging as an officer or advisor for a 
firm (BMLRs, 2013).  
 
The director is considered to be independent when the director does not has occupy any 
executive position or ownership position in a firm. Following previous studies (e.g., 
Abidin et al., 2014; Al-Matar et al., 2014; Fooladi, 2012; Hashim & Devi, 2008b), this 
study measures the independence of the BOD (BDIND) by employing the proportion 
of independent directors scaled by entire number of directors serving on the BOD. 
 
4.5.1.2 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Size  
BOD size is defined by prior studies (Andres & Vallelado, 2008; Hashim & Devi, 
2008a; Ismail et al., 2010) as the total number of directors on the firm’s BOD. This 
study follows the literature, for example Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), Andres and 
Vallelado  (2008), Aygun, Ic, and Arvas (2010), Dimitropoulos (2011), Epps and Ismail 
(2009), Hashim and Devi (2008a), Ishak and Manaf (2013), Kumari and Pattanayak 
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(2014) and Zgarni et al. (2014) by using the total number of directors on a firm’s BOD 
to measure the BOD size variable (BDSIZE).  
 
4.5.1.3 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Meetings 
Previous studies, for instance, Vafeas (1999), Mohamad et al. (2012) and Xie et al. 
(2003), define BOD meeting frequency as the number of meetings of the BOD during 
a year. Following existing literature (Hashim & Devi, 2008a; Sarkar et al., 2008; 
Vafeas, 1999; Xie et al., 2003; Zgarni et al., 2014), the frequency of BOD meetings is 
used to measure BOD meetings (BDMEET). 
 
4.5.1.4 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Financial Expertise  
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the United States says that a 
director is a financial expert when the director has accounting, finance or supervisory 
expertise (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). BMLRs stated three conditions to consider a director 
as a financial expert including; the director must have a membership in the Malaysian 
Institute of Accountants (MIA) or otherwise have experience with a minimum of three 
working years with academic qualifications, or hold membership in one of the bodies 
that are recognised and listed in the Accountants Act of 1967. Following previous 
studies (e.g. Amran & Che Ahmad, 2011; Yunos et al., 2014; Yunos et al., 2012), this 
study employs the ratio of directors with financial expertise to the total number of 





4.5.1.5 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Effectiveness as Score   
The existing literature, for example, Hunton et al. (2011), Zaman et al. (2011), Habbash 
(2013) and Bin-Ghanem and Ariff (2016) utilise an aggregate index to measure 
governance mechanisms. Those studies develop composite scores to measure the BOD 
and AC effectiveness. A composite score is used based on the argument that corporate 
governance is an interrelated system and is effective only in particular combinations 
rather than in isolated best practices. Aguilera et al. (2008) argued that a corporate 
governance system is an interrelated and becomes more efficient when considered as a 
bundle rather than as individual measurements.  
 
Accordingly, using the composite measurement of corporate governance mechanisms 
provides a stronger effect relative to individual measurement (O'Sullivan et al., 2008). 
Furthermore, examining a composite measure is more likely to avoid measurement 
errors that may occur through using an individual features (Srinidhi et al., 2014). Ward 
et al. (2009) report that using governance mechanisms as a group is better than using 
them individually because governance mechanisms perform in complementary manner.  
 
Based on previous studies (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Chobpichien et al., 2007; 
Hunton et al., 2011; Goh 2009; Johl et al., 2013; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Srinidhi et al., 
2014), this study utilises a composite measure for effectiveness of BOD, which, as 
discussed before, contains four features of the BOD (independence, size, meeting, and 
financial expertise) to represent its effectiveness. Each of these features is transformed 
to dichotomous values, which equals “1” if its original value is above its sample median 
and “0” if otherwise. This process is applied to the four features of the BOD. Then the 
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dichotomous value of all four features of the BOD is added together to produce a 
composite score of BOD effectiveness (BDSCORE).  
 
Table 4.1) 
Constructing the Composite Score of the BOD Effectiveness  









Dichotomous variable equals “1” 
if the percentage of independence 
of BOD members is larger than the 
sample median and equals “0” if 
otherwise (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 





BOD size  BDSIZE 
Dichotomous variable equals “1” 
for BOD members larger than the 
sample median and equals “0” if 
otherwise (Chobpichien et al., 








Dichotomous variable equals “1” 
if the number of meetings 
frequency is more than the sample 
median and equals “0” otherwise 
(Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; 
Chobpichien et al., 2008; Johl et 








Dichotomous variable equals “1” 
if the percentage of financial 
experts is more than the sample 
median and equals “0” if 










The sum of four components: 
BOD score, it is ranging from 0-4 
with 0 indicating the lowest 
effectiveness and 4 indicating the 
highest effectiveness of the BOD 
(Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; 
Chobpichien et al., 2008; Goh 






BDSCORE is a summed composite measure of the BOD’s effectiveness that ranges 
from “0” to “4” in this study. For example, if the value of the four features 
(independence, size, meetings, and financial expertise) for one observation is 1, 0, 1, 
and 1 respectively; this means that the value of the score for this observation is "3". The 
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BDSCORE indicates that BOD with more independent directors, a large size, more 
frequent meetings and more financial expert members are a highly effective BOD. This 
means that the higher score of the BOD’ effectiveness, the higher effectiveness of the 
BOD. Table 4.1 shows the process of computing the score of the BOD effectiveness. 
 
4.5.2 Audit Committee (AC) Effectiveness  
The same process of measuring BOD effectiveness is replicated to measure the 
effectiveness of AC. Four features of the AC, independence, size, the frequency of 
meetings and financial expertise, are summed together to calculate a composite score 
of its effectiveness. As mentioned before in the section of the BOD effectiveness, the 
study begins by measuring these features of the AC and then joining them together to 
calculate the composite score as a proxy for AC effectiveness (ACSCORE). 
 
4.5.2.1 Audit Committee (AC) Independence  
Following prior studies, the ratio of independent non-executive directors serving on AC 
to total number of its members is employed by this study to be a measurement of the 
AC independence variable (ACIND) (Abdul Latiff & Taib, 2011; Cohen et al., 2004; 
Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Khalifa & Hanefah, 2012; Madi et al., 2014; Saleh et al., 
2007; Song & Windram, 2004; Wan Ismail et al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003).  
 
4.5.2.2 Audit Committee (AC) Size  
AC size is defined as a number of directors serving on the committee. BMLRs require 
at least three members to serve on a firm’s AC. This current study follows the relevant 
literature by using the total number of directors serving on a firm’s AC as a 
measurement of the variable of AC size (ACSIZE) (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2015; Felo, 
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Krishnamurthy, & Solieri, 2003; Madi et al., 2014; Salihi & Jibril, 2015; Wan Ismail et 
al., 2010; Xie et al., 2003). 
 
4.5.2.3 Audit Committee (AC) Meetings 
AC meetings are defined as the frequency of meetings held by the AC in a given year 
(Ghosh et al., 2010). Following previous studies, this study uses the number of AC’s  
meetings as a proxy to measure the AC meetings (ACMEET) (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Chandrasegaram et al., 2013; Madi et al., 2014; Saleh et 
al., 2007; Song & Windram, 2004b; Xie et al., 2003). 
 
4.5.2.4 Audit Committee (AC) Financial Expertise 
The SEC in the United States considers a director to be financial expert director when 
the director has accounting, finance or supervisory expertise (Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
More specifically, BMLRs in Malaysia has defined a director as a financial expert if 
the director has a membership in “Malaysian Institute of Accountants, or alternatively 
have at least three years working experience with academic qualifications or a member 
of one of the recognised bodies list out in the Part II of the First Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967” (p. 1504). Following previous researchers (Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2015b; Felo et al., 2003; Madi et al., 2014; Saleh et al., 2007; Yeh & Chou, 
2014; Yunos et al., 2012), this study uses the ratio of financial expert members scaled 
by the total number of AC members to be a measure of the AC expertise (ACEXPRT). 
 
4.5.2.5 Audit Committee (AC) Effectiveness as Score  
The current study follows previous studies (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Brown & 
Caylor, 2006; Chobpichien et al. 2008; Habbash, 2013; Kent et al., 2010; Hunton et al., 
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2011; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Zaman, Hudaib, & Haniffa, 2011) in using a composite 
governance score to measure AC effectiveness. The same processes of computing the 
BOD score was repeated to calculate the score of AC effectiveness (ACSCORE). Thus, 
this study first measures AC features (independence, size, meetings, financial 
expertise). Then, those four features are transferred to dichotomous values equalling  
  
Table 4.2  
Constructing the Composite Score of the AC Effectiveness 





Dichotomous variable equals 
one if the AC independence is 
larger than the sample median 
and equals “0” if otherwise (Bin-
Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Cohen et 
al., 2004; Khalifa & Hanefah, 
2012). 





AC size  
 
ACSIZE  
Dichotomous variable equals 
“1” for AC size larger than the 
sample median and equals “0” if 
otherwise (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 
2016; Chobpichien et al., 2008; 
Zaman et al., 2011).  




AC meetings  ACMEET  
Dichotomous variable equals 
“1” if the number of meetings 
frequency is more than the 
sample median and equals “0” if 
otherwise (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 
2016; Chobpichien et al., 2008; 
Zaman et al., 2011). 
Agency theory and 
resource 
dependence 




Dichotomous variable equals 
“1” if the percentage of financial 
experts is more than the sample 
median and equals “0” if 
otherwise (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 
2016; Chobpichien et al., 2008; 
Zaman et al., 2011).  
Agency theory and 
resource 
dependence 




The sum of four components: AC 
score ranges from 0 - 4 with a 
higher score indicating a higher 
effectiveness of the AC (Bin-
Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; 
Chobpichien et al., 2008; Zaman 
et al., 2011).   
Agency theory and 
resource 
dependence 
theory.   
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“1” if it is above the median and “0” if otherwise to calculate the score as a composite 
measurement of AC effectiveness. The score refers to the total value of the four-
dichotomous value that takes a score ranging from 0 to 4 as presented in Table 4.2 
below. Higher scores reflect higher AC effectiveness. 
 
4.5.3 Audit Quality Measurement 
An external auditor is an independent party who is employed to review financial 
reports, internal control and accounting information system (Dandago & Binti Zamro, 
2012). Previous researchers have mentioned that international brand of big audit firms 
is associated with the ability to effectively monitoring and achieve better audit quality 
than non-Big audit firms (Francis et al., 1999; Francis & Yu, 2009). Based on the 
existing literature, audit quality (BIG4) is measured by a dichotomous variable equal to 
one if the firm is audited by a Big 4 audit firm and 0 if otherwise (Becker et al., 1998; 
Chandren et al., 2015; Francis & Yu, 2009; Thoopsamut & Jaikengkit, 2009).  
 
In addition, Big 4 auditors have more experience and knowledge related to the clients 
business, which enables them to detect any violations of financial reporting and mitigate 
earnings manipulation relative to non-Big 4 auditors (Francis & Yu, 2009; Krishnan, 
2003). Prior literature employs big audit firms as a proxy for audit quality (e.g., Becker 
et al., 1998; Chi et al., 2011; Cohen & Zarowin, 2010; Johl et al., 2007; Zang, 2012). 






4.5.4 Family Ownership Measurement 
Family-controlled firm are defined “as those where the founder or a member of his or 
her family by either blood or marriage, is an officer, a director, or a blockholder either 
individually or as a group” (Mohd-Saleh & Omar, 2014, p. 144). This study uses a more 
refined definition of family-owned firms that does not exclusively depend on ownership 
concentration as a main determining standard for identifying family firms. The study 
identifies family-controlled firms as being one in which: 1) at least one member of the 
controlling family holds a managerial position such as BOD member, CEO or 
chairman, or 2) a family block holder holds at least 5% of firms shares (direct and 
indirect) (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2011; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2013; Anderson et al., 
2003; Khan, Muttakin, & Siddiqui, 2015; Mohd-Saleh & Omar, 2014; Wang, 2006).  
 
Cascino et al. (2010) argue that indicating a certain percentage threshold would not 
make any alteration regarding family and non-family firms because a certain percentage 
threshold only represents high ownership concentration rather than family ownership 
and management. Thus, this study uses a dichotomous variable that equals “1” if a firm 
is considered to be a family-controlled firm and “0” if otherwise, as a measure for the 
family ownership variable (FAMD) (Khan et al., 2015). 
 
4.5.5 Managerial Ownership Measurement 
Managerial ownership is defined as firm’s shares held by executive directors (Mitchell 
& Dharmawan, 2007). Consistent with previous studies, this study uses the number of 
shares held by the executive directors scaled by the total number of outstanding shares 
as a proxy to measure managerial ownership variable (MOWN) (Abdul Latif & Taufil 
Mohd, 2014; Alves, 2012; Amran & Che Ahmad, 2013; Hashim & Devi, 2008a; 
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Mitchell & Dharmawan, 2007; Mohd Ali et al., 2010; Mustapha & Ahmad, 2011; Saleh 
et al., 2005). 
 
4.5.6 Foreign Ownership Measurement 
Most foreign shareholdings in Malaysian market are either a foreign nominee or direct 
ownership held by foreign firms (Mohd Ali et al., 2010). Consistent with the existing 
literature, this study uses the number of all total firm’s equity shares held by foreign 
investors scaled by the total outstanding shares of the firm as measurement for foreign 
ownership (FOWN) (Anum Mohd Ghazali, 2010; Ben-Nasr et al., 2015a; Guo et al., 
2015; Mohd-Saleh & Omar, 2014; Mohd-Saleh, Rahman, & Ridhuan, 2009; Mohd Ali 
et al., 2010). 
 
4.5.7 Employee Stock Options Measurement  
Employee stock options (ESOS) are defined as a legal contract that grants the 
employees the right to purchase a particular number of a firm’s shares at a specific price 
(Bickley, 2012; Katan et al., 2013). The primary aim of ESOS is to align the benefits 
of the management (executives and employees) and firm owners (Bickley, 2012). 
Existing literature focuses on stock options that are exercised during a fiscal year 
(Abdul Latif, 2010; Bens et al., 2003; Kahle, 2002; Lamba & Miranda, 2010) 
Consistent with previous studies, stock options exercise (ESOSEXR) is measured by 
the number of stock options exercised scaled by firm’s outstanding shares.  
 
4.5.8 Measurements and Definitions of Control Variables   
Following prior literature in the field of shares buyback policy (Burnett et al., 2012; 
Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Dittmar, 2000; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et al., 2006), 
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this study controls for several firm characteristics, namely, firm size, leverage, growth 
and cash level, that might affect the likelihood of firms engaging in share buyback 
programs, especially those that cause considerable change in EPS. Consisting with the 
notion that investor expectations are being formed at of the beginning of each year 
(Hribar et al., 2006), all measurement of control variables are calculated as of the end 
of the previous years (t-1). 
 
4.5.8.1 Firm Size 
Fenn and Liang (2001) and Vermaelen (1981) said that larger firms have lower 
information asymmetries and lower financing costs than smaller firms. However, small 
firms have less coverage from the media and analysts and, therefore, are more likely to 
be mispriced. Lower financing costs encourage firms to pay out more cash to their 
shareholders due to the costs of potential funds needed in the future will be 
comparatively inexpensive (Kahle, 2002). Previous studies document that firm with a 
small size is more likely to exercise shares buyback programs, more particularly 
accretive shares buyback, than a large firm (Bens et al., 2003; Chandren & Nadarajan, 
2013; Dittmar, 2000; Hribar et al., 2006; Vermaelen, 1981). Prior studies,  for example 
Warfield et al. (1995), Xie et al. (2003) and Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), document 
a negative influence for firm size on earnings management practices. Therefore, this 
study employs prior year firm's natural logarithm of total assets at the beginning of a 
fiscal year to be a proxy for the size of firms (FSIZEt-1) (Bens et al., 2003; Burnett et 





When the firm’s ratio of debt to equity (leverage) is lower than the optimal  ratio, firms 
have more incentive to engage in shares buyback programs (Abdul Latif, 2010; 
Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013; Burnett et al., 2012; Dittmar, 2000; Dixon et al., 2008; 
Hribar et al., 2006). Bens et al. (2003) also support this notion that, under optimal 
capital structure, firms engage in share buybacks to reduce a firm’s equity, ratio which 
leads to an increase in the debt ratio. Leverage is considered as an external monitoring 
mechanism, where bondholders may practice monitoring actions over managerial 
actions to protect their rights. Thus, the likelihood of earnings management through 
accretive share buyback is less in firms with a large percentage of leverage.  
 
Previous study documents a negative association between leverage and accretive share 
buyback activities (Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014). Consistent with prior 
literature (Abdul Latif & Taufil Mohd, 2014; Sitraselvi Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; 
Dittmar, 2000; Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014), the current study uses the 
proportion of current and long-term debt scaled by a firm’s total assets at the beginning 
of a fiscal year as a measure for the variable of leverage (LEVt-1).  
 
4.5.8.3 Growth 
A firm with large investment opportunities has the ability to improve its value by using 
cash flows to finance their investments rather than by distributing cash to shareholders 
(Jensen, 1986). Essentially, the foregone investment opportunities of fund used in share 
buyback programs are higher for firms with real growth than non-growth firms (Farrell 
et al., 2013). This is along the same line with the argument indicating that high growth 
firms have noteworthy investment opportunities and hold less free cash flows.  
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Additionally, previous empirical studies provide evidence that high level of growth 
opportunities are negatively connected to actions of earnings management (Abdul 
Rahman & Ali, 2006; Song & Windram, 2004a; Xie et al., 2003). Prior studies also 
suggest that high growth firms are less likely to exercise accretive share buyback 
(Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014). Consistent with existing literature, this study 
uses assets growth at the beginning of a fiscal year (AGRWOTHt-1) as a proxy to 
measure firms’ growth (Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2013). AGROWTH is 
calculated as following: assets growth equals total assets of the current year minus the 
prior year’s total assets, scaled by the prior year’s total assets (Farrell et al., 2013).  
 
4.5.8.4 Cash Level  
Previous studies document that the level of cash flows is more likely to positively 
influence firm share buyback activities (Abdul Latif et al., 2014; Dittmar, 2000; Grullon 
& Michaely, 2002; Jiang et al., 2013). Firms that hold a high amount of cash flows can 
reduce agency costs and avoid the risk of over-investing by distributing cash to 
shareholders (Lamba & Miranda, 2010). Prior studies suggest that high cash flow firms 
are more likely to exercise share buyback activities for the purposes of earnings 
management (Chandren et al., 2015; Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Farrell et al.,  2013; 
Farrell et al., 2014).  
 
Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) found that firms with a high cash level are more likely 
to involve in accretive share buybacks. However, Chandren et al. (2015) documented 
that a positive but not significant relationship exists between cash level and accretive 
share buyback. Burrent et al. (2012) also documented a negative relationship between 
the level of cash flow and real earnings management by accretive share buyback. 
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Following previous studies, for example, Dittmar (2000), Farrell et al. (2013), 
Kieschnick (1998) and Fenn and Liang (2001), state that the ratio of cash flows (CLt-1) 
are measured by cash and cash equivalents scaled by total assets at the beginning of the 
fiscal year.  
 
Table 4.3  
Summary of the Study’s Variable Measurements 





The natural logarithm of a number 
of accretive share buyback. The 
number of shares buyback 
represents the total volume of shares 
bought back by the firm’s 
management over the current year. 







The proportion of independent 
directors to a total number of 
directors on the BOD. 
(Hashim & Devi, 
2008b; Abidin et al., 






The total number of directors on the 
firm’s BOD.  
(Dimitropoulos, 
2011; Epps & 
Ismail, 2009; 
Hashim & Devi, 
2008a) 
BOD meetings BDMEET 
The total number of meetings of the 
BOD in a fiscal year. 
(Vafeas, 1999; Xie et 





The proportion of financial expert 
directors to a total number of 
directors on the BOD. 
(Amran & Che 






(Independence, size, number of 
meetings and financial expertise) 
(Bin-Ghanem & 
Ariff, 2016; 
Chobpichien et al., 
2008; Goh, 2009; 




The number of independent non-
executive members of AC scaled by 
the size of the AC. 
(Klein, 2002; Saleh 
et al., 2007; Xie et 
al., 2003) 
AC size ACSIZE 
The total number of directors 
serving on the firm’s AC. 
(Ismail et al., 2010; 
Xie et al., 2003; 
Salihi & Jibril, 2015) 
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Variable Acronym Measurement Support 
AC meetings  ACMEET 
The number of meetings held by the 
AC in a fiscal year. 
(Saleh et al., 2007; 





The percentage of financial expert 
members to total numbers of AC 
members. 
(Saleh et al., 2007; 
Sun et al., 2014; Al-






(Independence, size, number of 
meetings and financial expertise) 
(Bin-Ghanem & 
Ariff, 2016; 
Chobpichien et al., 
2008; Zaman et al., 
2011) 
Audit quality BIG4 
Dichotomous variable equals one if 
the firm is audited by Big 4 
Auditors, and zero otherwise. 
(Becker et al., 1998; 
Thoopsamut & 
Jaikengkit, 2009; 




Dichotomous variable equals one if 
the firm is controlled by the family 
group; and zero otherwise (Khan et 
al., 2015). 
(Abdullah & Ismail, 





The percentage of shares held by the 
executive directors (direct and 
indirect) to the total number of 
outstanding shares at the end of 
current fiscal years.  
(Amran & Che 
Ahmad, 2013; Mohd 
Ali et al., 2010; 




The percentage of firm’s shares held 
by foreign investors to the total 
ordinary shares at the end of current 
fiscal years outstanding. 
(Ben-Nasr et al., 
2015; Mohd-Saleh 
& Omar, 2014; 





The proportion of stock options 
exercised scaled by firm’s 
outstanding shares at the end of 
fiscal year. 
(Kahle, 2002; Bens 
et al., 2003; Lamba 
& Miranda, 2010) 
Control variables 
Firm size FSIZE t-1 
Natural log of total assets at the 
beginning of the year.  
 (Hribar et al., 2006; 
Burnett et al., 2012; 
Ismail et al., 2010; 
Rahman & Ali, 
2006) 
Growth  AGRWOTH t-1 
Assets growth at the beginning of the 
year, annual assets growth (current 
year assets – prior year’s 
assets)/prior year’s assets 
(Farrell et al., 2013; 
Ismail et al., 2010; 
Klein, 2002; Xie et 
al., 2003) 
Table 4.3 (Continued) 
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Variable Acronym Measurement Support 
Leverage LEV t-1 
The ratio of current plus long-term 
debt to total assets at the beginning 
of the year. 
(Dittmar, 2000; 
Burnett et al., 2012; 
Hribar et al., 2006; 
Rahman & Ali, 
2006) 
Cash level CL t-1 
Cash and cash equivalent at the 
beginning of the year, deflated by 
total assets.  
(Chandren & 
Nadarajan, 2013; 




4.6 Data Collection: Procedures and Sampling 
4.6.1 Data Collection Procedures  
This study examines the influence of corporate governance mechanisms and ESOS of 
firms on accretive shares buyback activities as a tool for real earnings management. 
The data used in this study is mainly collected from Thomson Financial DataStream 
and the annual reports of Malaysian firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia over the period 
from 2010 to 2015. From DataStream, the treasury shares are collected to identify the 
firms with shares buyback activities. Subsequently, the data related to the numbers of 
accretive share buybacks are collected from the firm’s annual report that is available on 
the website of Bursa Malaysia (http://www.bursamalaysia.com/ market/). In addition, 
the annual reports of the firms are used to collect data of BOD features, AC features, 
audit quality, ownership structure (family, managerial and foreign) and ESOS. 
Furthermore, the control variables data are gathered from DataStream. 
 
4.6.2 Population and Sampling  
Shares buyback programs of Malaysian listed firms were allowed during the Asian 
financial crisis. Their primary purpose was to stabilise the stock prices of listed firms 
(Isa et al., 2011). In the subsequent years, the number of firms with buybacks started to 
Table 4.3 (Continued) 
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gradually increase, especially during the global financial crisis (2008 and 2009). The 
population of this study is taken from the firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia (Main 
Market and ACE Market) from 2010 to 2015. This study focuses on these specific years 
to avoid the impact of the global financial crisis from 2008 to 2009. Additionally, this 
study covers the period around MCCG 2012 as suggested by Chandren et al. (2015). 
Thus, the sample covers from the years from 2010 until 2015 before the implementation 
of the new code of corporate governance MCCG 2017 that issued during the year 2016. 
 
The sample of this study comprises all accretive shares buyback firms listed on the 
Bursa Malaysia. Accretive shares buybacks are identified based on the procedures 
discussed in Section 4.4, which are followed to focus only on accretive share buybacks 
that lead to a considerable change in reported EPS. Based on the Hribar model, 106 
firms were involved in accretive share buyback activities during the sample period from 
years 2010 to 2015 as shown in Table 4.4. Following existing literature (Abdul Latif, 
2010; Bens et al., 2003; Chandren & Nadarajan, 2013; Hribar et al., 2006; Lamba & 
Miranda, 2010), five financial firms with accretive share buybacks listed on Bursa 
Malaysia are excluded because they have different financial and regulatory 
requirements.  
 
The final sample is 101 firms, which are nonfinancial listed firms that were involved in 
accretive share buyback activities during the sample period. These processes produce a 
sample comprising 606 observations of non-financial listed firms involved in accretive 
share buybacks over the period from 2010 to 2015 (101 firms * 6 years). However, two 
firm-observations in 2010 are excluded because of incomplete data. Additionally, three 
firm-observations in 2015 are excluded because their data are unavailable. Thus, the 
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final sample of this study is 601 firm-observations, which contain 235 accretive 
buybacks and 366 non-accretive buybacks observations, as presented in Table 4.4. This 
study focused on the 235 accretive buybacks observations to run the main analysis.  
 
Table 4.4  
Sample selection process for Accretive Share Buyback Firms 
Calculation of 601 observations 
Firms-year 
observations 
Accretive share buyback firms 2010-2015 106 
Less: Financial accretive share buyback 5 
Non-financial accretive share buyback firms 101 
Accretive share buyback firm’s observations  
(101 firms *6 years) 
606 
Less: uncompleted firms’ observations in 2010 2 
Less: unavailable firms’ observations in 2015 3 
Total observations for accretive share buybacks firms 
 Accretive buyback observations  






4.7 Data Analysis Techniques  
This study uses panel data analysis to examine the effect of the independent and 
variables on real earnings management proxied by accretive share buybacks. Panel data 
analysis is widely used in accounting and finance studies. Panel data, also known as 
cross-sectional time series data or longitudinal data, typically refers to data of many 
individuals observed over a period. Thus, panel data observations usually include a 
minimum of two aspects: a time series dimension represented by “t”; and a cross-
sectional dimension represented by “i” (Hsiao, 2014). Greene (2012) argues that panel 
data is suitable for studies that cover a long period and a large number of observations. 
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The influence of changes in corporate governance is one of these matters that is 
recommended to be studied using panel data analysis (Donker & Zahir, 2008). Thus, 
this study uses panel data analysis because it tests 601 firm-observations over a six-
year period. 
 
4.7.1 Panel Data Analysis  
Using simple regression for panel data can lead to different results with misleading 
inference (Jager, 2008). Therefore, applying panel data regression techniques for 
longitudinal data is vital. Baddeley and Barrowclough (2009) and Wooldridge (2010) 
explained the importance of taking into consideration the unique individual factors of 
panel data observations, which remain constant over time and cannot be assumed as 
independently distributed across time. Thus, using pooled estimation might cause an 
incorrect inference and cannot continually be applied to panel data (Wooldridge, 2010). 
Firm-specific factors are not considered in pooled estimation when applied to panel 
data, which result in autocorrelation as there is no isolation of the years of the same 
firm. In addition, this could result in omitted variables bias and heterogeneity bias 
because observations might have similar characteristics that are not considered 
(Baddeley & Barrowclough, 2009). A fixed effects model or random effects model is 
used to control for heterogeneity effect in panel data regression. The major difference 
between the two methods is whether the unobserved effects (the error term) are 
correlated with the examined independent variables (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
The Hausman test is the accepted way to determine whether the fixed or the random 
effects method is appropriate for the examined data. Statistically, the fixed effects 
model always provides consistent results that many researchers think is the cognitive 
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model to run with panel data, but it might not be the most efficient. Whereas, the 
random effects model provides better p-values and can be a more effective estimator, 
which makes it more appropriate but only if it is statistically justifiable (Al-gamrh, 
2015). 
 
The fixed effects model examines the relationships between variables within an 
individual, whether it is a firm or country, etc. This means that the fixed effect model 
takes into consideration the differences between the individual and itself within the 
period and this could control for any unobserved unique characteristics or the time-
invariant factors, which may bias the results (Al-gamrh, 2015). The error term in a fixed 
effects method is correlated with the independent variables. Therefore, a fixed effects 
method is believed to eliminate the impact of unobserved time-invariant characteristics 
of independent variables and make the estimation assessable. Thus, it is preferable to 
use a fixed effects estimate although it could be unproductive with time-variant factors 
(Wooldridge, 2010).  
 
The fixed effects technique can be applied either through the mean deviation method 
or by creating dichotomous variables. The unobserved time-invariant factors can be 
detected by the estimates of the individual’s dummies. The dummies method is 
criticised as being impractical for large data sets with many cross-sectional 
observations, which could impose calculation difficulties (Wooldridge, 2010). 
 
On the other hand, the critical advantage of the random effects model is its ability to 
examine time-constant independent variables that are dropped in the fixed effects 
estimate. This is based on the assumption that the unobserved effect is not correlated 
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with the independent variables regardless of the variation over time (Schmidheiny, 
2013). Thus, the random effects estimation could be superior if the primary concern of 
the research is time-constant variables. Random effects might be biased, however, if 
the suitable method is fixed effects.  
 
4.7.2 Advantages of Panel Data 
Baltagi (2008) and Hsiao (2014) explained several benefits of panel data over pure 
time-series and pure cross-sectional analysis summarised as follows: 
1. Panel data is a more accurate inference of model parameters, where it usually 
provides a large number of data points for researchers. This leads to an increase in 
the degrees of freedom and declining the collinearity between explanatory 
variables, which, in turn, improves econometric estimates efficiency. 
2. Panel data control the problem of omitted variables because of no observed items 
or mismeasurement. It can control the individual or time heterogeneity, which may 
produce biased findings (Moulton, 1986, 1987). 
3. Unlike time-series data that is usually criticised over the multicollinearity issue, 
panel data can control the problem of multicollinearity, which is less in panel data.  
In cross-sectional data, the variability is generally increased. However, the variation 
in panel data is undoubtedly disintegrated among the time-series and cross-sectional 
dimensions. The variation in cross-sectional is usually so high that it may provide 
more information that can create reliable parameters estimates. 
4. Panel data are better in measurement. Panel data can measure and identify effects 
that are not detectable in time-series or cross-sectional data. Panel data also can 
minimise measurement errors. 
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5. Panel data have the ability to test complicated models. More complex behavioural 
models can be better constructed and tested in panel data than in time-series or 
cross-sectional data. Panel data also can study the dynamics of adjustment. 
6. In some complicated cases such as nonstationary time series, measurement error 
and Dynamic Tobit models, using panel data may simplify computation and 
statistical inference better than using cross-sectional or time series.  
 
4.7.3 Multiple Regression Analysis  
The study’s objectives as mentioned in Chapter One are to examine the effect of 
corporate governance mechanisms and ESOS on accretive share buyback activities as 
a device for real earnings management. To achieve the objectives, this study needs to 
use the appropriate regression model. The Ordinary Lease Squares (OLS) regression 
model has commonly been used as an estimation technique of regressions for predicting 
accretive share buyback activities (Chandren et al., 2015; Chandren & Nadarajan, 
2013). 
 
This study used unbalanced panel data methodology to examine the effect of the 
independent variables on accretive buyback activities because panel data regression 
models control for the heterogeneity effect in panel data by using either random effects 
or fixed effects models. Bell and Jones (2015) indicated that random effects models are 
more appropriate than fixed effects models because the latter has more problems in 
terms of unbalanced panel data. The Hausman test is the commonly accepted method 
to determine whether the fixed or random effects methods is appropriate for examining 
the data. Hausman and Taylor’s (1981) test was employed to determine which panel 
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technique (the Fixed Effect Model or the Random Effect Model) was the most suitable 
for the observed sample data. 
 
4.7.3.1 Research Model  
This study used random effect estimation model to examine the influence of the 
independent variables, including the BOD effectiveness, ACs effectiveness, audit 
quality, family ownership, managerial ownership, foreign ownership and stock options 
on real earnings management through accretive shares buyback as the dependent 
variable. This study has employed the following model: 
 
ABB = β0 + β1 BODSCORE + β2 ACSCORE + β3 BIG4 + β4 FAMD + β5 MOWN + 
β6 FOWN + β7 ESOSEXR + β8 FSIZEt-1 + β9 AGROWTHt-1+ β10 LEVt-1 + β11 CLt-1+ 
e. 
Where: 
ABB =  The accretive share buyback is the natural logarithm of accretive 
shares buyback numbers during the current fiscal year. 
BODSCORE  = BOD effectiveness. 
ACSCORE = AC effectiveness. 
BIG4 =  Audit quality is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the firm is 
audited by Big 4 Auditors, and 0 if otherwise. 
FAMD =  Family ownership is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the firm 
is family controlled and 0 if otherwise. 
MOWN =  Managerial ownership is the percentage of shares held by the 
executive directors (direct and indirect) to the total number of 
outstanding shares at the end of current fiscal years. 
FOWN =  Foreign ownership is the percentage of firm’s shares held by 




ESOSEXR =  Stock options exercise is the proportion of total stock options 
exercised scaled by firm’s outstanding shares at the end of fiscal 
years. 




= Growth is the assets growth at the beginning of fiscal year, annual 
assets growth (current year assets – prior year’s assets)/prior year’s 
assets 
LEVt-1 =  Leverage is the ratio of current plus long-term debt to total assets at 
the beginning of the year. 
CLt-1 =  Cash level is the ratio of firm’s beginning of the year cash and cash 
equivalents scaled by total assets. 
e  =  Error term. 
 
  
4.8 Summary  
This chapter discusses the theoretical framework and hypotheses development of the 
study. This chapter also explains the methodology utilised in this study and describes 
the research design, sample selection procedures of the study and the techniques of data 
analysis. This study adopts a quantitative research approach and uses secondary data to 
achieve its objectives. A sample of 101 non-financial firms listed on the Main Market 
and the ACE Market of Bursa Malaysia over the years from 2010 to 2015, involved in 
accretive buyback activities, is used to examine the study’s objectives. Finally, this 





5 CHAPTER FIVE  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.0  Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter presents the findings and analysis regarding the influence of corporate 
governance mechanisms and stock options on accretive share buyback. The debate in 
this chapter is separated into five sections. Section 5.1 discusses the descriptive analysis 
for a share buyback in the sample period of the study. The descriptive analysis of 
independent variables is discussed in Section 5.2. The chapter proceeds with t-test 
analysis between accretive and non-accretive firm-observations in Section 5.3. 
Diagnostic tests are reported as well as the model specification test in Section 5.4. 
Additionally, the results and discussions are explained by the regression among 
dependent variable and independent variables in Section 5.5. Finally, Section 5.6 and 
Section 5.7 display additional analyses and summary of this chapter respectively.  
  
5.1 Descriptive Analysis of Dependent Variable 
Table 5.1 shows the descriptive analysis of actual share buyback activities during the 
sample period from 2010 to 2015. It displays the number of firms involved in actual 
share buyback activities by Malaysian listed firms through the sample period. The table 
also presents the number and the Malaysian ringgit value of shares buyback activities 
as well as the percentage of shares bought backs to outstanding shares. As shown in 
Table 5.1, the percentages ages of shares bought back yearly was less than 1% of their 
outstanding shares and average 0.76% for 836 shares bought back firms. These actual 
buyback percentages were substantially less than 10% of outstanding shares permitted 
by the Bursa Malaysia as share buybacks activities. The percentage of share buyback 
189 
 
shown in Table 5.1 was slightly lower than those reported by Abdul Latif et al. (2016), 
which was 1.7% for the period from 1999 to 2010. The difference in the percentage of 
actual buybacks in this study compared to earlier studies (Abdul Latif et al., 2016) was 
because these earlier studies included only actual share buybacks in their samples that 
form 1% or more of the outstanding shares. Whereas, Table 5.1 of this study covers all 
the actual share buyback through the sample period from 2010 to 2015.  
 
Table 5.1 











RM Value of 
Shares Buybacks 
(million) 
   Mean  Mean Sum Mean Sum 
2010 142  0.91%  2.39 340 3.37 478 
2011 139  0.64%  2.26 315 4.15 577 
2012 153  0.75%  5.91 904 9.37 1,434 
2013 154  0.66%  5.69 876 9.66 1,488 
2014 123  0.87%  8.99 1,106 18.85 2,318 
2015 125  0.73%  4.95 619 10.72 1,340 
Total 836     4,160  7,635 
Mean 139  0.76%  4.98  9.13   
 
Previous studies (Burrent et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et al., 2006) have 
argued that a share buyback is considered as an accretive share buyback if it caused a 
change in reported EPS by at least one cent. However, in this study, Table 5.1 shows 
the average percentage of shares bought back was 0.76% for the period 2010 to 2015, 
which is less than 1% of the outstanding shares. Consequently, the sample of this study 
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focused only on share buyback firms that engaged in accretive share buyback at least 
one time over the period from 2010 to 2015, which is consistent with the main objective 
of this study. This means that only listed firms with accretive share buyback were 
included in the sample of this study. After excluding financial firms and incomplete 
observations, the study’s sample covers 101 accretive share buyback firms (235 
observations) during the period from 2010 until 2015 as presented in Chapter Four, 
Section 4.6.2. In other words, the sample of this study includes all observations of 
nonfinancial firms that involve in accretive share buyback from 2010 to 2015. 
 
Table 5.2 presents the descriptive analysis of accretive share buyback firms through the 
sample period from 2010 to 2015. It shows the number of firms engaged in an accretive 
share buyback during the sample period. Table 5.2 also presents the percentage of 
accretive share buyback numbers to outstanding shares, as well as the number and 
Malaysian ringgit value of accretive shares buyback.  
 
As appears in Table 5.2, the percentages of accretive share buyback to outstanding 
Sshares were more than 1% for the entire sample period from 2010 to 2015. 
Accordingly, the average percentage of the number of accretive share buyback to 
outstanding shares for the entire period was 1.3% compare to 0.76% for actual share 
buybacks during the same period as mentioned in Table 5.1. These percentages mean 
that only accretive buybacks can significantly cause changes in EPS.  This means that 
accretive buybacks mitigate the quality of financial reports which may mislead the 
investors’ decisions. Therefore, this current study focuses only on accretive share 
buybacks that may be used by managers to manage EPS. This is consistent with the 
viewpoint of Burrent et al. (2012), Farrell et al. (2013), and Hribar et al. (2006) who 
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argued that, if the share buyback practice adjusts EPS by one cent or more, this would 
be recognised as an accretive share buyback. Further, Table 5.2 shows 601 observations 
of accretive buyback firms during the sample period of this study, which is shown in 
more detail below in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.2 











RM Value of 
Accretive Buybacks 
(million) 
    Mean  Mean Sum Mean Sum 
2010 99 
 
 1.6%  2.84 281.4 4.14 409.4 
2011 101 
 
 1.0%  2.70 272.5 3.75 379.1 
2012 101 
 
 1.3%  8.64 872.5 13.90 1,403.8 
2013 101 
 
 1.1%  8.39 847 14.26 1,440.6 
2014 101 
 
 1.6%  10.09 1018.8 21.02 2,123.3 
2015 98 
 
 1.0%  5.50 538.8 11.86 1162 
Total 601      3,931  7,218.2 
Mean    1.3%  6.54  12.01  
 
Table 5.2 and Figure 5.1 show the Malaysian ringgit value and numbers of accretive 
shares buyback during the sample period of this study from 2010 to 2015. They show 
the number and value of accretive share buyback activities during the sample period, 
which reached a total of 3,931 million shares and RM 7,218.2 million in value. The 
Malaysian ringgit value of accretive buybacks gradually increased in the years from 
2010 to 2013 and reached the highest point in 2014 at RM 2,123.3 million. Similarly, 
the number of accretive shares buybacks gradually rose through the sample period and 
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RM Value and Shares Number of Accretive Buyback from 2010 to 2015 
 
Table 5.3 shows the details of the accretive share buyback firm observations over the 
sample period from 2010 to 2015. As it appears in the table, the total observations of 
accretive buyback firms were 601, which were classified as 235 (39.1%) accretive share 
buyback observations and 366 (60.9%) non-accretive share buyback observations. This 
study reports 235 accretive share buyback firm-observations. This magnitude of 
accretive buyback firms is slightly higher than the study of Chandren et al. (2015) that 
found 220 accretive buyback firm-observations from 2001 to 2008. Unlike the study of 
Chandren et al. (2015) that focused only on accretive buyback observations and omitted 
non-accretive buyback observations of their sampling firms, this study considers all the 
observations of listed firms that involved in accretive buybacks through the sample 
period from 2010 to 2015. In other words, this study covers all the observations of 







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Accretive Buyback 2010 to 2015
Accretive Buyback Number  Accretive  Buyback RM Value
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mechanisms in mitigating the use of accretive buyback as a tool for real earnings 
management. 
Table 5.3 








  Number Percentage Number Percentage 
2010 99 38 38.38% 61 61.62% 
2011 101 44 43.56% 57 56.44% 
2012 101 53 52.48% 48 47.52% 
2013 101 43 42.57% 58 57.43% 
2014 101 30 29.70% 71 70.30% 
2015 98 27 27.55% 71 72.45% 
Total 601 235  366  
Average  39.1%   60.9% 
 
5.2 Descriptive Analysis of Independent Variables 
Table 5.4 presents the descriptive analysis for 235 observations of accretive buyback 
firms through the sample period of this study from 2010 to 2015. Table 5.4 in Panel A 
presents the descriptive statistics for the continuous variables included in the mean 
model of this study. The descriptive statistics of corporate governance mechanisms 
including; BOD effectiveness (BDIND, BDSIZE, BDMEET, BDEXPRT, and 
BDSCORE), AC effectiveness (ACIND, ACSIZE, ACMEET, ACEXPRT, and 
ACSCORE), family ownership (FAMOWN), managerial ownership (MOWN), and 
foreign ownership (FOWN) as well as the control variables (FSIZE, AGROWTH, LEV, 
and CL). The mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, skewness and 
kurtoses are presented for all continuous variables. In addition, the dichotomous 
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variables (BIG4 and FAMD) are presented in Table 5.4 Panel B based on the frequency 
and the percentage of the variables in the study sample.  
Table 5.4 
Descriptive Analysis of the Variables (n = 235) 
Panel A: Continuous Variables  
Variable Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max Skew. Kurt. 
BDIND 0.31 0.31 0.17 0 0.8 0.11 2.84 
BDSIZE 7.78 7 2.19 4 14 0.85 3.33 
BDMEET 5.65 5 1.69 3 13 1.50 5.63 
BDEXPRT 0.31 0.3 0.12 0.1 0.8 0.91 4.49 
BDSCORE 1.82 2 0.94 0 4 0.24 2.82 
ACIND 0.68 0.67 0.31 0 1 -0.74 2.66 
ACSIZE 3.20 3 0.41 2 4 1.34 3.40 
ACMEET 5.04 5 1.10 3 11 2.04 9.01 
ACEXPRT 0.46 0.33 0.20 0 1 0.60 2.70 
ACSCORE 2.17 2 0.90 0 4 -0.20 1.83 
MOWN 0.34 0.34 0.20 0 0.89 -0.05 2.17 
FOWN 0.09 0.06 0.10 0 0.49 1.68 5.99 
ESOSEX (m) 2.275 0 12.800 0 182 12.07 166.42 
ESOSEXR  0.003 0 0.01 0 0.12 6.37 49.32 
FSIZE(million) 3740 645 8720 26.6 53600 3.87 18.93 
FSIZE t-1 (log) 20.42 20.28 1.81 17.10 24.71 0.33 2.44 
AGROWTH t-1 0.08 0.07 0.21 -0.36 2.00 4.12 36.23 
LEV t-1 0.19 0.18 0.15 0 0.63 0.58 2.97 
CL t-1 0.17 0.13 0.14 0 0.66 1.52 5.19 
Panel B: Dichotomous Variables 
Variables Frequency   Percentage  Skew. Kurt. 
 1 0  1 0   
BIG4 115 120  49% 51% 0.03 1.00 
FAMD 164 71  70% 30% -0.88 1.78 
Note: BDIND = BOD independence, BDSIZE = BOD size, BDMEET = BOD meetings,  BDEXPERT 
= BOD financial expertise, BDSCORE = BOD effectiveness score, ACIND = AC independence, 
ACSIZE = AC size, ACMEET = AC meetings, ACEXPERT = AC financial expertise, ACSCORE = AC 
effectiveness score, MOWN = managerial ownership, FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEX = the 
number of stock options exercised during a fiscal year, ESOSEXR = the percentage of stock options 
exercised to outstanding shares, FSIZE = Logarithm of total assets, AGROWTH = assets growth, LEV= 
Leverage, CL = cash level. BIG4 = audit quality, and FAMD = dichotomous variable equal one if firm 
is family controlled and zero otherwise, 
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Regarding BOD effectiveness, Table 5.4 Panel A reports the mean of BOD 
independence (BDIND) reported in this study is 31%, which indicates that firms have 
complied with the recommendations of MCCG 2012 that at least one-third of the BOD 
comprises independent directors. The mean and median fractions of independent 
directors in this study are lower than those found in Abdul Latif et al. (2016), Abdullah 
et al. (2010), and Chandren et al. (2015). The Bursa Malaysia defines an independent 
director as “a director who is independent of management and free from any business 
or other relationship which could interfere with the exercise of independent judgment 
or the ability to act in the best interests of an applicant or a listed issuer” (BMLRs, 2013, 
p. 105). Therefore, this study excluded independent directors who have economic 
interests or relationships in a firm.  
 
The mean of BOD size (BDSIZE) reported in this study was 7.78. This average is 
similar to prior studies conducted in Malaysia by Chandren et al. (2015), Ismail et al. 
(2010) and Saleh et al. (2005) reporting a BOD size mean within the range of seven to 
eight directors, which is consistent with the recommendation of Jensen (1993) for the 
BOD effectiveness. 
 
The statistics in Table 5.4 also indicate that the average frequency of BOD meetings 
(BDMEET) was 5.65 for accretive buyback firms in Malaysia, suggesting that 
Malaysian accretive buyback firms follow the recommendation of MCCG 2012 (i.e., at 
least 4 meetings per year). In addition, the statistics reported that the average of BOD 
financial expertise (qualification or experience in accounting, finance and audit) 
(BDEXPERT) was 31%. This percentage age is higher than Yunos (2011) who reported 
that 26.7% of BOD directors had financial expertise, which means that listed firms in 
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Malaysia are aware the importance of financial expertise in their BOD. This financial 
expertise may assist in practising effective monitoring in the process of information 
reporting and probably will lead to an increase in the quality of accounting numbers.  
 
The score of the effectiveness of the BOD was a composite of independence, size, the 
frequency of meetings and financial expertise. The score as a composite measurement 
for the effectiveness of the BOD ranges from 0 to 4 with a higher score indicating higher 
effectiveness of the BOD. The mean (median) of the BOD score (BDSCORE) were 
1.82 (2.00), and minimum and maximum were 0 and 4 respectively. This value of BOD 
score is higher than Alqadasi (2016) who reported a main of BOD score of 1.51. Thus, 
this value is slightly low in relative to the value of BOD score in this current study.    
 
Table 5.4 Panel A also presents descriptive statistics of AC attributes, which indicate 
that the mean and median of independent members serving in AC were 68% and 67%. 
This mean of independent directors is similar to that of Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) 
and Yunos et al. (2010) who reported that 66.7% and 70.0% of AC members 
respectively were independent. This proportion is consistent with the recommendation 
of MCCG 2012 to have non-executive directors in AC. The mean and median size of 
the AC was 3.20 and 3 members respectively. These percentages are consistent with 
the recommendation of BMLRs to have at least three directors serving as members of 
an AC, which is consistent with Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015b) who found that the 
mean size of the AC was 3.24.  
 
The statistics in Table 5.4 Panel A also show that the mean number of meetings for AC 
(ACMEET) in the buyback firms was 5.04. This number is consistent with the 
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recommendations of MCCG 2012 to meet least four times yearly. Regarding the 
financial expertise of the AC (ACEXPRT) (qualification or experience in accounting, 
finance and audit), the mean percentage of the financial expert member was 46% , 
which is consistent with Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) who found that 46% of the 
members serving on the AC were experts.  
 
Regarding the scores of the effectiveness of AC, which is a composite of independence, 
size, the frequency of meetings and financial expertise. The score was a composite 
measurement for the effectiveness of the AC ranged from 0 to 4, with a higher score 
indicating a higher effectiveness of the AC. The mean (median) of the AC score 
(ACSCORE) was 2.17 (2.00), and the maximum value was 4. This result means that 
54% (2.17/4) of the sample firms have effective AC, which is higher than Alqadasi 
(2016) who reported only 35% of the sample firms have effective AC. 
 
Table 5.4 Panel A also reveals that the mean and median of managerial ownership 
(MOWN) were 34% and 34% respectively, which implies that equity held by managers 
was lower than reported before, as Abdul Latif (2010) found, on average, that directors 
owned about 41.69% of the equity of buyback firms for the years from 1999 to 2006. 
The descriptive statistic results for foreign ownership showed that, on average, 9% of 
ownership of the sampled firms was held by foreign investors (FOWN), which is higher 
than the results of Yatim et al. (2016) who found that foreign investors held 6.78% of 
firms shares.  
 
Regarding the exercise of stock options (ESOSEX), the descriptive statistic indicates 
that, on mean, RM 2.275 million and 0.3% of stock options were exercised during the 
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sample period. This percentage of stock options exercised was similar to Abdul Latif 
(2010) who reported that 0.3% of the stock options were exercised from 1999 to 2006.  
 
With respect to skewness and kurtosis, Kline (2011) suggested that the normal values 
of skewness should not exceed ±3 and kurtosis should be less than ±10. As shown in 
Table 5.4, only ESOSEXR and AGROWTH had abnormal values of skewness 
(kurtosis), which were 6.37 (49.32) and 4.12 (36.23) respectively.  
 
Regarding control variables, a descriptive statistic in Table 5.4 displays that the mean 
and median of firm size (FSIZE) were RM 3740 and 645 million respectively, with a 
minimum of RM 18.8 million and a maximum of RM 61042 million. The mean and 
median of FSIZE (log) were 20.42 and 20.28 respectively, which are similar to the 
statistics of Chandren et al. (2015) who reported 20.15 and 19.97 respectively.  
 
Table 5.4 also presents the mean and median of assets growth (AGROWTH), which 
were 8% and 7% for Malaysian accretive buyback firms for years 2010 to 2015. The 
negative value of assets growth means that the total assets of some firms in the current 
year were less than the total assets of the previous year. Table 5.4 above also shows 
19% and 18% as the mean and median of leverage (LEV) respectively. Finally, Table 
5.4 shows that the mean and median of cash level (CL) were 17% and 13% respectively, 
which is higher than Chandren et al. (2015) who reported 11.1% and 9.8 % as the mean 
and the median of cash level respectively. 
 
Regarding the variable of Big 4 auditors (BIG4), which represents the external audit 
quality, Table 5.4 in Panel B shows that 49% were audited by Big 4 audit firms whereas 
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51% of firms were audited by non-Big 4 audit firms. This mean of BIG4 is less than 
Chandren et al. (2015) who found that 69.1% of accretive buyback firms were audited 
by Big 4 audit firms from 2001 to 2008, suggesting that accretive buyback firms in the 
last few years have started to depend on non-Big 4 auditors to conduct auditing services 
rather than depending on Big 4 auditors. Regarding the variable of family ownership, 
family-owned firms (FAMD) represented 70% of the sample of this study, and only 
30% of the sample firms were non-family controlled firms. This is consistent with 
previous studies that document that about 70% of Malaysian firms are family-
controlled firms (Amran & Che Ahmad, 2010b; Ibrahim & Samad, 2011). 
 
5.3 Diagnostic Test 
Before using diagnostic tests for the main model of this study, the most suitable 
regression must be chosen to avoid misleading results. As mentioned before, the 
hypotheses of this study are tested by using OLS random effect regression analysis. 
This study used data for the six years from 2010 to 2015. Therefore, this study 
performed Breusch and Pagan (1980) and Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests to identify 
the choice between the random effects model and the pooled regression.  
 
Based on a significant p-value for LM test, there is evidence of significant differences 
across companies, and the null hypotheses are rejected (p-value, prob < 0.05). based on 
this test, the study concluded that the random effects model was more appropriate than 
the pooled regression model. Thus, the unbalanced panel data model was utilised 
consistently with econometric assumptions. Panel data allows for more powerful tests 
because it provides supplementary useful data, high degrees of freedom and greater 
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efficiency. It also provides more variability and less collinearity between variables 
(Baltagi, 2008; Hsiao, 2014).  
 
Previous studies have commonly used the Hausman test to identify whether the random 
or the fixed effects method is more appropriate for the tested data. The Hausman test is 
appropriate test for OLS regression and other linear regressions because the fixed 
effects method maximum likelihood estimator is consistent under both the null and 
alternative hypotheses (Greene & Hensher, 2010). Therefore, this study employed the 
Hausman test to determine which panel technique (the Fixed Effect Model or the 
Random Effect Model) does appropriate for the observed sample data. Based on this 
test, the null hypothesis is supported, which means that the random effects regression 
is employed to examine the main model of this current study as presented in Table 5.5.  
 
Table 5.5 
Hausman Test for Choosing Random/Fixed Effect Models 
  Chi2(9) Prob > chi2 HO 
Model  10.03 0.3484 supported 
 
Diagnostic tests must be implemented to confirm that the assumptions of multiple 
regressions hold correct. Therefore, they are conducted to avoid misleading results. The 
diagnostic tests begin by checking outliers, normality, multicollinearity, 
heteroscedasticity and the autocorrelation test as follows.  
 
5.3.1 Outliers Test 
Outliers are observations that have unique or different characteristics compared to the 
whole population, which may cause measurement errors (Hair, Black, Babin & Tatham, 
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2010). Previous studies provide several ways to handle outliers such as Cook’s distance, 
studentized residual, leverage, transformation, winsorizing and trimming. Following 
previous studies (Cohen et al., 2008; Farrell et al., 2013; Francis et al., 2004; Kraft, Lee 
& Lopatta, 2014; Saleh et al., 2005), this study winsorizes the variables of the main 
model of this study to eliminate possible outliers. The continuous variables, including 
MOWN, FOWN, ESOSEXR, AGROWTH, LEV, and CL were winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th % percentiles of their distributions to mitigate the influence of outliers. Their 
actual observations were transformed to the normal distributions by winsorizing at the 
1st and 99th % percentiles, which is the minimum level of the top and bottom of their 
distributions to maintain the characteristics of the original data. 
 
5.3.2 Normality  
Normality refers to the distribution of the data and whether the shape of the data show 
a normal distribution. There are several ways to check the normality of the data. It can 
be checked using several tests, such as Shapiro-Francia, Shapiro-Wilk and Kamagorov 
Smiron tests by obtaining the values of skewness and kurtosis or by using residual 
graphs, such as normal probability plots, quartiles of a normal distribution plot and 
histograms. This study employs graphical method to check the normality assumption 
of the residuals. The graphical method includes drawing, probability- probability (P-P) 
plot. Based on Figure 5.2, the residual is slightly normally distributed for this study’s 






Normal P-P Plot of Regression Residuals. 
 
Moreover, this study examined data from a large sample, 235 observations. Therefore, 
this condition may not distort the results as a significant departure from non-normality 
may be negligible for a sample size of 200 observations or more (Hair et al., 2010). 
Further, a normality test in panel data analysis is not a key concern because the standard 
least squares assumption is not appropriate for panel data (Gujarati & Porter, 2009). 
 
5.3.3 Multicollinearity and Correlation 
Multicollinearity is the intercorrelation of the independent variables. The main worry 
is that, when there is a rise in the level of multicollinearity, the estimated coefficients 
of the regression model tend to be unstable and the coefficients of the standard errors 
tend to get large. High correlations between independent variables may cause inflate 
the standard errors as well as the estimated coefficients of the regression model tends 
to be unstable (Hamilton, 2012). The Pearson correlation test is conducted to explore 
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The Pearson correlation coefficients were undertaken between the independent 
variables as showed in Table 5.6. All the correlations between the variables were not 
more than 0.56. The highest correlation of the variables was between total assets 
(FSIZE) and leverage (LEV) at 0.61, and the correlation between family ownership 
(FAMD) and managerial ownership (MOWN) was 0.43. Overall, these outcomes mean 
that the multicollinearity issue is not a concern in this study’s model unless the 
percentages of correlation between variables exceed 0.70 as mentioned by prior studies 
(Hair et al., 2010; Gujarati, 2003). 
 
Furthermore, some scholars have argued that the correlation matrix is not adequate to 
detect multicollinearity and, thus, it is important to perform the variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test to ensure no collinearity between variables (Hamilton, 2012). VIF is an 
indicator of the influence of the estimated coefficient because of collinearity. Previous 
studies indicate that a multicollinearity problem does not exist when the variance 
inflation factor (VIF) is less than 10 (Hair et al., 2010).  As it appears in Table 5.7, the 
mean of VIF score for the entire variables used in the study’s model was 1.36, and each 
variable’s score did not exceed 1.98. This provides evidence that multicollinearity 





Table 5.6  





Notes: *, **, ***, indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively. ABB = natural logarithm of actual share buyback numbers, BDSCORE 
= BOD effectiveness, ACSCORE = AC effectiveness, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = family ownership, MOWN = managerial ownership, FOWN = foreign ownership, 





Variable ABB BDSCORE ACSCORE BIG4 FAMD MOWN FOWN ESOSEXR FSIZE AGROWTH LEV CL 
ABB 1            
BDSCORE 0.26*** 1           
ACSCORE 0.07** 0.41*** 1          
BIG4 0.25*** 0.00 0.14*** 1         
FAMD -0.09** -0.15*** 0.00 -0.05* 1        
MOWN -0.13*** -0.07** 0.01 -0.15*** 0.43*** 1       
FOWN 0.26*** 0.09** 0.00 0.19*** -0.15*** -0.19*** 1      
ESOSEXR 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.12*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.08** 1     
FSIZE 0.54*** 0.26*** 0.24*** 0.32*** 0.14*** -0.03 0.28*** -0.03 1    
AGROWTH -0.12*** -0.01 0.11*** 0.06* 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.03 0.07** 0.11*** 1   
LEV 0.38*** 0.18*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.17*** 0.07** 0.18*** 0.01 0.61*** 0.03 1  
CL 0.04 -0.02 -0.06* -0.05* -0.21*** -0.06* 0.05* -0.04 -0.21*** -0.2 -0.30*** 1 
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Table 5.7  
Standard Tests on VIF Results 
 
5.3.4 Heteroscedasticity Test 
The homoscedasticity of variance refers to the constancy of the residual in that such 
residuals are randomly dispersed throughout the various estimations and the existence 
of unequal variance, which indicates the existence of heteroscedasticity (Baum, 2001; 
Gujarati, 2003). Prior literature reveals several approaches to test the presence of 
heteroscedasticity such as Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test  and White’s General 
test (Greene, 2012). Thus, Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test is used through a 
command in STATA packages called “hettest”, which is commonly used to detect the 
problem of heteroscedasticity. The consistency of variance is the null hypothesis of 
this test. The null hypothesis will be accepted when there is a large probability. 
However, the null hypothesis is rejected when the p-value is less than 0.05.  
 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FSIZE 1.98 0.51 
LEV 1.73 0.58 
BDSCORE 1.43 0.70 
MOWN 1.34 0.75 
FAMD 1.3 0.77 
ACSCORE 1.28 0.78 
FOWN 1.21 0.83 
BIG4 1.21 0.83 
CL 1.18 0.85 
AGROWTH 1.14 0.88 
ESOSEXR 1.06 0.95 
Mean VIF 1.35   
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STATA contains options for the estimation of robust standard errors. In this regard, 
heteroscedasticity leads to biased standard errors, and, while Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) expect errors to be independent and identically distributed, robust standard 
errors relax both or either of the above assumptions. The robust function also corrects 
the problem of bias in the standard errors and gives estimates that are more efficient. 
Regarding this study, the results of heteroscedasticity test are presented in Table 5.8.  
The test outcomes show that the heteroscedasticity problem is present in the main 




Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity 
  chi2(1) Prob > chi2 HO 
Model  23.33 0.000 Rejected 
 
5.3.5 Autocorrelation  
Autocorrelation is the issue of error components being correlated across time due to 
high similarities. The regression model assumes that the error term of units is not 
correlated and not influenced by other units. Although this is a violation of the ordinary 
assumption, this is a common issue in a panel or time-series analysis (Wooldridge, 
2010). Thus, researchers should examine their models against such problem to derive 
correct results and appropriate conclusions. The Wooldridge test for autocorrelation is 
the appropriate test to detect autocorrelation in fixed and random effect models in 




This study conducted a user-written command, called 'xtserial" in STATA packages, 
written by Drukke (2003), to test for the existence of first-order correlation in panel 
data. If the F value in Wooldridge test value is below the 5% significance level, the 
null hypothesis can be rejected, which means there is no first-order correlation. The 
results in Table 5.9 show that autocorrelation issue exists in this study’s data. The 
results suggest that the null hypothesis can be rejected for the model, implying that 
autocorrelation is a significant problem in this study’s model. Following the 
econometric literature, this study used the Huber-White robust standard errors that are 
clustered at the firm level to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Farrell 
et al., 2014). 
 
Table 5.9 
Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
 F (1, 24) Prob > chi2 H0 
Model  9.27 0.0056 Rejected 
Note: H0: no first-order autocorrelation. 
 
5.4 Multivariate Analysis 
After the assumptions (diagnostic tests) for the main model were met, the OLS 
estimation model was conducted to examine the relationship between accretive share 
buybacks (ABB) as the dependent variable and the independent variables using the 
multiple regression techniques. The model includes BOD effectiveness (BDSCORE), 
AC effectiveness (ACSCORE), audit quality (BIG4), family ownership (FAMD), 
managerial ownership (MOWN), foreign ownership (FOWN) and stock options 
(ESOSEXR) as independent variables; it also contains the firm size (FSIZE), assets 
growth (AGROWTH), leverage (LEV) and cash level (CL) as control variables. 
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Unbalanced panel data analysis estimation is used to examine these relationships for 
the study’s sample consisting of 235 firm-year observations over the period from 2010 
and 2015.  
 
Table 5.10 
Regression Results for Random Effect OLS Estimation Model 
ABB = β0+ β1 BDSCORE + β2ACSCORE + β3 BIG4 + β4 FAMD + β5 MOWN + β6 FOWN 
+ β7 ESOSEXR + β8 FSIZE + β9 AGROWTH + β10 LEV+ β11 CL + e. 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted Signs Coef. z P-value 
Constant ? 9.07 9.79 0.000*** 
BDSCORE - 0.21 2.66 0.008*** 
ACSCORE - -0.14 -1.83 0.069* 
BIG4 ? 0.30 2.20 0.029** 
FAMD ? -0.30 -2.00 0.047** 
MOWN ? 0.17 0.37 0.712 
FOWN - 0.08 0.13 0.896 
ESOSEXR + 10.72 1.79 0.074* 
FSIZE - 0.31 6.18 0.000*** 
AGROWTH - -0.48 -2.18 0.031** 
LEV - -1.03 -2.41 0.017** 
CL + 0.72 1.31 0.190 
Years  Included 
R2  0.41  
Sig  0.000  
N of observations 235 
No. of Firms 101 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively at 
two-tailed. ABB = natural logarithm of accretive share buyback numbers, BDSCORE = BOD 
effectiveness, ACSCORE = AC effectiveness, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = family ownership, 
MOWN = managerial ownership, FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEXR = stock options exercised, 
FSIZE = natural Logarithm of total assets, AGROWTH = assets growth, LEV= Leverage, and CL = 
cash level. 
 
Table 5.10 reports the results of the random effect OLS estimation model examining 
the relationship between the number of shares bought back for accretive share buyback 
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firms and the independent variables. As shown in Table 5.10, the model is statistically 
significant at 1% level (Prob. (F) = 0.000), with R2 = 0.41, meaning that R2 value is 
better estimate of the true population value. Pallant (2007) indicated that a R2 value 
equals or more than 0.30 is a better estimate of the true population value. Thus, the 
model explains 41% of the total variance in the accretive share buybacks, indicating 
that the overall model exhibited a good fit for the observed sample data. The following 
section explains the relationship between the independent and control variables with 
the dependent variables as tabulated in Table 5.10. 
 
5.4.1 Board of Directors’ (BOD) Effectiveness 
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the findings showed that BOD effectiveness 
(BDSCORE) had significant and positive association with accretive share buyback 
(ABB) (z = 2.66, p-value = 0.008), indicating that the more effective BOD, the more 
likely firms to engage in earnings management through accretive share buyback 
activities. Therefore, H1 is rejected, where H1 assumes a negative relationship 
between the BOD effectiveness and accretive buyback practices.  
 
This result does not support the arguments of agency theory and resource dependency 
theory, which predicted that the more effective of the BOD, the less is the practice of 
earnings management. However, this finding is consistent with Abdul Rahman and Ali 
(2006), Hashim and Devi (2008b), and Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2015a) who reported 
a significant and positive relationship between the BOD independence and accrual-
based earnings management. They justified those unexpected findings by the impact 
of the ownership concentration in Malaysia market, as well as the weakness of the 
experience and skills of the independent directors.  
210 
 
Also, Aygun et al. (2010) and Ghosh et al. (2010) found that BOD size was positively 
associated with earnings management. Hashim and Devi (2008b) found a positive 
linkage between frequent meetings of the BOD and accruals quality, which support 
the findings of this study. Further, Al-Rassas and Kamardin (2016) and Haji-Abdullah 
and Wan-Hussin (2015) failed to find a significant effective role for financial expert 
directors in mitigating practices of earnings management, which is slightly consistent 
with the result of this study.  
 
Two different explanations exist for the finding of BDSCORE with ABB. The first 
explanation is that the BODs of Malaysia firms are dominated by family and individual 
controlling shareholders, where the mean of family shareholdings is 30% as shown in 
Table 5.4. Thus, these controlling shareholders may use their power to utilise the firms’ 
resources to achieve their interests at the expense of minority shareholders. Practically, 
from Table 5.10, the results show that family-owned firms are more aggressive in 
engaging in accretive buybacks compared to non-family firms, which supports the 
positive association between the BOD and accretive share buybacks. This is consistent 
with prior studies indicating that the BODs of Malaysian firms are dominated by 
family shareholdings (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002).  
 
The second explanation for the result of the BOD and accretive buyback linkage is 
consistent with the argument that managers practice accruals-based earnings 
management and real earnings management in a reciprocal way. Managers in firms 
with high-quality governance mechanisms tend to practice earnings management 
through real activities rather than through accrual-based activities (Roychowdhury, 
2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012). Furthermore, Burnnet et al. (2012) found 
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evidence that supports this notion, whereby managers engaged in accretive share 
buyback to manage reported EPS when the external audit is high quality rather than 
accruals-based earnings management. This argument supports the results of this study, 
which revealed that BDSCORE had a significant positive linkage with accretive share 
buybacks.  
 
Moreover, Chandren et al. (2015) in Malaysian context provided empirical evidence 
that supports the results of this study in terms of the BOD effectiveness. They found a 
positive effect on the associations between the BOD independence, BOD size and 
CEO duality with the accretive share buyback. Consistently, Chandren et al. (2017) 
used data of the Bursa Malaysia for the period from 2001 to 2008 to examine the effect 
of accretive buybacks on firm performance. Chandren et al. (2017) documented a 
positive relationship between accretive share buyback and long-term performance in 
Malaysia. Their results revealed that accretive share buyback is an efficient earnings 
management that caused no adverse effect on firms and shareholders. Despite the 
positive effect of accretive share buyback on firm performance, earnings management 
is an activity that misleads investors’ perceptions by hiding the true value of firms, 
which should be discouraged or mitigated. In conclusion, previous debates may help 
explain the significant positive association between BDSCORE and accretive share 
buybacks in the current study. 
 
5.4.2 Audit Committee (AC) Effectiveness 
This study predicts a negative association between the AC effectiveness (ACSCORE) 
and accretive buyback activities, which means the greater AC effectiveness, the less 
accretive share buyback is practised by Malaysian listed firms. Consistently, the result 
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in Table 5.10 reveals a significant and negative relationship between AC effectiveness 
and accretive buyback actions (z = -1.83, p-value = 0.069). Therefore, H2 is supported. 
This result supports the arguments of the agency theory and resource dependence 
theory, which claim that independent directors with relevant skills and experience 
significantly contribute to enhancing governance effectiveness, increase the quality of 
financial reporting and reduce the agency problem (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 2003). 
 
This finding aligns with the results of Vafeas (2005) and Xie et al. (2003) who 
examined attributes of the AC, which included AC independence, AC size, AC 
financial expertise and the frequency of AC meetings, as indicators of AC 
effectiveness. The results support the effectiveness of AC in mitigating accruals-based 
earnings management.  
 
In Malaysia, previous studies have explored several attributes of the AC including AC 
independent, AC size, AC meetings, and AC financial expertise. Their results have 
provided weak evidence about the effectiveness of AC features in mitigating accruals-
based earnings management (Al-Rassas & Kamardin, 2016; Hussain Alkdai & 
Hanefah, 2012; Saleh et al., 2007; Yunos, 2011). Further, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-
Hussin (2015) documented that AC independent, AC size, AC meetings, and AC 
financial expertise have negative but not significant relationships with real earnings 
management.  
 
This current study provided a different result for the effectiveness of AC in mitigating 
real earnings management because this study used a composite score as a proxy for 
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AC effectiveness. Prior literature (Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Habbash, 2013; Kent 
et al., 2010; Hunton et al., 2011; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2011) argued 
that corporate governance is an interrelated system and becomes effective only in 
particular combinations rather than in isolated best practices. O’Sullivan et al. (2008) 
reported that examining the mechanisms of corporate governance as a package gives 
a stronger outcome  than does examining them individually. Particularly, Sharma and 
Kuang (2014) as well as Woidtke and Yeh (2013) indicated that focusing on individual 
features of an AC such as the independence cannot be sufficient to restrict earnings 
management, as independent members need to possess some financial expertise to 
support their confidence in accounting and financial information, which assists in 
raising earnings quality. 
 
The evidence of this study regarding ACSCORE with accretive buyback is consistent 
with MCCG 2012, which requires the BOD to create an effective AC to ensure that a 
financial statement is reliable and relevant for investors and other related parties and 
is prepared according to the applied financial reporting standards. MCCG 2012 also 
contains certain rules to reinforce the function of an AC in creating better quality 
financial reporting. Particularly, MCCG 2012 recommends strengthening the 
independence of independent directors through revised it yearly as well as limiting the 
tenure of independent directors to a maximum of 9 years. 
 
5.4.3 Audit Quality  
This study in H3 proposes that firms audited by Big 4 auditors (BIG4) will have a 
significant association with accretive share buyback. Consistently, the result in Table 
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5.10 shows a positive and significant association between BIG4 and accretive buyback 
activities (z= 2.20, p-value = 0.029).  Therefore, H3 is supported.  
 
This result is consistent with prior studies such as the study of Burnett et al. (2012) 
who provided evidence that firms with high audit quality are more likely to employ 
shares buyback for earnings management purposes and however less likely to use 
accruals-based earnings management. Similarly, Chandren et al. (2015) used data from 
2001 to 2008 and found a positive and significant association between accretive share 
buybacks and BIG4. This means that Big 4 auditors were not aware of the use of 
accretive buyback as a tool for real earnings management. Consistently, Bryan and 
Mason (2016) examined whether earnings management by accretive share buybacks 
affected auditor perceptions of risk and found a significant and positive connection 
between the use of accretive share buybacks as an earnings management tool and audit 
fees. 
 
The result of this study is also consistent with Chi et al. (2011) and Cohen and Zarowin 
(2010) who found that firms audited by Big 4 auditors are more likely to undertake 
real earnings management than accrual-based earnings management when involved in 
a seasoned equity offering. Lawrence et al. (2011) indicated that the effect of Big 4 
audit firms may belong to the fundamental differences in client characteristics rather 
than in differential audit quality. This outcome is consistent with the argument predicts 
that even though Big 4 audit firms have more skills and expertise to perform auditing 
functions for their clients relative to non-Big 4 auditors, they still have limited 
understanding and awareness of the use of accretive buyback to manage earnings 
management, which is likely to change in the future. Further, this result is consistent 
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the principles of MCCG 2012 that cover the responsibility of AC to review and 
monitor independence and rationalization of an external audit. 
 
5.4.4 Family Ownership  
The assumption in this study is that family ownership (FAMD) may have a significant 
association with accretive share buyback activities. Consistently, the outcomes in 
Table 5.10 revealed that family ownership had a significant and negative relationship 
with accretive buyback activities as a tool for managing earnings (z = -2.00, p-value = 
0.047), meaning that the family-controlled firms are more conservative in managing 
earnings by engaging in accretive share buyback activities. Therefore, H4 is supported. 
 
The finding of this study is consistent with the argument indicating that family-
controlled firms have more efficient monitoring functions as they are dominated 
management and have more relevant information with efficient monitoring functions, 
which, in turn, would provide a great opportunity to support the interests of minority 
shareholders (Alzoubi, 2016); Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Li 
& Hung, 2013; Siregar & Utama, 2008). This is consistent with alignment hypothesis 
predicts that family shareholders could align the interest of management and 
shareholders, which, in turn, mitigate the practice of earnings management (Wang, 
2006). This also is along the same line with agency theory (type I) that the notion 
assumes that insiders’ shareholding assists in aligning the benefits of managers and 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
The findings of this study are consistent with Adiguzel (2013) who documented that 
the magnitude of accruals- based earnings management is less in family controlled 
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firms than in non-family controlled firms. Along the same line, Wang (2006) and Ali 
et al. (2007) provided evidence that family ownership has a significant and negative 
connection with abnormal accruals, which support the credibility of reported earnings. 
Consistent with this finding, Cascino et al. (2010) examined earnings quality between 
family controlled firms and non-family controlled firms and found that family firms 
generally reported high-quality earnings compared to non-family firms, which support 
the findings of this study. In Malaysia, the study of Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin 
(2015) documented evidence that support this study findings, which revealed that 
family controlled firms restricted real earnings management through related party 
transactions, which also supports the alignment role of family ownership. 
 
Moreover, Siregar and Utama (2008) revealed that firms with a high proportion of 
family ownership had more of a tendency to select efficient earnings management than 
non-family owned firms. Li and Hung (2013) found that family ownership indeed 
lessened the motivations for earnings management in family-controlled firms. 
Achleitner et al. (2014) provided evidence that family-controlled firms as compared to 
non-family firms were less involved in real earnings management as a substitute or 
complementary for accruals-based earnings management. These previous findings are 
support this study’s outcomes which reveals the alignment role of family shareholding 
in mitigating real earnings management through accretive share buybacks.  
 
5.4.5 Managerial Ownership 
This study in H5 assumes a significant association between managerial ownership and 
accretive buybacks. However, this study in Table 5.10 shows a positive but 
insignificant relationship between managerial ownership (MOWN) and accretive 
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share buybacks (z = 0.37, p-value = 0.712), which means that the percentage of a firm’s 
shares held by executive directors could not encourage or depress the magnitude of 
accretive share buybacks to manage reported EPS. Therefore, H5 is rejected.  
 
A possible interpretation of this result is that in firms with high managerial ownership, 
such as family-owned firms, it is unnecessary to mitigate accretive share buybacks as 
a tool for managing earnings. They may use buyback to earn real wealth transfers from 
the outside shareholders to insider shareholders (Shayan-Nia et al., 2017). This result 
is consistent with Al-Dhamari and Ku Ismail (2013) who found no significant effect 
for managerial ownership on earnings management through earnings informativeness 
in the Malaysian context. Also, Al-Fayoumi et al. (2010) and Masmoudi and 
Boujelbène (2014) revealed that managerial ownership had a significant and positive 
influence on the practice of earnings management, which is consistent with the 
entrenchment viewpoint. Similarly, Oluku (2017) found that managers holding a high 
level of firm equity were more likely to practice earnings management.  
 
Regarding accretive buyback decisions, the results of prior studies are not consistent 
with this study’s findings.  In a study of the United States, Farrell et al. (2013) found 
that firms with a high percentage of CEO ownership are less likely to exercise earnings 
management through accretive share buyback, indicating that managerial ownership 
assists in mitigating accretive share buyback as a proxy for real earnings management. 
Correspondingly, Chandren et al. (2015), in a Malaysian study, also reported a 
significant and negative linkage between direct shareholdings of executive directors 
and real earnings management by accretive share buybacks. This is consistent with 
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traditional agency theory, which assumes that managerial shareholdings are more 
probable to mitigate the agency problem between shareholders and managers.  
 
The possible explanation for the different results from this study to Farrell et al. (2013) 
and Chandren et al. (2015) is that they used limited measurement for managerial 
ownership, wherein they used CEO ownership and direct shareholdings of executive 
directors respectively, as proxies for managerial ownership. Whereas, this current 
study used direct and indirect shareholdings of executive directors (indirect shares 
refer to the shares of an individual shareholder or firms through interests held in 
another related firm or by their family members) for the managerial ownership. 
Logically, the measurement of managerial ownership used by this study better 
represents managerial ownership as it considers both the direct and indirect 
shareholdings of all executive directors.  
 
5.4.6 Foreign Ownership  
This study assumes that firms with a high proportion of shares held by foreign 
investors (FOWN) are less likely to engage in accretive buyback activities because 
they have superior capabilities compared to the domestic investors, which is expected 
to improve the governance level of a firm. However, the finding shown in Table 5.10 
reveals an insignificant association with accretive share buyback activities (z = 0.13, 
p-value = 0.869). Therefore, H6 is rejected. This result is inconsistent with the 
knowledge spillover hypothesis, which assumes that the superior knowledge of foreign 




A possible explanation for this result is probably related to the level of corporate 
governance for a country, which substantially affects the relationship between foreign 
ownership and earnings management practices. Ben-Nasr et al. (2015) documented a 
significant and negative relationship between foreign ownership in countries with high 
governance stability and that experience lower government expropriation risk. 
whereas the relationships were positive with earnings management in countries with a 
poor corporate governance system. This may support the result of this study, which 
found a limited effect for foreign ownership in mitigating earnings management 
through accretive share buybacks. That is because previous study has reported that the 
corporate governance system in Malaysia is still under development, and the country 
experiences poor investor protection (Hasnan et al., 2013). 
 
In addition, the size of foreign ownership in firms may play a considerable role in their 
ability to control and monitor management behaviours. Previous studies have indicated 
that only foreign investors, who hold a significant magnitude of a firm’s equity, could 
perform monitoring for management actions (Chhibber & Majumdar, 1999). They 
found a positive effect of the spillover hypothesis only when foreign investors were 
given proper authority and controlled more than 50% of ownership, to display better 
performance. In the current study, only 7% of the firms had more than 50% of their 
shares held by foreign investors. Accordingly, this study found that the mean of 
percentage of foreign ownership was 7.5% as shown in Table 5.10, which is considered 
very low to make a substantial difference in management policy.  
 
5.4.7 Employee Stock Options  
220 
 
Table 5.10 demonstrates that the stock options exercise (ESOSEXR) had significant 
and positive association with accretive buyback activities at the 10% level (z = 1.79, p 
= 0.074). This means that firms with a high exercise of stock options were more likely 
to engage in accretive share buyback to manage EPS. Thus, H7 is supported. This 
result is consistent with the stock options hypothesis which predicts that firms may be 
involved in share buyback programs to offset the dilution in EPS caused by the 
exercise of stock options (Bens et al., 2003; Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002). Consistent 
with this result, Kadan and Yang (2016) found that newly granted stock options are 
significantly related to practices of earnings management to affect the stock price. 
 
Similarly, Bedard et al. (2004), and Cheng and Warfield (2005) indicated that 
managers with a high amount of managerial ownership including stock options have 
more incentive to manipulate earnings to meet or beat forecasts of analysts, especially 
when the probability of negative earnings surprise is high. Also, Bartov and Mohanram 
(2004) provided an empirical result that managers manage earnings by discretionary 
accruals during the short time before the exercise of stock options. Furthermore, Lin 
et al. (2009) found that managerial options exercisable were positively related to the 
size of earnings management. These are in line with the finding of this current study 
in terms of using stock options schemes to manage the earnings threshold.  
 
5.4.8 Control Variables 
Regarding the control variables, the relationship between the natural logarithm of total 
assets (FSIZE) and accretive buyback actions was significant and positive at the 1% 
level (z= 6.18, p < 0.000). This finding is consistent with the argument that predicts 
that analysts usually track large firms more than they track small firms, which 
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presumes that large firms being under more pressure to meet EPS benchmarks 
(Bhushan, 1989). This finding is also consistent with Farrell et al. (2013) and Farrell 
et al. (2014) who reported a positive and significant association between firm size and 
accretive buyback behaviours. Further, Chandren et al. (2015) found a positive but 
insignificant relationship between firm size and accretive buyback actions.  
 
Asset growth (AGROWTH) had a negative and significant association with accretive 
share buyback (z = -2.18, p value = 0.031). This result is consistent with the empirical 
evidence of previous studies (Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014) who documented 
that high growth firms are less likely to exercise accretive buyback activities for the 
purposes of earnings management. Jensen (1986) indicated that firms with high 
investment opportunities may use cash to improve their value by investments rather 
than use cash in share buyback programs.  
 
Previous studies (Andriosopoulos & Hoque, 2013; Bens et al., 2003; Burnett et al., 
2012; Dittmar, 2000; Hribar et al., 2006) have predicted that underleveraged firms 
engage in shares buyback to reduce a firm’s equity fraction, which leads to an increase 
in the debt ratio (the percentage of total debts to total assets). Consistently, Table 5.10 
shows that the variable of leverage (LEV) had a significant and negative association 
with accretive buyback actions at the 5% level (z= -2.41, p-value = 0.017), indicating 
that firms with low percentage of total debt to total assets (LEV) are more likely to 
undertake shares buyback to reach optimal leverage level. This is consistent with 
Farrell et al. (2013) who found that the leverage level was negatively related to 




Regarding the variable of cash level (CL), previous studies have predicted that firms 
with higher cash levels are more likely to spend funds in share buyback activities 
(Abdul Latif, 2010). Jensen (1986) reported that firms with free cash could spend more 
cash on non-profitable activities. However, the result of this study shows an 
insignificant relationship with accretive share buybacks (z = 1.31 p-value = 0.190), 
which is inconsistent with the cash flow hypothesis that predicts that firms use their 
cash in share buyback activities. This result is consistent with the finding of Chandren 
et al. (2015), which revealed a positive and insignificant association between the level 
of cash and accretive share buyback. Similarly, Chandren and Nadarajan (2013) 
reported a positive linkage between cash level and accretive share buyback at the 10% 
significance level, which is slightly in the same line with the result of this study.   
 
5.5 Additional Analysis 
This section displays a series of additional analysis conducted to investigate the 
robustness of the regression model. To improve the reliability of the findings, this 
study used alternative model specifications. First, the study used Tobit random effect 
regression to compare their results with the main analysis. Second, because the primary 
objective of this study focused on accretive share buyback decisions, the main model 
was re-examined by replacing the measurement of accretive share buyback by using a 
dichotomous variable equal to 1 if the shares buyback was an accretive share buyback 
and 0 if otherwise (Farrell et al., 2013). Third, this study re-ran the main analysis 
excluding the variable of managerial ownership (MOWN) to avoid the correlation 
effect between MOWN and family ownership (FAMD). Finally, this study re-
examined the main model by using the individual attributes of governance mechanisms 
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(the BOD and AC) rather than a composite measure. The outcomes of additional 
analyses emphasise the consistency of the earlier results. 
 
5.5.1 Tobit Model’s Regression Analysis  
As mentioned before, this study in the main analysis used only the accretive share 
buyback observations (ABB) during the sample period of the study to test the 
hypotheses in order to achieve its objectives. Therefore, to test the robustness of the 
main analysis’s findings, the analysis was repeated after including both accretive and 
non-accretive buyback observations to ensure the results are not affected by using 
different sample size. the Tobit estimation model was conducted to re-examine the 
main analysis of this current study. Tobin (1958) introduced the Tobit regression 
model to analyse the association between dependent variable with non-negative 
values.  
 
The Tobit regression model can also be used to analyse variables whose actual values 
are not observed (censored dependent variables). Thus, unbalanced panel Tobit 
regression is used in this analysis to retest the study’s hypotheses. The Tobit model is 
used because the dependent variable (accretive share buyback) is limited, where about 
29% of sample observations are left censored at zero and the Tobit model is used to 
neutralize the effect of the non-buyback observations (censored values).  
 
This section includes accretive and non-accretive buyback, 235 and 366 observations 
respectively, included in this section, and the diagnostic tests iare re-examined to 
confirm that the assumptions of multiple regressions hold correctly. The study used 
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Breusch and Pagan (1980) Lagrange multiplier (LM) test to inspect the hypothesis that 
there are no random effects. The study concluded that the random effects model was 
more appropriate than classical regression model based on a significant p-value for the 
(LM) test. Additionally, the Hausman test was employed to determine which panel 
technique (the Fixed Effect Model or the Random Effect Model) was more appropriate 
for the observed sample data. Based on this test, the random effects regression was 
employed to examine the sample of accretive and non-accretive observations.  
 
To deal with heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (autocorrelation) in the panel 
data set, this study includes time fixed-effects and robust standard errors clustered at 
the firm level (Beltratti, Spear, & Szabo, 2013; Petersen, 2009). In order to ensure that 
the regression results are not driven by a few extreme observations, this study 
Winsorized all continuous variables at the 1st and 99th percentiles (Filip et al., 2015). 
 
Table 5.11 reports the results of the Tobit estimation model examining the relationship 
between the number of shares bought back for accretive share buyback firms and the 
independent variables. As shown in Table 5.11, the model is statistically significant at 
a p-value of less than 0.01 (Prob>chi2 = 0.0000) with a Wald Chi-square of 67.69. The 
Wald-chi-square was significant at the 1% level, indicating that the overall model 
exhibited a good fit for the observed sample data. The following section explains the 
relationship between the independent and control variables with the dependent 
variables as tabulated in Table 5.11. 
 
Contrary to the expectations of this study, the findings showed that BOD effectiveness 
(BDSCORE) had significant and positive association with accretive share buyback 
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(ABB) (z = 3.22, p-value = 0.001), indicating that the more effective BOD, the more 
likely firms are to engage in earnings management through accretive share buyback 
activities, which support the result in the main model. This result does not support the 
arguments of agency theory and resource dependency theory, which predicted that the 
more effective that the BOD is, the less is the practice of earnings management. This 
result is likely to be justified by the fact that the BODs of Malaysia firms are dominated 
by controlling shareholders, where the mean of family shareholdings is 30% as shown 
in Table 5.4. Thus, these controlling shareholders may use their power to utilise the 
firms’ resources to achieve their interests at the expense of minority shareholders.  
Table 5.11 
Regression Results for Panel Tobit Estimation Model 
ABB = β0+ β1 BDSCORE + β2ACSCORE + β3 BIG4 + β4 FAMD + β5 MOWN + β6 FOWN 
+ β7 ESOSEXR + β8 FSIZE + β9 AGROWTH + β10 LEV+ β11 CL + e. 
Independent 
Variables 
Predicted Signs Coef. z P-value 
Constant ? -21.39 -2.95 0.003*** 
BDSCORE - 1.650 3.22 0.001*** 
ACSCORE - -1.157 -2.48 0.013** 
BIG4 - -0.627 -0.62 0.538 
FAMD ? 2.738 2.27 0.023** 
MOWN ? 0.888 0.34 0.731 
FOWN - 1.929 0.38 0.704 
ESOSEXR + 175.96 2.64 0.008*** 
FSIZE - 1.306 3.37 0.000*** 
AGROWTH - -3.350 -1.46 0.143 
LEV - -7.424 -1.93 0.053* 
CL + 1.975 0.57 0.566 
Years  Included 
Wald chi2(16)  67.69  
Prob > Chi2  0.000  
N of observations 601 
No. of Firms 101 
Notes: ***, **, * indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively at 
two-tailed. ABB = natural logarithm of accretive share buyback numbers, BDSCORE = BOD 
effectiveness, ACSCORE = AC effectiveness, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = family ownership, 
MOWN = managerial ownership, FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEXR = stock options exercised, 




This Tobit regression reveals a negative relationship between the AC effectiveness 
(ACSCORE) and accretive share buyback (z = -2.48, p-value = 0.013), which means 
the greater AC effectiveness, the less accretive share buyback is practised by 
Malaysian listed firms. Consistently, the result in the main model Table 5.10 reveals a 
significant and negative relationship between AC effectiveness and accretive buyback 
actions. This result supports the arguments of the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, which claim that independent directors with relevant skills and 
experience significantly contribute to enhancing governance effectiveness, increase 
the quality of financial reporting and reduce the agency problem. 
 
With regards to audit quality, this study predicts that firms audited by Big 4 auditors 
(BIG4) are more likely to practice less accretive share buyback than those firms 
audited by non-Big 4 auditors. However, this result in Table 5.11 shows a negative 
and insignificant association between BIG4 and accretive buyback activities (z= -62, 
p-value = 0.538), which is consistent with the main result in Table 5.10. This result is 
consistent with prior studies such as Yusof (2010), Abdul Rahman and Ali (2006), 
Zang (2012) and Zeng (2014), which failed to find a significant relationship between 
Big 4 auditors and the practise of reality-based and accrual-based earnings 
management. Chandren et al. (2015) used data from 2001 to 2008 and found a positive 
and significant association between accretive share buybacks and BIG4. This means 
that Big 4 auditors were not aware of the use of accretive buyback as a tool for real 
earnings management. However, this study’s result reveals a negative but insignificant 
relationship between BIG4 and accretive share buybacks. This possibly means that Big 
4 auditors have begun to understand and realise the use of accretive share buyback as 




Regarding the variable of family ownership (FAMD), the results of this model in Table 
5.11 reveal a significant and positive association with accretive share buyback 
activities (z = 2.27, p-value = 0.023). The finding of this study is consistent with the 
argument indicating that family-controlled firms have less efficient monitoring 
functions as they are dominated by family members and have managers with less 
efficient monitoring functions, which, in turn, would provide a great opportunity to 
expropriate the interests of minority shareholders (Bhaumik & Gregoriou, 2010; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Omar & Mohd-Saleh, 2011). This is consistent with entrenchment 
hypothesis, which predicts that family shareholders could dominate management and 
lead to the practice of earnings management (Wang, 2006). This also is along the same 
line with agency theory (type II) problems that exist between majority and minority 
shareholders (Claessens et al., 2000; Fan & Wong, 2002). 
 
The finding of this study is consistent with Faccio et al. (2001) and Fan and Wong 
(2002) who reported that family shareholding expropriates the rights of minority 
outside shareholders, which may limit the credibility of reported earnings. Consistent 
with this finding, Omar and Mohd-Saleh (2011) in Malaysia found that managers and 
controlling shareholders may use goodwill impairment as a tool to manage earnings. 
In addition, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2011) reported that family-controlled firms exercise 
earnings management to gain private interests of control. Recently, Abdullah and 
Ismail (2016) suggested no effective role for family ownership in interacting with 
women on the BOD to constrain earnings management. This possibly means that 
family members have an entrenchment effect rather than an alignment interest effect 




Another explanation for this finding is that family members may be involved in 
earnings management through accretive buybacks rather in accruals-based earnings 
management, which become under the lens of external auditors and other monitoring 
agencies. This interpretation is consistent with the findings of Wang (2006), Ali et al. 
(2007) and Li and Hung (2013) who found that accruals-based earnings management 
actions are better mitigated in family-controlled firms relative to non-family controlled 
firms. Tai (2017) examined both types of earnings management in family-controlled 
firms and found that they engaged in real earnings management more than accruals-
based earnings management. Further, Razzaque et al. (2015) provided evidence that 
supports the results of this current study, suggesting that family firms practice real 
earnings management more than non-family firms in Bangladesh. 
  
Consistent with the results of the main model in Table 5.10, this Tobit regression 
shows a positive but insignificant relationship between managerial ownership 
(MOWN) and accretive share buybacks (z = 0.34, p-value = 0.731). This means that 
the proportion of a firm’s managerial ownership could not encourage or depress the 
managers to involve in accretive share buybacks as a tool for real earnings 
management.  
 
With respect to foreign ownership (FOWN), the finding shown in Table 5.11 reveals 
an insignificant association with accretive share buyback activities (z = 0.38, p-value 
= 0.704). This result is consistent with the results of the main model in Table 5.10 that 
reveal an inactive role for foreign investors in mitigating accretive buyback activities. 
This result is inconsistent with the knowledge spillover hypothesis assumes that the 
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superior knowledge of foreign investors is more likely to limit earnings management 
activities (Guo et al., 2015). 
 
The stock options exercise (ESOSEXR) had significant and positive association with 
accretive buyback activities at the 1% level (z = 2.64, p < 0.008). this result is 
consistent with the study’s main model in Table 5.10. This result means that more 
exercise of stock options encourages managers to involve in accretive share buyback. 
This is along the same line with the stock options hypothesis assumes that firms may 
be involved in share buyback to avoid the dilution in EPS caused by the exercise of 
stock options (Dittmar, 2000; Kahle, 2002). Lin et al. (2009) found that managerial 
options exercisable were positively related to the size of earnings management. These 
are in line with the finding of this current study in terms of using stock options schemes 
to manage the earnings threshold. Similarly, Kadan and Yang (2016) found that newly 
granted stock options are significantly related to practices of earnings management to 
affect the stock price. 
 
In terms of the control variables, this model in Table 5.11 reveals that total assets 
(FSIZE) has a significant and positive connection with accretive share buyback at the 
1% level (z= 3.37, p < 0.01). This result is in line with the argument that predicts that 
analysts usually track large firms more than they track small firms, which presumes 
that large firms being under more pressure to meet EPS benchmarks (Bhushan, 1989). 
Asset growth (AGROWTH) had a negative and insignificant relationship with 
accretive share buyback (z = -1.46, p = 0.143). This result is consistent with the 
empirical evidence of previous studies (Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014), 
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indicating that firms with high investment opportunities may use cash to improve their 
value by investments rather than use cash in share buyback programs.  
 
Table 5.11 presents a negative and significant association between leverage (LEV) and 
accretive share buyback (z= -1.93, p-value = 0.053), meaning that firms with low 
leverage (LEV) are more likely to practice shares buyback to reach optimal leverage 
level. Regards cash level (CL), The results of this study show an insignificant 
relationship with accretive buyback activities (z = 0.57 p-value = 0.566), which is 
inconsistent with the cash flow hypothesis that predicts that firms use their cash in 
share buyback activities. This result is consistent with the finding of the main model 
in Table 5.10, which revealed a positive and insignificant relationship between the 
level of cash and accretive share buyback.  
 
In summary, the result of BDSCORE, ACSCORE, MOWN, FOWN and ESOSEXR 
had results that are slightly similar with the main model except for the BIG4 and 
FAMD variables. FAMD has a significant and positive association with ABB, which 
support the entrenchment role of family members over firms’ management. Whereas, 
BIG4 in this section has insignificant connection with ABB, meaning that Big 4 
auditors are not an active mechanism to detect and prevent earnings management 
through accretive share buybacks.  
 
5.5.2 Logistic Regression Analysis: Dichotomous Measurement of ABB 
This study in the main analysis used the logarithm of the number of shares bought back 
(ABB) during the years of study as a measure to accretive buyback in the main analysis 
because EPS is directly affected by the number of shares bought back rather than the 
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value of share buybacks. Thus, the main analysis is re-estimated in this section by 
using logistic regression for 601 (235 accretive buybacks & 366 non-accretive 
buybacks) observations of buyback firms over the period 2010 to 2015. Thus, the 
measurement of the dependent variable (ABB) is replaced with a dichotomous variable 
equal to 1 for an accretive share buyback observations and 0 if otherwise (ABBD) 
(Farrell et al., 2013; Farrell et al., 2014; Hribar et al., 2006).  
 
Because the measurement of the dependent variable ABBD is not similar to the main 
analysis as mentioned above, the diagnostic tests were re-run for this logistic fixed 
effects model to test the regression assumptions. In terms of extreme outliers, 
normality, and multicollinearity, they are similar to the main analysis as discussed 
earlier. For the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
and Wooldridge tests were performed respectively to examine the null hypothesis. As 
the p-value for both tests were above 5%, this means that homoscedasticity and serial 
correlation problems are absent in this model. This can be a sign that applying fixed 
effects model is the correct technique to be used as suggested by the Hausman test, 
which enabled the study to avoid any possible bias in the estimation. 
 
As presented in Table 5.12, the results of this model are commonly consistent with the 
findings of the main analysis except for that BIG4, where these results show that BIG4 
has a negative and significant effect on ABBD. This means that firms audited by Big 
4 auditors experience less earnings management than non-Big 4 audit firms (Francis 
& Yu, 2009). As show in Table 5.12, the results revealed a significant and negative 
relationship between ABBD and AC effectiveness. Whereas, the variables of the 
BDSCORE, FAMD, and ESOSEXR had a significant and positive association with 
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ABBD. Regarding control variables, only AGROWTH had a significantly negative 
relationship with ABBD. The other control variables including FSIZE, LEV, and CL 
had a linkage with ABBD in the same directions as the mean model but not were 
significant. 
Table 5.12  
Regression Results for Panel Logistic Fixed Effect Estimation Model 
ABBD = β0+ β1 BDSCORE + β2ACSCORE + β3 BIG4 + β4 FAMD + β5 MOWN + β6 





Coef. z P-value 
BDSCORE - 0.640 3.21 0.001*** 
ACSCORE - -0.367 -2.12 0.034** 
BIG4 ? -2.625 -2.06 0.040** 
FAMD ? 4.686 2.07 0.038** 
MOWN ? -2.006 -1.25 0.210 
FOWN - 1.254 0.6 0.546 
ESOSEXR + 74.279 3.14 0.002*** 
FSIZE - 0.639 1.37 0.169 
AGROWTH - -2.202 -2.9 0.004*** 
LEV - -1.346 -0.84 0.400 
CL + 1.517 0.43 0.316 
Years  Included 
LR chi2 (16)  66.81  
Prob > Chi2  0.000  
N of observations.  601  
N of Firms  101  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively at 
two-tailed. ABBD = dichotomous variable equal one if share buyback is accretive and zero otherwise, 
BDSCORE = BOD effectiveness, ACSCORE = AC effectiveness, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = 
dichotomous variable equal one if a firm is family controlled and zero otherwise, MOWN = 
managerial ownership (direct and indirect), FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEXR = stock options 
exercised, FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets, AGROWTH = rate of assets growth, LEV= 
Leverage, and CL = cash level. 
 
5.5.3 Excluding Managerial Ownership (MOWN) 
To test the robustness of the findings, the analysis was repeated after excluding the 
variable of managerial ownership (MOWN) to ensure results were not influenced by 
the correlation between MOWN and FAMD. The results as presented in Table 5.13 
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are consistent with the main analysis except for that level of significance for FAMD 
was at the 10% level (p value = 0.051) while in the main analysis shown in Table 5.10, 
FAMD was significant at the 5% level (p value = 0.047). However, other variables like 
BDSCORE, ACSCORE, FAMD, and ESOSEXR, as well as control variable, remain 
unchanged (directions and level of significance) with ABB in comparison to the results 
of the main model in Table 5.10. This shows that the results of the main analysis were 
not affected by the correlation between MOWN and FAMD. 
 
Table 5.13 
Regression Results for Random Effect OLS Estimation Model with Excluding MOWN 
ABBD = β0+ β1 BDSCORE + β2ACSCORE + β3 BIG4 + β4 FAMD + β5 MOWN + β6 





Coef. z p-value 
Constant  9.18 10.57 0.000*** 
BDSCORE - 0.20 2.64 0.009*** 
ACSCORE - -0.14 -1.82 0.07* 
BIG4 - 0.30 2.2 0.029** 
FAMD ? -0.29 -1.97 0.051* 
FOWN - 0.06 0.09 0.925 
ESOSEXR + 10.58 1.78 0.077* 
FSIZE - 0.30 6.31 0.000*** 
AGROWTH - -0.48 -2.16 0.032** 
LEV - -1.06 -2.5 0.013** 
CL + 0.76 1.4 0.162 
Years  Included 
R2  0.41  
Sig  0.000  
N of observations  235  
N of Firms  101  
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively at 
two-tailed. ABBD = dichotomous variable equal one if buyback is accretive or zero otherwise, 
BDSCORE = BOD effectiveness, ACSCORE = AC effectiveness, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = 
dichotomous variable equal one if firms is family controlled and zero otherwise, MOWN = 
managerial ownership (direct and indirect), FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEXR = stock options 
exercised, FSIZE = natural logarithm of total assets, AGROWTH = rate of assets growth, LEV= 





5.5.4 Individual Attributes of Corporate Governance Mechanisms 
Following prior studies (Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Chobpichien et al., 2007; 
DeFond et al. 2005; Garcia Lara et al., 2007; Johl et al., 2013; Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008; O'Sullivan et al., 2008), this study in the main analysis shown in 
Table 5.10 uses a composite score to measure the effectiveness of both BOD and AC. 
Prior empirical studies exhibited fair consensus regarding certain attributes including 
independence, size, meetings and financial experience for both BOD and AC, which 
supported their effectiveness in monitoring managers actions (e.g. Abdul Rahman & 
Ali, 2006; Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Chobpichien et al., 2007; Hashim & Devi, 
2008a; Hunton et al., 2011; Johl et al., 2013; Srinidhi et al., 2014; Sarkar et al., 2008; 
Vafeas, 1999; Xie et al., 2003). However, in this section, this study re-estimated the 
main analysis by replacing the scores of the BOD (BDSCORE) and AC (ACSCORE) 
with their individual features which composite the scores including BDIND, BSIZE, 
BDMEET, BDEXPRT, ACIND, ACSIZE, ACMEET, and ACEXPRT.  
 
Table 5.14 below shows the results of the random effects Tobit regressions for the full 
sample, whereby four models are estimated. Model (1) estimated the entire variables 
of corporate governance mechanisms and ESOS with ABB. Model (2) estimated all 
variables of corporate governance but, however, excluded the AC features (ACIND, 
ACSIZE, ACMEET, and ACEXPRT). Model (3) estimated the impact of corporate 
governance mechanisms on ABB with excluding BOD features (BDIND, BDSIZE, 
BDMEET, and BDEXPRT).  Finally, Model (4) estimated only BIG4, FAMD, 
MOWN, FOWN, and ESOSEXR, but, excluded both the features of BOD and AC. 
Table 5.15 below shows that all models were fit and significant at the 1% level with 




As shown in Table 5.14, the findings of the models are not totally similar to the 
findings of the main analysis reported in Table 5.10. In terms of the BOD features, 
Table 5.15 shows conflicting results of the relationship between the BOD features and 
ABB. BDIND had a negative relationship with ABB. However, BDMEET had a 
positive association with ABB. Regarding BDSIZE and BDEXPRT, this study failed 
to provide evidence to support their ability to constrain ABB. These results are 
consistent with previous studies (e.g., Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006; Al-Rassas & 
Kamardin, 2015; Davidson et al., 2005; Hashim & Devi, 2008a; Klein, 2002; Peasnell 
et al., 2000; Peasnell et al., 2005; Shiri et al., 2012), which found conflicting findings 
for BOD features with earnings management. Similarly, Chandren et al. (2015) 
reported conflicting results for the BOD features with accretive share buybacks.  
 
These conflicting results support using a composite score as a proxy for the 
effectiveness of the BOD (BDSCORE), which this study adopted rather than 
depending on individual features. Prior studies (e.g., Bin-Ghanem & Ariff, 2016; Kent 
et al., 2010; Hunton et al., 2011; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Zaman et al., 2011) have 
indicated that corporate governance is an interrelated system and becomes effective 
only in particular combinations rather than isolated practices. Consistently, O’Sullivan 
et al. (2008) reported that the mechanisms of corporate governance as a bundle provide 
better results than investigating them individually.  
 
Regarding AC features, Table 5.14 presents conflicting findings of the association 
between AC features and ABB. ACIND, ACSIZE and ACEXPRT had a negative 
relationship with ABB.  However, ACMEET had a positive linkage with ABB. These 
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findings are not consistent with the result of the main analysis in Table 5.10, but they 
are like several prior studies, for example Adiguzel (2013), Chandrasegaram et al. 
(2013), Felo et al. (2003), García et al. (2012), which found conflicting and 
insignificant associations between AC features and earnings management practices. 
Similarly, Haji-Abdullah and Wan-Hussin (2015) reported that AC features, including 
ACIND, ACSIZE, ACMEET, and ACEXPRT had a negative but insignificant 
association with real earnings management, suggesting that AC is an ineffective 
mechanism to mitigate real earnings management activities. However, this study 
employed a composite score for AC (ACSCORE), as corporate governance 
mechanisms are an interrelated system and become effective when combined rather 
than used in isolated practices (O’Sullivan et al., 2008). 
 
BIG4, FAMD, MOWN, and FOWN had results that are slightly similar with the main 
model except for the BIG4 was not significant in Model 2, but were significant at the 
5% level in Model (1) Model (3), and Model (4), as shown in Table 5.14. However, 
ESOSEXR in the entire models had insignificant and positive linkages with ABB, 
which is not the same line with the main analysis shown in Table 5.10. Finally, the 
results of control variables, FSIZE, AGROWTH, LEV, and CL were slightly similar 
to the main analysis presented in Table 5.10, whereby they kept the same directions of 




Panel OLS Regression of Accretive Buyback with Individual Attributes of Corporate Governance Mechanisms  
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Cof. P value Cof. P value Cof. P value Cof. P value 
Constant 9.03 0.000*** 8.60 0.000*** 9.09 0.000*** 9.07 0.000*** 
B_IND -0.66 0.513 -0.93 0.028**     
BSIZE 0.04 0.461 0.02 0.553     
BMEET 0.05 0.324 0.08 0.050**     
B_EXPRT 0.60 0.358 0.64 0.265     
ACIND -0.18 0.743   -0.36 0.094*   
ACSIZE -0.11 0.58   -0.04 0.795   
ACMEEET 0.08 0.282   0.12 0.05**   
ACEXPRT -0.01 0.969   0.12 0.723   
BIG4 0.24 0.087* 0.22 0.117 0.24 0.085* 0.24 0.083* 
FAMD -0.43 0.008*** -0.41 0.008*** -0.44 0.005*** -0.39 0.011** 
MOWN 0.02 0.969 0.05 0.905 -0.11 0.819 0.02 0.965 
FOWN 0.06 0.928 0.13 0.844 0.10 0.879 0.24 0.705 
ESOSEXR 8.61 0.162 8.73 0.153 8.15 0.183 9.91 0.103 
FSIZE 0.30 0.000*** 0.32 0.000*** 0.30 0.000*** 0.31 0.000*** 
AGROWTH -0.47 0.041** -0.47 0.041** -0.46 0.043*** -0.54 0.016** 
LEV -0.94 0.047** -0.95 0.038** -0.81 0.065* -0.85 0.049** 
CL 0.80 0.162 0.68 0.224 1.03 0.069* 0.86 0.123 
Years included  included  included  included  
R2 0.42  0.42  0.41  0.39 
Sig  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
N of observations  235  235  235  235 
N of Firms 101  101  101  101 
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels respectively at two-tailed. ABB = logarithm of number of accretive share 
buyback, BDIND = BOD independence, BDSIZE = BOD size, BDMEET = frequency of BOD meetings, BDEXPERT = BOD financial expertise, ACIND = AC 
independence, ACSIZE = AC size, ACMEET = frequency of AC meetings, ACEXPERT = AC’s financial expertise, BIG4 = audit quality, FAMD = family controlled 
firms, MOWN = managerial ownership, FOWN = foreign ownership, ESOSEXR = stock options exercised, FSIZE = firm size, AGROWTH = rate of assets growth, 
LEV= Leverage, and CL = cash level
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5.6 Summary  
This study investigates the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms 
and stock options with accretive share buybacks in the Malaysian context. The 
governance mechanisms include the effectiveness of the BOD and AC, audit quality, 
family ownership, managerial ownership, and foreign ownership. The natural 
logarithm of accretive buyback numbers was used to proxy accretive buyback actions. 
The sample of this study focused on Malaysian listed firms practising accretive 
buyback activities from 2010 to 2015. Unbalanced panel regression was estimated for 
the study’s model due to the control of uncensored observations as mentioned before. 
 
Seven hypotheses were developed to achieve the study’s objectives. H1 and H2 were 
utilised to investigate the association between the effectiveness of the BOD and AC 
and accretive share buyback actions respectively. The empirical findings support the 
second hypothesis H2 but they rejected H1. This could reflect the ineffective 
monitoring role of the BOD as a monitoring mechanism, whereas AC is effective 
governance mechanism to eliminate accretive buyback behaviours in the Malaysian 
context. Unlike a BOD, which is dominated by block shareholders, AC comprises non-
executive members who are less controlled by those block shareholders. Furthermore, 
H3 was related to the relationship between audit quality proxied by Big4 and accretive 
buyback actions. The outcomes supported the hypothesis and revealed a significant 
and positive association between them.  
 
Regarding examining the impact of ownership structure on accretive buyback actions, 
three hypotheses (H4, H5, and H6) were used. H4 for family shareholding and 
accretive buyback was supported. While managerial ownership H5 and foreign 
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ownership H6 were rejected. These findings reported that firms with concentrated 
family groups are more likely to engage in accretive buybacks to manage EPS. 
However, managerial and foreign shareholdings do not have sufficient evidence for 
their association with accretive buyback actions. Foreign ownership of the sample 
firms was on average only 7.5% of the outstanding shares, which is a small fraction to 
make a difference in the decisions of management, especially, in emerging market with 
highly concentrated ownership like Malaysia. 
 
With respect to the influence of employee stock options on the accretive share 
buyback, H7 was supported. This means that firms with more stock options for 
employee and executives are more likely to engage in accretive buyback actions, 
which is consistent with the stock options hypothesis that predicted that the more stock 
options held by management, the more is the incentive to undertake earnings 
management. Further, additional analyses were discussed in Section 5.6, which 









6 CHAPTER SIX  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
6.0 Overview of the Chapter 
This chapter reviews the findings of the study and discusses the main contributions 
and limitations of the research with some suggestions for future research. Section 6.1 
provides an overview of the study and findings. The potential implications of the study 
are addressed in Section 6.2. This chapter also discusses the limitations that were 
encountered conducting this study in Section 6.3. The chapter then provides 
suggestions for future research in Section 6.4. Finally, Section 6.5 discusses the 
conclusion of this chapter. 
 
6.1 Summary of the Study 
The existing literature reveals that managers manipulate real activities of firms to 
manage earnings threshold (Cohen et al., 2008; Roychowdhury, 2006; Sun et al., 
2014). Managers have started using share buyback programs as a mechanism for real 
earnings management (Burnett et al., 2012; Farrell et al., 2013; Hribar et al., 2006). 
Accretive share buybacks cause an increase in EPS by decreasing the number of 
outstanding shares, which represent the denominator of EPS calculation. Managers 
engage in earnings management through real economic activities to match specific 
earnings targets rather than to increase firm performance in the long term 
(Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008). Earnings management actions hide 
economic and financial information of firms, which may negatively affect the quality 
of financial reporting and mislead current and potential investors. 
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From the viewpoints of agency theory and resource dependence theory, corporate 
governance mechanisms can mitigate the manipulative actions of firm managers 
(Dhaliwal et al., 2010; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Hillman et al., 2009). Effective 
corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to decrease agency conflicts in 
firms (Pergola & Joseph, 2011; Song & Windram, 2004). The existing literature 
provides evidence that effective corporate governance mechanisms mitigate earnings 
management practices (Al-rassas and Kamardin, 2016; Habbash, 2012; Klein, 2002; 
Soliman & Ragab, 2014). Corporate governance may protect investors’ rights by 
providing precise and fair information on firm activities (Abdul Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
Hence, effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to mitigate 
practices of earnings management, which, in turn, protect investors from misleading 
financial information.  
 
With respect to accretive share buybacks, Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren et al. 
(2015) found a significant association between some mechanisms of corporate 
governance, including the BOD features and managerial ownership, with real earnings 
management through an accretive share buyback. This study also investigates the 
influence of BOD effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality, family ownership, 
managerial ownership, foreign ownership and employee stock options on accretive 
share buybacks as a tool to manage earnings. The sample of this study was drawn from 
101 (235 observations) non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia over 6 years from 
2010 to 2015. The quantitative method was used by this study to examine the seven 
hypotheses of this study. The statistical method employed was random effects OLS 
regression to examine the impacts of corporate governance mechanisms and ESOS on 
accretive share buybacks. 
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The findings of the influence of BOD effectiveness on accretive share buybacks were 
positively significant, which was not expected. This result is contrary to the views of 
agency theory and resource dependency theory, which argue that a BOD with more 
independent directors, a large size, more frequent meetings and more financial expert 
members will be an effective BOD in mitigating agency problem in firms, and then 
lessen the practice of earnings management. This result can be justified by the fact that 
a BOD is dominated by large shareholders such as family and individual majority 
shareholders because they hold a majority of rights and votes in firms. This means that 
majority shareholders may utilise the resources of a firm to become involved in 
accretive share buyback to achieve their interests at the expense of minority 
shareholders.  
 
This finding is consistent with the argument assuming that weakness of BOD in 
mitigating earnings management is related to the domination of majority shareholders 
such as family members. Also, the lack of skills and experience by independent 
directors is another reason because they perform as a "rubber stamp" rather as 
enforcers. Generally, these findings suggest that the majority shareholders of firms 
listed on the Bursa Malaysia practice entrenchment actions through accretive share 
buybacks to achieve personal benefits. This means that the composition and 
competency of the BOD as suggested by the current MCCG in Malaysia is inadequate 
to monitor earnings management practices, which require more improvement and 
reinforcement via the independence and financial expertise of BOD.  
 
These findings support the policies of the new code of corporate governance MCCG 
2017, which tries to limit the powers of majority shareholders who hold more than 
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33% of a firm’s equity. MCCG 2017 states that those controlling shareholders cannot 
decide on the appointment of independent directors alone. This new code identifies a 
two-tier voting system to assign independent directors, in which minority shareholders 
under this system will have the same power as the majority shareholders in the election 
of independent directors. With respect to the tenure of service of independent directors, 
MCCG 2017 recommends that the tenure of independent directors should not exceed 
nine years on the BOD. However, the annual two-tier voting process should be adapted 
so that the tenure could be extended to a maximum of twelve years. The two-tier voting 
process gives the same voting power to majority and minority shareholders, which 
may improve the monitoring role of independent directors.  
 
With regards to AC effectiveness, this study hypothesizes a negative relationship 
between AC effectiveness and accretive share buybacks. The AC was found as 
expected to affect accretive share buybacks negatively. This means that an AC with 
more independent members, a larger size, more frequent meetings, and more financial 
expertise is considered to be an effective AC in mitigating the use of accretive share 
buybacks to manage earnings. This result shows that an effective AC can play a vital 
role in mitigating practices of earnings management, which may hide accurate 
financial information that misleads potential and current investors of firms. This result 
is consistent with the arguments of agency theory and resource dependency theory, 
which predict an effective role for an AC in restricting earnings management activities.  
 
Furthermore, this result is along same line with the orientation of Malaysian regulators 
through MCCG 2012 and BMLRs to improve the monitoring functions of AC over 
financial reporting quality. These findings are along the same line with the new 
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policies of MCCG 2017 that support the strength of independence of the AC. MCCG 
2017 recommends that firm ACs should contain only independent directors.  
 
This study hypothesizes that audit quality (Big 4 auditors) are likely to engage in 
accretive share buyback activities. Similarly, the findings of this study show a 
significant and positive association between audit quality (BIG4) and accretive share 
buybacks. This result means that Big 4 auditors were competent enough to detect and 
prevent practices of accruals based earnings management thus managers tend to 
practice earnings management through accretive share buybacks, which may be less 
possibility to detect by external auditors. This argument is consistent with the findings 
of Chandren et al. (2015) who found a positive association between Big 4 auditors and 
real earnings management by accretive share buybacks. They justified the positive 
relationship between Big 4 audit firms and accretive share buyback as the real 
activities manipulation through accretive share buybacks was not easily detectable by 
auditors. 
 
These findings are consistent with MCCG 2012, which states that an AC should have 
guidelines and ability to assess the independence and suitability of external auditors. 
This procedure promotes improving the role of external auditors in mitigating 
accretive buyback as a method to manage EPS. Consistently, the results support the 
procedures of MCCG 2017 that aim to enhance the independence and objectivity of 
external auditors. MCCG 2017 gives AC the responsibility to perform the processes 
for evaluating the objectivity, independence, and suitability of the external auditor. 
These policies may assist to enhance and reinforce the role of external auditors in 




Regarding ownership structure, this study examined three classifications of ownership, 
namely, family, managerial, and foreign ownership. The study predicts that firms with 
family-owned ownership would be significantly associated with undertaking accretive 
share buyback to manage EPS. Family members may use their power to align the 
interests of controlling shareholders and minority shareholders to protect their firm’s 
reputation. Consistently, the findings of this study revealed a significant and negative 
association between family-owned firms and accretive share buyback. This result 
supports the alignment hypothesis, which proposed that when the ownership is 
concentrated by family groups, they might control the decisions of management 
decisions to employee firms’ resources in line with the interests of firm’s shareholders. 
This argument is consistent with agency theory that assumes that insiders’ 
shareholding may assist in mitigating the agency problem between management and 
shareholders of firms.  
 
The outcomes of this study suggest that family members practice alignment actions 
and save interests of outside shareholders, which indicates that the family ownership 
is an active mechanism of corporate governance that monitor or prevent managers 
from undertaking earnings management practices. Thus, the oversight bodies and 
regulations in Malaysia should be revised and reinforced to augment corporate 
governance regulations, particularly the BOD and its sub-committees to enhance their 
effectiveness in mitigating entrenchment actions of firm’s managers. 
 
 Consistently, the new rules of MCCG 2017 may limit the effect of majority 
shareholders, family members and individuals who hold not less than 33% of a firm’s 
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shares by recommending a two-tier voting system to assign independent directors as 
mentioned before. By means of this system, the majority shareholders do not have the 
ability to appoint independent directors exclusively because to the voting authority is 
distributed between majority and minority correspondingly. These rules are more 
likely to provide more power to independent directors to be an effective monitoring 
mechanism, which may reduce the entrenchment behaviours of family managers and 
then mitigate earnings management practices, particularly accretive share buybacks.  
 
With respect to managerial ownership, this study also relies on the two conflict views 
of agency theory (type I and type II) and predicts that firms with high managerial 
shareholdings are significantly related to accretive share buybacks as a tool for 
managing EPS. The results indicated a positive relationship but insignificant 
relationship between managerial ownership and accretive share buybacks. This result 
is slightly consistent with the views of agency theory (type II), which predicts 
entrenchment actions for managers who held a high level of the firm’s equity. This 
finding means that managers who held a high percentage of firm shares slightly engage 
in accretive share buybacks to manage EPS.  
 
Regarding foreign ownership, this study hypothesizes that the more firm’s shares held 
by foreign investors, the less real earnings management through accretive share 
buybacks will occur. The results, however, revealed an insignificant relationship 
between foreign shareholdings and accretive share buyback. This finding is not 
consistent with the argument predicts that the superior knowledge and skills of foreign 
investors are likely to support the restriction of earnings management through real 
activities such as accretive share buybacks. This unexpected result can be justified by 
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that the percentage of foreign ownership is small of 7.5%, which is not enough to make 
a change in management decisions particularly in an emerging market with highly 
concentrated ownership like Malaysia. 
 
Finally, this study proposes that the more stock options exercised by employees and 
executives the more likely a firm is to use accretive share buyback to manage earnings. 
Practically, this study’s findings document a significant association between the 
percentage of stock options exercised by executives and employee and accretive share 
buyback activities. This result is consistent with the hypothesis of employee stock 
options that predicts firms may engage in share buyback activities to avoid a dilution 
in EPS caused by the exercise of stock options. Executives who hold a high percentage 
of stock options have more incentives to manage earnings to match earnings targets. 
This finding provides evidence that managers use accretive share buyback to enhance 
EPS and increasing share prices to gain benefits from the exercise of stock options. 
Table 6.1 summarizes the findings of the current study’s hypotheses. 
 
Table 6.1  
Summary of the Study Main Model’s Findings 
No. Hypothesis Findings 
H1 
There is a negative association between the BOD 
effectiveness and accretive share buyback as a mechanism 




There is a negative relationship between of AC 
effectiveness and accretive share buyback as a mechanism 
for real earnings management. 
Supported  
H3 
There is a significant relationship between audit quality 




There is a significant association between family 
ownership and accretive share buyback as a mechanism 





There is a significant association between managerial 
ownership and accretive share buyback as a mechanism 
for real earnings management. 
Rejected  
H6 
There is a negative relationship between foreign owne  




There is a positive relationship between employee stock 
options and accretive share buyback as a mechanism for 
real earnings management. 
Supported  
 
6.2 Implications of the Study  
The current study has several theoretical, practical and academic implications, which 
are discussed in the following sub-sections. 
 
6.2.1 Theoretical Implications  
The existing literature investigates the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and earnings management either by accruals or real earnings 
management. Most of the previous literature has applied to developed countries where 
the ownership is widespread, and there is real separation among shareholdings and 
management, which, in turn, creates traditional agency problem between them. With 
regards to accretive share buyback as a mechanism for real earnings management, this 
study contributes to the literature in the fields of corporate governance and earnings 
management in several important ways; 
 
 First, drawn from agency theory and resource dependence theory, this study extends 
studies of Farrell et al. (2013) and Chandren et al. (2015) by examining further 
corporate governance mechanisms including AC effectiveness, audit quality, family 
ownership, managerial ownership, and foreign ownership to identify their association 
Table 6.1 (continued) 
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with accretive share buybacks. Second, this study is also different from those previous 
studies by examining BOD effectiveness as a composite score rather than as individual 
features to examine their effect on accretive share buybacks. Third, drawn from the 
stock option hypothesis, this study investigates the impact of employee stock options 
on accretive share buybacks. 
 
With respect to the BOD effectiveness, the findings of this study show a positive 
association between the BOD effectiveness and accretive share buybacks. This study 
failed to find evidence that the BOD is a key internal mechanism of corporate 
governance that can mitigate real earnings management practices through accretive 
share buybacks. These findings may reflect the domination of controlling shareholders 
over the BOD to exploit some firm resources to achieve their benefits at the expense 
of minority shareholders. These outcomes reveal the negative role of concentrated 
ownership in the rationality of the BOD decisions. These findings highlight further 
understandings for the agency problem in an emerging market, which is generated 
between the majority and minority shareholders rather than the classic agency problem 
between management and shareholders. 
 
With regard to AC effectiveness, the study’s findings reveal a significant and negative 
relationship between the effectiveness of AC and accretive share buyback activities. 
These findings are consistent with the arguments of agency theory and resource 
dependency theory proposing that the more effective an AC, the less earnings 
management activities are practiced. Therefore, these outcomes highlight the MCCG 
2012 recommendations, which state that the AC has the primary responsibility for the 
quality of financial reporting. Collectively, this study hopes that the empirical findings 
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contribute to improving the knowledge and skills of monitoring agents over managers’ 
actions relating to accretive share buybacks and to clarify the role played by the AC as 
internal governance mechanism responsible for financial reporting quality. 
 
Drawn from agency theory, this study predicts that audit quality (Big 4 auditors) may 
mitigate accretive share buybacks. However, the findings document an effective role 
for Big 4 auditors in alleviating the use of accretive share buybacks to manage 
earnings, which power managers to involve in earnings manipulations through real 
activities such as accretive buybacks. These findings highlight the argument that 
auditors need more understand on real earrings management techniques that not early 
detected compared to accruals based earnings management.  In other words, Big 4 
auditors still have weak awareness of the use of accretive buybacks to manage earnings 
management. MCCG 2012 stated that the AC has the responsibility to assess the 
independence and suitability of external auditors. This study hopes that external 
auditors become more knowledgeable and develop more skills to understand and 
detect the opportunistic actions of managers such as involving accretive buyback as a 
method to manage EPS.  
 
For the relationship between ownership structure and accretive share buyback 
activities, the current study extends the existing literature using agency theory to 
examine the impact of family ownership on accretive share buyback as tools for the 
practice of real earnings management. The results of the main model show that family-
owned firms are negatively associated with accretive share buyback. This finding 
supports the argument of the alignment hypothesis predicting that family members are 
less likely to exploit a firm’s resources to achieve their own benefits at the expense of 
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minority shareholders. These findings highlight a positive role of family members in 
the rationality of management’s decisions, which  mitigate the agency problem that 
occurs in a situation between the management and shareholders in which managers 
may use their authority to expropriate the interests of shareholders. 
 
In terms of managerial ownership, this study extends the literature by using agency 
theory to explain the role of managerial shareholdings in restricting accretive share 
buybacks. However, the result does not support the prediction of the agency theory. 
The result reveals that managerial ownership has an insignificant and positive 
association with accretive share buybacks. Furthermore, this study explores the impact 
of foreign ownership on limiting accretive share buybacks. The study relies on the 
knowledge spillover hypothesis that predicts the superior knowledge of foreign 
investors relative to local investors may lead to mitigating real earnings management 
through accretive share buybacks.  
 
The results, however, reveal an insignificant association between foreign ownership 
and accretive share buyback. These outcomes highlight that foreign investors in 
themselves are not sufficient to accomplish the monitoring role in mitigating accretive 
share buybacks, as they do not have adequate voting power to make a substantial 
change in management decisions. Particularly, their monitoring functions become 
more difficult in firms with highly concentrated shareholdings.   
   
Finally, influence of employee stock options on accretive share buyback activities is a 
new debate in the field of using accretive buyback to manage earnings. Drawn from 
the stock options hypothesis, this study reports a significant and positive association 
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between stock options exercised and accretive share buyback. This finding is 
consistent with the notion proposing that the more stock options exercised by a firm’s 
executives and employee, the more accretive share buyback is used to manage reported 
EPS. Moreover, these results suggest a life cycle of earnings management wherein 
managers manage earnings upwards to increase the stock price and to pocket more 
benefits through the exercise of stock options. 
 
With regards to the measurement implications, this study also contributes to the 
literature of corporate governance by using different measures for effectiveness of the 
BOD and the AC. Unlike prior studies that depend on the individual characteristics of 
the BOD and the AC to measure their effectiveness, this study uses a composite 
measurement (SCORE) to measure the effectiveness of the BOD and AC. Following 
previous studies (Bin-Ghanem and Ariff, 2016; Chobpichien et al., 2008; Goh 2009; 
Johl et al., 2013; O'Sullivan et al., 2008; Srinidhi et al., 2014), this study utilizes four 
features (independence, size, frequent meetings and financial expertise) added together 
as a score to measure the effectiveness of the BOD and the AC. The use of the score 
technic as a measure is more likely to reduce the measurement error that occurred in 
the use of individual characteristics to represent specific mechanisms like a BOD or 
AC (Srinidhi et al., 2014).  
 
6.2.2 Practical and Policy Implications 
The current study is useful to policymakers, regulators and market participants in many 
ways. First, the findings of this study imply that regulatory agencies and investors 
should pay more attention to monitoring share buybacks. Managers are more likely to 
use an accretive share buyback to manage reported EPS, especially when systems of 
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corporate governance and investor protections need to be upgraded. Accretive share 
buybacks as a mechanism for real earnings management have negative consequences 
on a firm’s image. Furthermore, firms face substantial opportunity costs as they spend 
valuable resources in undertaking an accretive share buyback, which could be invested 
in profitable projects that increase firms value over the long-run.  
 
Second, the outcomes of this study inform the policymakers and regulators regarding 
the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms. More precisely, the findings 
show that a substantial role of the AC is necessary for restricting managers from using 
accretive share buybacks to practice earnings management. These results can support 
policymakers and regulatory agencies in their drive to reinforce and enhance the 
independence of the BOD room and its sub-committees.  
 
The results show an ineffective role for the BOD effectiveness in constraining earnings 
management through accretive share buyback activities. This result should draw the 
attention of the policymakers, regulators and investors to the negative impacts of 
controlling shareholders on the effectiveness of the BOD because they dominate the 
management decisions for their interests at the expense of minority shareholders. 
These highlight that regulatory bodies and policy makers should boost the ability of 
internal governance to provide a balance of power inside the BOD and on its 
committees. They should revise the composition of the BOD and focus on the quality 
of outside directors in terms of their skills in financial, auditing and legal fields. 
 
Third, this study documents that family-owned firms are less likely to engage in real 
earnings management through accretive share buybacks. This study’s findings 
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highlight valued implications for policymakers, regulators and investors regarding the 
monitoring role of family members. They are less involved in accretive share buybacks 
to manage reported EPS, which, in turn, leads to help current and potential external 
investors to make the right decisions. These results hence provide the need to enhance 
and reinforce corporate governance mechanisms, especially internal mechanisms, to 
confirm the integrity of financial reporting. These findings may offer informative 
indicators to regulators and policymakers developing a new code on corporate 
governance to limit the opportunistic influence of controlling shareholders and 
enhance the enforcement role of the BOD and the AC. These imply that the application 
of effective governance mechanisms is required to consider local peculiarities and 
business environment by regulatory bodies and policymakers. 
 
Finally, the findings of this study provide evidence that accretive share buybacks as a 
tool to earnings management is positively associated with the stock options exercised. 
This result informs regulators, policymakers and investors that managers may engage 
in accretive share buybacks to substitute for decline in EPS caused by exercised stock 
options. These findings highlight the importance of updating regulations and roles 
related to exercised stock options as well as to enhancing corporate governance to 
prevent the use of accretive share buyback for earnings management purposes and then 
mislead investors. 
 
6.2.3 Academic Implications 
To academia and researchers, previous studies such as Cohen et al. (2008) and 
Roychowdhury (2006) documented a considerable decline in accruals based-earnings 
management activities, as managers instead focused on using real activities to manage 
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earnings. Previous studies have provided evidence that managers involve in accretive 
share buyback as a tool to EPS (Hribar et al., 2006; Burrnett et al., 2012, Chandren & 
Nadarajan, 2013). This study also documents that firms listed on the Bursa Malaysia 
engage in accretive share buyback to manage EPS. The findings of this study could be 
useful to scholars who study corporate governance and accretive share buybacks as a 
mechanism for real earnings management in several ways;  
 
First, the current study provides insights on how mechanisms of corporate governance 
could play a vital role in mitigating real earnings management through accretive share 
buybacks. Instead of focusing on the individual features of corporate governance 
mechanisms, this study provides evidence that corporate governance mechanisms, as 
a score (effectiveness of the BOD and AC), can influence several factors in the 
environment of firms, which, in turn, highlights the extended use of the agency theory. 
Thus, the results of this study could inspire scholars to explore other associations in 
other markets in the future. 
 
Second, the Malaysian market has unique features such as highly concentrated 
ownership, family-controlled firms and government-linked firms. This study provides 
empirical evidence that shows how family-owned firms are significantly encouraged 
to be involved in accretive share buyback to manage EPS. Thus, further researchers 
could conduct studies focusing more on those characteristics of ownership structure 
and their association with accretive share buyback activities and other dependent 




Finally, this study also provides evidence related to the impact of exercised stock 
options on accretive buyback activities. However, academic researchers can focus 
more on other features of stock options such as stock options grants, exercisable and 
non-exercisable and outstanding shares either based on RM value or the number of 
shares.   
 
6.3 Limitations of the Study  
Similar to other studies, the current study has several limitations that should be 
mentioned to confirm that the study’s results are reasonably interpreted; 
1. One limitation of this study regards the features of the BOD and the AC. This study 
focusses only on specific features, namely, independence, size, meeting and 
financial expertise. However, other influential features of the BOD and the AC are 
omitted, like experience in law, serving tenure, ethnicity and so on. 
2. Many dimensions such as audit fees, non-audit fees and auditors’ speciality can be 
used to measure audit quality. Whereas, the current study uses only Big 4 audit 
firms to measure audit quality.  
3. This study focuses only on family, managerial and foreign ownership. However, 
other relevant classifications for ownership structure exist such as institutional and 
government-related ownership as well as ownership concentration that were not 
considered this study. 
4. Employee stock options schemes may focus on other aspects of stock options such 
as grants and outstanding (exercisable and non-exercisable), either based on RM 




5. This study covers only the six years from 2010 to 2015, which may not be 
generalizable for other periods. 
6. Using a quantitative approach to achieve the objectives of this study may be 
considered another limitation. A qualitative approach could be used to investigate 
further features of directors serving on the BOD and its committees such as the 
personal-social relationship among the BODs’ members. 
 
6.4 Future Research  
The above limitations highlight a platform for the enhancement of corporate 
governance regime and earnings management studies. Future studies could extend the 
current study in several areas as follows:  
1. Although this study was conducted to provide an insight into the role of corporate 
governance mechanisms and employee stock options in constraining accretive 
share buyback activities among non-financial Malaysian firms, future researchers 
may further explore this role for financial firms. In addition, future studies could 
be extended by replicating this study by using other time periods and markets. 
2. This study focuses on particular features of the BOD and the AC as mentioned 
before. Thus, future researchers could explore other features of the BOD, the AC 
and directors such as experience in auditing, law and ethnicity to examine their 
impacts on activities of accretive share buybacks. Additionally, they might 
examine the association between the internal audit function and accretive share 
buybacks.  
3. Future studies may explore other proxies of audit quality such as audit speciality, 
audit fees and non-audit fees. 
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4. Future researchers could investigate further classifications of the ownership 
structure such as government-linked, institutional, ownership concentration on 
accretive share buyback activities.  
5. Future studies may explore the influence of IFRS on accretive share buyback 
activities. 
6. This study uses a quantitative approach to conduct its objectives. Therefore, future 
researchers could use a qualitative approach to investigate in depth the impact of 
further effective features of the BOD and its committees as well as other internal 
governance mechanisms, on accretive share buyback activities.  
 
6.5 Summary 
Previous studies have provided evidence related to using share buyback programs as a 
tool for real earnings management. This study examines the influence of the BOD 
effectiveness, AC effectiveness, audit quality and ownership structure, namely, family, 
managerial and foreign ownership on real earnings management through accretive 
share buybacks. In addition, this current study investigates the effect of employee stock 
options on accretive buyback activities. The study provides evidence that BOD 
effectiveness is positively related to accretive share buyback activities. Whereas, AC 
effectiveness has a negative association with accretive share buyback activities, which 
means that an AC is an effective mechanism to constrain earnings management 
activities through an accretive share buyback. In addition, family-owned firms are less 
aggressive in practising accretive share buybacks relative to non-family firms. 
 
The MCCG 2000, 2007, 2012 and 2017 contributed to enhancing and reinforcing 
corporate governance mechanisms to protect the firms and investors. The findings of 
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this study contribute to an understanding that the effectiveness of the BOD and the AC 
as key internal governance mechanisms should be enhanced to provide a positive 
synergistic effect between the two groups to mitigate earnings management practices, 
particularly using accretive share buybacks to manage reported EPS. This may assist 
in improving the quality of financial reporting and then protecting potential and current 
investors of firms. Furthermore, exercised employee stock options are positively 
related to accretive share buybacks. Finally, this study hopes that these outcomes 
provide a reference point for various parties such as policymakers, standard setters, 
regulations bodies, and market participants, who have incentives to improve the 
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List of Accretive Share Buyback Firms 
Firm Name Sector  
ACME HOLDINGS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADV PACKAGING TECH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADVANCE INF MKTG TRADING/SERVICES 
ANALABS TRADING/SERVICES 
ASIAMET EDUCATION  TRADING/SERVICES 
ASTINO BERHAD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ATLAN HOLDINGS BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ATTA GLOBAL  INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
BATU KAWAN BERHAD PLANTATION 
BENALEC HOLDINGS BHD CONSTRUCTION 
BERJAYA CORP TRADING/SERVICES 
BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO TRADING/SERVICES 
BREM HOLDING BERHAD CONSTRUCTION 
BSL CORP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
CAHYA MATA SARAWAK INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
CAM RESOURCES BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
CB IND PRODUCT HLDGS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
CCK CONSOL CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
CENTURY LOGISTICS TRADING/SERVICES 
CEPATWAWASAN GRP PLANTATION 
CHEETAH HOLDINGS BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
CYMAO HOLDINGS BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
DAIBOCHI PLASTIC INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
DAIMAN DEVELOPMENT PROPERTIES 
DAYA MATERIALS BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
DELLOYD VENTURES BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
DIGISTAR CORP BHD TECHNOLOGY 
EASTERN & ORIENTAL PROPERTIES 
ENGTEX GROUP BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
EONMETALL GRP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
EP MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
FAJARBARU BUILD CONSTRUCTION 
FITTERS DIVERSIFIED TRADING/SERVICES 
GLOMAC BHD PROPERTIES 
GOLDEN LAND BERHAD PLANTATION 
GOLDIS BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
GRAND-FLO BHD TECHNOLOGY 
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Firm Name Sector  
ACME HOLDINGS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADV PACKAGING TECH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADVANCE INF MKTG TRADING/SERVICES 
GUH HOLDINGS BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
HAI-O ENTERPRISE BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
HAP SENG CONSOLIDATE TRADING/SERVICES 
HUAT LAI RESOURCES CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
HUNZA PROPERTIES BHD PROPERTIES 
IGB CORPORATION BHD PROPERTIES 
INCH KENNETH KAJANG PLANTATION 
INTEGRATED LOGISTICS TRADING/SERVICES 
IOI CORPORATION BHD PLANTATION 
JAYCORP BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
JOBSTREET CORP BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
KEN HOLDINGS BERHAD CONSTRUCTION 
KNM GROUP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
KPJ HEALTHCARE BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
KULIM (MALAYSIA) BHD PLANTATION 
KUMPULAN H & L INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
LBI CAPITAL BHD PROPERTIES 
LBS BINA GROUP BHD PROPERTIES 
LIEN HOE CORPORATION PROPERTIES 
M3 TECH TECHNOLOGY 
MEDA INCORPORATED PROPERTIES 
MEGA FIRST CORP TRADING/SERVICES 
MQ TECHNOLOGY BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
MTOUCHE TECH BHD TECHNOLOGY 
MUDAJAYA GROUP BHD CONSTRUCTION 
MULPHA INTERNATIONAL TRADING/SERVICES 
N2N CONNECT BERHAD TECHNOLOGY 
NOTION VTEC BERHAD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
NTPM HOLDINGS BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
ORNAPAPER BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
OSK PROPERTY HLDGS PROPERTIES 
PARKSON HOLDINGS TRADING/SERVICES 
PELANGI PUBLISHING INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
PELIKAN INT'L CORP CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
PERMAJU INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
PJ DEVELOPMENT HLDGS PROPERTIES 
POH HUAT RES HLDGS CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
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Firm Name Sector  
ACME HOLDINGS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADV PACKAGING TECH INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
ADVANCE INF MKTG TRADING/SERVICES 
PROTASCO BHD CONSTRUCTION 
PW CONSOLIDATED BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
RALCO CORP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
REXIT BERHAD TECHNOLOGY 
SCANWOLF CORP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
SEG INTERNATIONAL TRADING/SERVICES 
SMRT HOLDINGS BHD TECHNOLOGY 
SUCCESS TRANSFORMER INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
SUNWAY BHD  PROPERTIES 
SUPERLON HOLDINGS INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
SYMPHONY LIFE BHD PROPERTIES 
TAS OFFSHORE  INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
TASEK CORPORATION INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
TEKALA CORP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
TONG HERR RES INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
TROPICANA CORP PROPERTIES 
UMS-NEIKEN GROUP BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
UNIMECH GROUP BHD TRADING/SERVICES 
UPA CORP BHD CONSUMER PRODUCTS 
WAH SEONG CORP INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
WCT HOLDINGS BHD  CONSTRUCTION 
WILLOWGLEN MSC BHD TECHNOLOGY 
YI-LAI BHD INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
YNH PROPERTY BHD PROPERTIES 
YOKOHAMA INDUSTRIES INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS 
YTL CORPORATION BERHAD CONSTRUCTION 
YTL POWER INT'L BHD IPC 
 
